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REED 1. T AYLOR, a single person, ) 
) 
Counterdefendant. ) 
AIA Services Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc. (collectively, "AIA"), by and through 
their counsel of record, Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP ("Hawley Troxell"), submit this 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff Reed Taylor's Motion to Disqualify the Attorneys and 
Law Firms of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP; Clements, Brown & McNichols, P.A.; and 
Quarles & Brady LLP ("DQ Motion"). This Memorandum is supported by the Affidavits of 
John A. Strait, loLee Duclos, Gary D. Babbitt, Richard A. Riley and Patrick V. Collins, and the 
Exhibits thereto. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
After sixteen months of threats to disqualify Hawley Troxell, Plaintiff has finally filed a 
Motion to Disqualify Hawley Troxell (as well as all other defense counsel except David Gittins), 
but not before first: (1) threatening to file a separate malpractice action against Hawley Troxell 
and to deliver a copy of the complaint to the Idaho State Bar if the law firm did not voluntarily 
withdraw (Affidavit of Gary D. Babbitt ["Babbitt Aff."J Exs. 3 and 4); (2) as a precursor to 
commencement of a supposedly derivative malpractice action against Hawley Troxell, engaging 
co-counsel to deliver to the directors of Hawley Troxell's clients, AIA Services Corporation and 
AIA Insurance, a demand that the corporations sue their lawyers (Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond 
in Support of Reed Taylor's Motion to Disqualify, etc. ["Bond Aff."J Ex. 16); and (3) filing a 
separate lawsuit alleging supposedly direct claims against Hawley Troxell related to its defense 
of the AIA entities in this litigation (Bond Aff. Ex. 38). Plaintiffs motion to disqualify counsel 
is one manifestation of a concerted scheme to manufacture conflicts of interest between Hawley 
Troxell and its clients in order to gain an unfair and unconscionable advantage in this litigation. 
It is an abuse of the judicial process and the spirit of Rules 3.1, 3.4 and 4.4 of the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct. 
Hawley Troxell undertook its representation of Defendants AIA Services Corporation 
and its wholly-owned subsidiary, AIA Insurance, Inc., and later agreed to act as local counsel for 
Defendant Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. based on its assessment that these Defendants 
share a common interest in presenting a united front to oppose Plaintiffs claims and the relief he 
seeks against all of them, jointly and severally, and in controlling litigation costs that AIA is 
obligated to advance to the individual Defendants. Hawley Troxell's clients have a common 
tJt7'L. 
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interest in defending against the shotgun claims Plaintiff has asserted indiscriminantly against 
them and have common defenses to most, if not all, of these claims. 
Disqualification at this late date would result in severe prejudice to the corporate 
Defendants and the possible loss of meritorious defenses. It would be extremely difficult, if not 
impossible, for the corporate Defendants to hire new counsel. Moreover, any new counsel, even 
separate counsel for each corporate Defendant, would face the prospect of being sued if Plaintiff 
did not consent to their appointment. 
For the reasons articulated in the Affidavit of John A. Strait and in this Memorandum, 
there is no basis whatsoever for disqualification of Hawley Troxell under the circumstances of its 
representation of the corporate Defendants in this case. In particular (but without limitation): 
o Plaintiffs motion to disqualify Hawley Troxell is untimely and brought at this 
late time for tactical purposes. 
o Reed Taylor is not a creditor, but a former shareholder to whom redemption 
payments are restricted by statute and AIA Services' articles of incorporation. 
o Hawley Troxell represents only the corporate Defendants and not, either directly 
or indirectly through the Joint Defense Agreement, any of the individual Director 
Defendants. 
o All claims between or among the Defendants have been tolled and preserved 
pending the outcome of the defense of this case. 
o The Defendants share a common interest in defending Plaintiff s claim. 
Accordingly, the Defendants are legally entitled to enter into the joint defense 
agreement; and Hawley Troxell's participation in the agreement does not violate 
any applicable legal or ethical rules 
Plaintiffs Amended Motion to Disqualify Hawley Troxell should be dismissed. 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff appears to be using the DQ Motion as a forum for repeating his allegations 
against the Defendants, rather than focusing on issues relating to counsel's role. As a result, 
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Plaintiffs motion to disqualify counsel and the supporting Bond Affidavit l are replete with 
inaccurate allegations of unproven (and unprovable) "fact", intermixed with unsubstantiated 
opinions and erroneous legal conclusions of Plaintiffs counsel, many or most of which are 
irrelevant to Plaintiffs motion to disqualify Hawley Troxell. Insofar as relevant to Plaintiffs 
allegations in this case, Hawley Troxell's role has been limited to representation of the corporate 
Defendants in the defense of Plaintiffs lawsuit, issuing an opinion letter that had no effect on 
Plaintiffs alleged rights, and documenting a transaction that merely permitted AIA Services to 
pay its legal bills without impairing Plaintiff s alleged security interest in certain collateral. 
The following recitation of facts is limited to those facts pertinent to the motion to 
disqualify Hawley Troxell. That this Memorandum does not address certain of Plaintiffs or his 
counsel's allegations of fact or conclusions of law should not be construed as tacit admission of 
their accuracy or correctness. 
A. 1995 And 1996 AlA Services Stock Redemption Transactions. 
The original Stock Redemption Agreement between AIA Services and Reed Taylor was 
signed as of July 22, 1995. Section 2.5 of the Agreement contemplated that the $1.5 million cash 
Downpayment would be delivered at Closing. However, AIA Services did not have the cash 
available for that purpose; and the parties executed an Addendum to Stock Redemption 
Agreement, also as of July 22, 1995, providing for a short term Downpayment Note in the 
1 Mr. Bond's Affidavit is fraught with supposed "facts" of which he cannot possibly have personal 
knowledge, as well as opinions and conclusions of law not properly includable in an affidavit. As a 
direct result, the opinions proffered by Plaintiffs experts, being expressly based on Mr. Bond's 
Affidavit and discussions with Mr. Bond concerning his opinions about the case, are entitled to little 
weight because their conclusions are premised on erroneous assumptions. 
3q74 
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amount of $1.5 million payable within 90 days of the execution of the Addendum. Closing 
occurred on or about August 15, 1995. 
At the time of the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement between AlA Services and Reed 
Taylor, AIA Services hoped to raise in excess of$7 million through a private placement of its 
Series B preferred stock and warrants. This anticipated private placement and the stock 
redemption agreement with Reed were submitted to the shareholders of AlA Services for 
approval and were approved at a shareholder meeting held in March 1995. Affidavit of JoLee 
Duclos ("Duclos Aff.") Exs. 1,2 and 3. 
In connection with the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement, in which Reed Taylor was 
represented by a Seattle law firm (Cairncross Hempelmann), the law firm of Eberle Berlin 
Kading Turnbow & McKlveen, Chtd. ("Eberle Berlin") rendered an opinion dated August 15, 
1995 addressed to Reed Taylor. Bond Aff. Ex. 2. At that time, Richard A. Riley, now a lawyer 
with Hawley Troxell, was a shareholder of Eberle Berlin and worked on the AlA Services stock 
redemption transaction. The opinion was given by the law firm, not by any individual attorney 
in the firm. Affidavit of Richard A. Riley ("Riley Aff.") '2. 
The anticipated private placement of Series B preferred stock and warrants to raise 
capital was unsuccessful; and AIA Services was unable to pay the Downpayment Note when due 
or to make payments on the $6 million note. Duclos Aff. Ex. 4. In April and June 1996, Reed 
Taylor gave AlA Services formal written notice of default, including failure to pay the 
Downpayment Note or to pay the interest on the $6M Note. Bond Aff. Ex. 3 , D. The entire 
transaction was restructured as of July 1, 1996; and the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure 
Agreement and related agreements replaced and superseded the 1995 Stock Redemption 
!J175 
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Agreement and related agreements in their entirety. Bond Aff. Ex. 3 ~ G. Eberle Berlin did not 
render an opinion in connection with the restructured 1996 obligations. Riley Aff. ~ 3. 
B. 1999-2000: Organization Of CropUSA. 
According to the records of the Idaho Secretary of State, Crop USA Insurance Agency, 
Inc. ("CropUSA") was originally incorporated under the name AIA Crop Insurance, Inc. in 
November 1999. Hawley Troxell was not engaged to render, and did not provide, any legal 
services or other assistance in connection with the formation, ownership structure, governance or 
start up of CropUSA. In particular (but without limitation) Hawley Troxell was not engaged to 
provide, and did not provide, any advice or other legal services or other assistance concerning 
the issuance of Crop USA common stock to the AlA Services Corporation Series C Preferred 
Stockholders. Hawley Troxell was first engaged by CropUSA, in February 2001, to provide 
legal services in connection with a proposed Regulation A offering of Crop USA stock. At no 
time has Hawley Troxell been engaged to provide any advice or other legal services, and at no 
time has Hawley Troxell provided any legal advice or other legal services, to AIA Services, AIA 
Insurance, CropUSA or any other person concerning the allocation of or accounting for salaries, 
other expenses, employees, assets or other resources between or among AIA Services, AIA 
Insurance and/or CropUSA. Riley Aff. ~~ 6, 7. 
C. 2001 Parking Lot Purchase. 
The DQ Motion (p. 12) references transactions involving a parking lot purchased by John 
and Connie Taylor. Hawley Troxell was not engaged to provide and did not provide any legal 
services or other assistance to John or Connie Taylor, AIA Services, AIA Insurance, CropUSA 
or any other person in connection with any facet of this transaction. Riley Aff. ~ 8. 
?:i17(P 
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D. 2004 AlA Insurance Purchase Of AlA Services Stock From Crop USA. 
The DQ Motion (p. 4) references an August 2004 transaction in which AlA Insurance 
purchased from CropUSA shares of Series C Preferred Stock of AlA Services Corporation for 
$1,510,693. Hawley Troxell was not engaged to provide and did not provide any legal services 
or other assistance to AlA Services, AlA Insurance, CropUSA or any other person in connection 
with any facet of this transaction. In particular (but without limitation), Hawley Troxell was not 
engaged to advise any person in connection with the source of funding for the purchase, the 
effect (if any) of Reed's security interest in the commissions earned by AlA Insurance, or the 
accounting for this transaction. Riley Aff. , 9. 
E. Radio Station Transactions. 
The DQ Motion (p. 13) references transactions involving Pacific Empire Radio 
Corporation. Hawley Troxell was not engaged to provide and did not provide any legal services 
or other assistance to AlA Services, AlA Insurance, CropUSA or any other person in connection 
with any facet of any transaction involving Pacific Empire Radio Corporation. Riley Aff. , 10. 
F. 2006 Hawley Troxell Opinion On Surge Loan To CropUSA. 
The DQ Motion (pp. 5-6) references an opinion given by Hawley Troxell in connection 
with an October 2006 loan to CropUSA by an umelated lender, Surge Capital (referenced in the 
opinion letter as Lancelot Investors Fund). Bond Aff. Ex. 35. Hawley Troxell was engaged by 
CropUSA to provide the local counsel opinion of borrower's counsel. Hawley Troxell did not 
provide legal services to CropUSA or AlA Insurance in connection with the negotiation or 
documentation ofthe loan. Affidavit of Patrick V. Collins ("Collins Aff."), 2. Hawley Troxell 
was retained as local Idaho counsel solely for purposes of opining on Idaho law issues that could 
not be addressed by Quarles & Brady, counsel for CropUSA. Id. 
3~77 
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The Surge loan documents included guarantees of the debt by AIA Insurance, Inc. and 
John Taylor. AIA Services Corporation was not a party to the loan. In the opinion letter, Hawley 
Troxell opined that the execution, delivery and performance of the AIA Insurance guaranty were 
duly authorized. The due authorization opinion was based in part on certified copies of 
resolutions adopted by the AIA Insurance, Inc. Board of Directors. The AlA Insurance board 
resolutions authorizing its guarantee were drafted by the lender's counsel, not Hawley Troxell; 
were adopted by the AIA Insurance Board of Directors without involvement by Hawley Troxell; 
aJ).d were delivered to Hawley Troxell for the firm's reliance in giving the opinion. See Collins 
Aff. ~ 3. 
The DQ Motion (p. 21) alleges that the AIA Insurance guaranty was expressly prohibited 
by the Articles of Incorporation of AIA Services Corporation. (Significantly, Plaintiffs motion 
does not - and could not - allege that the guaranty was prohibited by the articles of incorporation 
of AIA Insurance.) The reference to AIA Services' Articles of Incorporation likely relates to 
Section 4.2.9(c) of the Amended and Restated Articles of Incorporation (Bond Aff. Ex. 19) in 
which AIA Services covenants, for the benefit of the holder of the Series A Preferred Stock, 
Donna Taylor, that AIA Services will not, and will not permit any subsidiary to, guaranty any 
Indebtedness (subject to inapplicable exceptions). There is no comparable provision in the 
articles of incorporation of AIA Insurance (Babbitt Aff. Ex. lB), which Hawley Troxell 
reviewed in connection with the opinion. Because AIA Services Corporation was not a party to 
the Surge loan transaction, the legal opinion sought by the lender did not seek any legal opinions 
regarding AIA Services Corporation and, therefore, Hawley Troxell did not review the articles of 
incorporation of AlA Services in preparing the opinion. Collins Aff. ~4. 
3'i7~ 
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In August 2008, the Surge loan lender assigned its rights as lender to Hudson Insurance 
Company; and Hudson subsequently purchased assets of Crop USA and assumed CropUSA's 
obligations as borrower under the Surge loan. Babbitt Aff. Exs. 11 and 12. As a result, Hudson 
is both lender and borrower, thereby discharging the Surge loan and extinguishing the guarantee 
by AIA Insurance. AIA Insurance was never called upon to pay one cent under its guarantee. 
G. Other "Related Party" Transactions. 
The DQ Motion (at 16) references "related party" transactions identified in the Affidavit 
of Paul E. Pederson. Other than the legal opinion of borrower's local counsel provided to the 
lender on behalf of Crop USA in connection with the Surge loan described above, Hawley 
Troxell was not engaged to provide and did not provide any advice or other legal services or 
other assistance to AIA Services, AIA Insurance, CropUSA or any other person in connection 
with any of the transactions identified in paragraph 11 of the Pederson Affidavit. Riley Aff. 
~ll. 
H. 2007 Limited Scope Engagements Of Hawley Troxell To Defend AlA Entities And 
CropUSA. 
The law firm of Clements, Brown & McNichols, P.A. initially appeared in this case for 
AIA Services, AIA Insurance and John Taylor. After obtaining a temporary restraining order to 
enjoin Reed from his wee hour attempt to take possession of the companies' offices and from 
interfering with the operation of the companies' business, Clements, Brown & McNichols 
withdrew from representation of the two AIA entities pursuant to Court order dated April 13, 
2007. 
1. 2007 Initial Engagement Of Hawley Troxell By AlA. In connection with Hawley 
Troxell's agreement to undertake the representation of AIA Services and AIA Insurance, Hawley 
Troxell entered into a written engagement/conflict waiver agreement with AlA Services and AIA 
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Insurance; obtained conflict waivers from all of the other Defendants (as well as CropUSA 
which, although not then named as a Defendant, was identified in Reed's complaint as a 
participant in transactions that Reed contends were improper); and required that each Defendant 
execute a standstill and tolling agreement which tolled and preserved any possible claims that 
might be brought against that Defendant by any other Defendant. In addition, the boards of 
directors of ALA Services and AIA Insurance reviewed and approved the engagement/conflict 
waiver letter agreement and the standstill and tolling agreements at a meeting on April 30, 2007. 
Babbitt Aff. ~ 8; Bond Aff. Ex. 10. 
In connection with Hawley Troxell's appearance in the case, Defendants' counsel 
proposed to their respective clients a Joint Defense Agreement among the Defendants. Babbitt 
Aff. ~ 9. At the April 30, 2007 meeting, the AIA Services and ALA Insurance boards of directors 
approved the corporations' participation in the Joint Defense Agreement, as well as execution of 
the related standstill and tolling agreements. See Bond Aff. Ex. 10. Each of the Defendants did 
in fact sign a standstill and tolling agreement and the Joint Defense Agreement. Babbitt Aff. ~ 9. 
2. Subsequent Engagement Of Hawley Troxell As Local Counsel For Crop USA. 
Later in 2007, Reed filed an amended complaint naming CropUSA, Connie Taylor, and Jim and 
Corrine Beck as Defendants. As an accommodation to CropUSA and its counsel, Quarles & 
Brady, Hawley Troxell agreed to serve as CropUSA's local counsel and filed a motion for 
limited admission of Quarles & Brady pro hac vice. In connection with the addition ofthe newly 
named Defendants and Hawley Troxell's agreement to serve as local counsel for CropUSA, all 
of the Representation Agreements were revised to reflect the additional defendants - Connie 
Taylor and Jim and Corrine Beck, in addition to CropUSA - named in Reed's amended 
complaint. Effective as of November 1,2007, Hawley Troxell entered into an 
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engagement/conflict waiver letter agreement with CropUSA agreeing to serve as local counsel 
with Quarles & Brady as lead counsel; AIA Services and AIA Insurance signed an amended 
engagement/conflict waiver letter agreement; and all of the Defendants entered into an Amended 
and Restated Standstill and Tolling Agreement and an Amended Joint Defense Agreement. 
Babbitt Aff. ~ 8. 
3. Representation Agreements. Hawley Troxell's representation of its clients in this 
case is based on (i) informed written conflict waivers by the three corporations and by each of 
the individual Defendants, (ii) standstill and tolling agreements between and among the three 
corporate Defendants and all of the individual Defendants, thereby preserving all claims between 
or among the Defendants pending the outcome of this case, and (iii) a j oint defense agreement. 
These documents are collectively referenced in this Memorandum as the "Representation 
Agreements".2 
I. 2007 Distribution Of Building Mortgage By ULIC To AlA Services. 
In 1993, The Universe Life Insurance Company CULIC"), a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
AIA Services, sold the Lewis Clark Plaza office building (the old Lewis Clark Hotel in 
Lewiston) to Washington Bank Properties. See documents included in Bond Aff. Ex. 32. The 
purchase price included a note payable by Washington Bank Properties secured by a deed of 
trust on the building. Id. Title to the note and deed of trust, sometimes referenced by the parties 
in this litigation as the "Mortgage", was vested by operation of law in the ULIC Liquidator when 
the insurer was placed in liquidation. Idaho Code § 41-3318(1). During the liquidation 
2 The Representation Agreements constitute attorney-client and joint defense privileged 
communications. To protect the applicable privileges, AIA has filed a motion requesting that the 
Court issue an order pennitting AIA to file the Representation Agreements under seal for in camera 
inspection. 
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proceedings, AIA Services and the Liquidator negotiated settlement of certain claims against one 
another. The settlement included mutual releases and the distribution of the note and deed of 
trust to AIA Services, ULIC's parent company. See documents included in Bond Aff. Ex. 32. 
Hawley Troxell worked with the ULIC Liquidator to document the settlement agreement and to 
prepare the assignments of the note and deed of trust and related documents necessary to transfer 
the Mortgage in accordance with the settlement agreement. Riley Aff. ~ 13. 
In the Amended and Restated Pledge Agreement dated as of July 1, 1996 ("Pledge 
Agreement"), AIA Services granted Reed a security interest in the ULIC stock owned by AIA 
Services and in all noncash dividends and other property distributed in respect of the ULIC 
shares. Bond Aff. Ex 4. Neither the Pledge Agreement nor the Idaho Uniform Commercial 
Code entitles Reed to any dividend or distribution in respect of the pledged ULIC shares, 
including (without limitation) the Mortgage, unles's and until Reed forecloses on the ULIC shares 
in accordance with the UCc. In pledging the note and deed of trust, AIA Services did not 
purport to extinguish any properly perfected security interest Plaintiff may have had. Rather, if 
Reed has a valid and perfected security interest in the Mortgage (as apparently asserted by 
Plaintiff), that security interest would continue to encumber the Mortgage notwithstanding the 
assignment of the Mortgage by AIA Services to CropUSA for security purposes. 
J. AlA's Contractual Obligation To Advance Defense Costs To The Individual 
Defendants. 
1. lBCA and Bylaws Obligate AlA to Advance Litigation Expenses. The AIA 
Insurance, Inc. bylaw provisions on indemnification and expense advances appear in Article XI 
3q82. 
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of the Bylaws of A. LA. Inc) adopted January 5th 1988. Bond Aff. Ex. 20.4 Section 11.1 of the 
Bylaws provides that "[t]he corporation shall indemnify the directors and executive officers of 
the corporation to the full extent permitted by the Idaho Business Corporation Act, as the same 
exists or may hereafter be amended .... " Accordingly, the scope of permissible indemnification 
and expense advances is governed by the current statutes, Idaho Code § § 30-1-850 to 30-1-859. 
Idaho Code § 30-1-858(1) provides, in pertinent part: 
"A corporation may, by a provision in its ... bylaws ... , obligate 
itself in advance ofthe act or omission giving rise to a proceeding 
to ... advance funds to pay for or reimburse expenses in accordance 
with section 30-1-853(3) .... Any such obligatory provision shall 
be deemed to satisfy the requirements for authorization referred to 
in section 30-1-853 (3) .... Any such provision that obligates the 
corporation to provide indemnification to the fullest extent 
permitted by law shall be deemed to obligate the corporation to 
advance funds to pay for or reimburse expenses ... to the fullest 
extent permitted by law, unless the provision specifically provides 
otherwise." (Emphasis added.) 
By Section 11.1 of the Bylaws, AIA Insurance, Inc. has obligated itself in advance to indemnify 
its directors and executive officers to the full extent permitted by law and thereby, pursuant to 
Idaho Code § 30-1-858(1), has obligated itself to payor reimburse all litigation expenses 
incurred by the corporation's present or former directors and officers who are Defendants in this 
case. Further, Section 11.5 of the AIA Insurance Bylaws expressly provides that "ft} he 
corporation shall advance, prior to the final disposition of any proceeding, promptly following 
request therefor, all expenses incurred by any director, officer, or employee or other agent of the 
corporation ... upon receipt of an undertaking by or on behalf of such person to repay [the 
3 
4 
AIA msuranee, me. was originally incorporated under the name A.LA., mc. 
Article XI of the New Restated Bylaws of AIA Services Corporation contains essentially the same 
provisions as the AIA msurance Bylaws. See Bond Aff. Ex. 21. 
3q~3 
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advances] if it should ultimately be determined that such person is not entitled to be indemnified 
under this Article XI or otherwise." (Emphasis added.) Each of the individual defendants has 
executed and delivered the required undertaking. Duclos AffEx. 8. 
Accordingly, AIA Insurance is obligated by its Bylaws and Idaho Code § 30-1-858(1) to 
advance litigation expenses to the Defendants in this case. In addition, pursuant to Idaho Code 
§ 30-1-858(1), Bylaws Section 11.1 is deemed by statutory fiat to satisfy the authorization 
requirement ofIdaho Code § 30-1-853(3). 
Note also that Section 11.6 (Enforcement) of the AIA Insurance Bylaws provides that all 
rights to indemnification and expenses under Article XI are contractual rights and are 
enforceable against the corporation by its directors and officers; Section 11.8 (Survival of 
Rights) provides that the rights conferred by Article XI continue as to any person (such as JoLee 
Duclos and Bryan Freeman) who ceases to be a director or officer of the corporation; 
Section 11.9 (Amendments) provides that repeal or modification of Article XI is prospective 
only and shall not affect rights in effect at the time of the alleged occurrence of the act or 
omission to act that is the cause of the proceeding against any agent of the corporation; and 
Section 11.10 (Savings Clause) provides that, in the event of invalidity of any provision in 
Article XI of the Bylaws, the corporation shall nevertheless indemnify each director and officer 
to the full extent permitted by any valid provision of Article XI or other applicable law. Section 
11.9 in particular, and all of these provisions read together, make it clear that indemnification 
and expense advance rights of a director or officer of the corporation vest at the time of the 
occurrence of the alleged act or omission that resulted in the litigation filed against the 
requesting party. 
Y184 
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In the Court's May 31, 2007 Order, the Court rejected Reed's motion for a temporary 
restraining order enjoining AIA Insurance from expending its resources to pay legal fees 
incurred by defendants John Taylor, Bryan Freeman and JoLee Duclos in defense of Reed's suit. 
The court held: 
Idaho's statutory scheme specifically provides for payment 
of legal fees reasonably incurred by a corporate director, who is a 
party to an action because of the individual's status as a director, to 
be paid by the corporation if the statutory requirements are met. 
The Court's record in the above-entitled matter reflects I.e. § 30-1-
853 has been met by Defendants John Taylor, Bryan Freeman and 
JoLee Duclos[]. 
2. AlA Services Shareholder Approval Of Expense Advances. In March 2007, AIA 
Services solicited and obtained shareholder approval of the advance of litigation expenses 
incurred by the individual Defendants in defense of Reed's lawsuit. See Bond Aff. Ex. 12. Reed 
contends that AIA wrongfully obtained shareholder consent without full disclosure or vote of 
only disinterested shareholders. 5 DQ Motion (at pp. 9). To the extent Reed may be asserting 
this argument as a basis for disqualifying Hawley Troxell, it is wholly irrelevant: Hawley 
Troxell was not asked to advise, and did not advise, AIA Services in connection with its 
solicitation of the vote of AIA Services shareholders in March 2007 to approve the advance of 
litigation expenses to the individual Defendants, or the disclosure made to the shareholders by 
the corporation. Babbitt Aff. ~ 13. Accordingly, the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of 
5 This argument is legally incorrect: There exists no legal obligation requiring AIA Services or its 
directors to obtain shareholder approval ofthe expense advances. Idaho Code §§ 30-1-861 and 
30-1-863 provide a safe harbor if a director's conflicting interest transaction is approved by the 
disinterested shareholders after disclosure of the material facts; but failure to obtain such a vote is not 
wrongful. Further, as discussed in the text above, the authorization required by Idaho Code § 30-1-
853(3) is satisfied by the Bylaw provisions obligating the corporation to advance defense costs. 
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shareholder approval as a safe harbor for advancement of litigation expenses is irrelevant to 
Reed's disqualification motion. 
Reed correctly observes that AlA Services and AIA Insurance did not obtain the consent 
of Reed Taylor or Donna Taylor for the advance oflitigation expenses to the individual 
Defendants. DQ Motion p. 9. But Reed Taylor is not a shareholder of either AlA entity; Donna 
is not a shareholder of AlA Insurance: and Donna's Series A Preferred Stock in AlA Services 
Corporation is non-voting. See Section 4.2.8 of AlA Services Corporation's Amended and 
Restated Articles of Incorporation. Bond Aff. Ex. 19. 
K. 2007 Documentation Of CropUSA Loan To AIA Services. 
In September 2007, AIA Services Corporation arranged to borrow up to $500,000 from 
CropUSA The loan is secured by the assignment to CropUSA, for security purposes, of an asset 
of AlA Services Corporation - the promissory note payable by Washington Bank Properties and 
secured by a deed of trust on One Lewis Clark Plaza. Hawley Troxell did not have any role in 
negotiating or determining the terms of the loan arrangement but rather acted as scrivener to 
document the loan terms as agreed by AlA Services Corporation and Crop USA Collins Aff. 
~ 5. 
III. DISQUALIFICATION STANDARDS 
The principles governing the Court's consideration of a motion by one party to disqualify 
the attorneys for the opposing party are most recently summarized in Crown v. Hawkins Co., 128 
Idaho 114, 122,910 P.2d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 1996). As the party moving for disqualification of 
counsel, Reed Taylor has the burden of establishing grounds for the disqualification. Crown v. 
Hawkins Co. at 794. Though the decision to grant or deny a motion to disqualify counsel is 
within the discretion of the trial Court, the Court's goal should be to shape a remedy that will 
?irtlo 
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assure fairness to the parties and the integrity of the judicial process. Id. at 795. "Whenever 
possible, courts should endeavor to reach a solution that is least burdensome to the client." Id. 
(affirming the trial court's determination that the prejudice to the client of removing his counsel 
shortly before the trial date "outweighed any potential ethical violation"). The cost of separate 
representation is one ofthe factors that may be considered when determining whether common 
representation is in the client's interest. Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct ("IRCP") Rule 1.7, 
cmt. 19. 
Further, as is the case here, "[ w ]here the motion to disqualify comes not from a client or 
former client of the attorney, but from an opposing party, the motion should be reviewed with 
caution." !d. Disqualification motions brought by an opposing party are disfavored because they 
are "often made for tactical reasons, may result in unnecessary delay, and interfere with a party's 
right to employ counsel of its choice." Cohen v. Acorn International. LTD., 921 F. Supp. 1062, 
1063-64. (S.D.N.Y. 1995). "For these reasons, a high standard of proof is required of those 
seeking disqualification." Id. Out of "concern about 'tactical use of disqualification motions' to 
harass opposing counsel," courts act with caution in considering motions to disqualify. 
Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 436 (1985); see also id. at 441 (Brennan, l, 
concurring) ("The tactical use of attorney-misconduct disqualification motions is a deeply 
disturbing phenomenon in modem civil litigation."). 
Moreover, "[a] motion to disqualify [an attorney] is of equitable nature, and a party 
making the motion should do so with reasonable diligence and promptness after the facts have 
become known." Schneider v. Curry, 106 Idaho 264, 266, 678 P.2d 56,58 (Ct. App. 1984). A 
failure to act promptly warrants denial of the motion. Weaver v. Millard, 120 Idaho 692, 698, 
819 P.2d 110,116 (Ct. App. 1991). Amotion to disqualify should be filed with promptness and 
5'187 
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reasonable diligence; and a failure to act promptly can warrant denial of the motion. Crown, 128 
Idaho at 123,910 P.2d at 795. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Reed Taylor Waived Any Right To Seek Disqualification By Delaying His Motion 
To Disqualify For Sixteen Months. 
Idaho courts have consistently held that "a motion to disqualify opposing counsel should 
be filed at the onset of the litigation, or with promptness and reasonable diligence once the facts 
upon which the motion is based have become known." Weaver, 120 Idaho at 698; Crown, 128 
Idaho at 123.6 A failure to act promptly warrants denial of the motion. Crown, 128 Idaho at 
123. A motion to disqualify counsel is "properly denied on basis of waiver alone, where 
movants had reason to know of existence of basis for potential disqualification several years 
before filing the motion." Weaver, 120 Idaho at 698 (citation omitted). The rationale behind the 
promptness requirement is to "prevent a litigant from using the motion as a tool to deprive his 
opponent of counsel of his choice after completing substantial preparation of the case." 
Transmark, US.A., Inc. v. State, Dept. o/Ins., 631 So.2d 1112, 1116 (Fla. App. 1994); see also 
Central Milk Producers Coop. v. Sentry Food Stores, Inc., 573 F.2d 988,992 (8th Cir. 1978) 
("This court will not allow a litigant to delay filing a motion to disqualify in order to use the 
6 Reed Taylor cites Nevada Yellow Cab Corp. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex reI. County of Clark, 
152 P.3d 737 (Nev. 2007), for the proposition that there is no waiver when a party fails to 
demonstrate a clear intention to relinquish the right to challenge representation. That Nevada case is 
contrary to the timeliness requirement adopted by the Idaho Supreme Court. Moreover, the facts in 
Nevada Yellow Cab Corp. are easily distinguishable. There, the parties agreed to mediate a case after 
the alleged conflict of interest was identified. The party seeking disqualification "postponed any 
motion for disqualification, while stating that it reserved its right to file such a motion if mediation 
failed." Id. at 740. Then, "[w]hen mediation failed, ICW promptly filed its motion." Id. No similar 
facts exist here. 
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motion later as a tool to deprive his opponent of counsel of his choice after substantial 
preparation of a case has been completed."). 
Courts consider a variety of factors in determining whether a party has waived the right 
to seek disqualification, including (1) the length of the delay in bringing a motion to disqualify; 
(2) when the movant learned of the conflict; (3) whether the movant was represented by counsel 
during the delay; (4) why the delay occurred, and in particular whether the motion was delayed 
for tactical reasons; and (5) whether disqualification would result in prejudice to the nonmoving 
party. Employers Ins. o/Wausau v. Albert D. Seeno Const. Co., 692 F.Supp. 1150, 1165 (N.D. 
Cal. 1988). Here, each ofthese factors weighs strongly in favor of waiver and denial of the 
motion to disqualify. 
1. Reed Taylor Waited Over Sixteen Months To Bring This Motion To Disqualify. 
The first two factors listed above - the "length of the delay in bringing a motion to disqualify" 
and "when the movant learned of the conflict" - weigh heavily in favor of denying the motion to 
disqualify. In determining whether a party has waived any right to seek the disqualification of 
another party's counsel, Idaho courts place heavy emphasis on the length of delay in bringing the 
motion. See, e.g., Schneider, 106 Idaho at 266 (court declined to review district court's refusal to 
grant motion to disqualify counsel in part because of the moving party's delay - from June 1980 
to October 27, 1980 - in bringing the motion to disqualify); Weaver, 120 Idaho at 698 (noting 
that a thirteen month delay in bringing the motion to disqualify supported the trial court's denial 
of the motion to disqualify); see also Exterior Systems, Inc. v. Noble Composites, Inc., 210 
F.Supp.2d 1062, 1077 (N.D. Ind. 2002) (finding waiver where movant sent a letter objecting to 
opposing counsel's conflict of interest, but waited until twelve months later to file a motion to 
disqualify). 
2fJ~~ 
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Here, the delay in bringing the motion to disqualify is excessive. Reed Taylor and his 
counsel have been aware of the alleged conflicts of interest for over sixteen months. Hawley 
Troxell appeared on behalf of AIA Services and AIA Insurance on May 7, 2007. The very same 
facts that Reed Taylor now relies upon to support his allegations of conflict of interest existed 
when Hawley Troxell appeared in this case. Not only did the same facts exist, but Reed Taylor's 
counsel was keenly aware of the alleged conflicts. Indeed, he has been vaguely accusing Hawley 
Troxell of alleged conflicts of interest since the very inception of this litigation. By way of 
example, in a recent email fromMr. BondtoAIA'scounsel, GaryBabbitt,Mr. Bond lectured: 
.... I have repeatedly advised all of you in writing, through 
telephone conferences and/or in person of the various conflicts. 
Even after all my warnings, you have all continued on with the 
conflicts to the detriment of AIA Services and AlA Insurance .... I 
advised you all time and time again that AIA Insurance should 
have separate counsel. 
See Babbitt Aff. Ex. 6; see also id. Ex. 4 ("All I have ever done is advised everyone of all 
applicable conflicts .... I warned you and warned you, and all you did was ignore me"). 
Mr. Bond began raising nonspecific conflict of interest accusations in May 2007: 
You of all people should know how often I complained about your 
ethical violations over and over again. I am forwarding you my 
email and attached letter of May 11, 2007, yes, over 1 year and 
2 months ago .... Does greed blind you that much? 
Id. at Ex. 5 (July 27,2008 email); see also id. at Ex. 3 (July 17, 2008 email asserting: "I recall 
sending you a clear and concise letter [regarding conflicts] when you first appeared in this case, 
which you ignored."). 
Thus, it is abundantly clear that Reed Taylor and his counsel have been accusing Hawley 
Troxell of conflicts of interest since May 2007, yet they waited over sixteen months to bring a 
motion to disqualify which, for the first time, purports to specifically identify disqualifying 
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conflicts of interest. By sitting on his hands for over sixteen months, Plaintiff has waived any 
right to seek disqualification of AIA's counsel. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that much 
shorter delays constitute waiver. See Schneider, 106 Idaho at 266 (four month delay supports 
finding of waiver); Weaver, 120 Idaho at 698 (thirteen month delay in bringing the motion to 
disqualify supported the trial court's denial of the motion to disqualify). 
2. Reed Taylor Has Been Represented At All Times By Counsel. In determining 
whether a motion to disqualify is timely, courts also consider ''whether the movant was 
represented by counsel during the delay." Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Albert D. Seeno Const. 
Co., 692 F.Supp. 1150, 1165 (N.D. Cal. 1988). Here, Reed Taylor has been represented by Rod 
Bond at all times, plus several consecutive sets of co-counsel. Anyone of Reed Taylor's counsel 
could have brought a motion to disqualify sixteen months ago ifthey really believed there were 
grounds for such a motion. 
3. This Belated Motion To Disqualify Has Been Brought For Tactical Reasons. The 
United States Supreme Court has warned that motions to disqualify brought by an opposing party 
should be considered with caution out of "concern about tactical use of disqualification motions 
to harass opposing counsel." Richardson-Merrell, 472 U.S. at 436. It is abundantly clear that 
Reed Taylor has embarked in an improper mission to obtain a litigation advantage by 
disqualifying all opposing counsel in this case. 
If this motion to disqualify were anything other than a litigation tactic, it would have been 
brought sixteen months ago - not now after Hawley Troxell has spent the last sixteen months 
defending AIA and preparing for trial. The improper litigation tactic is further evidenced by (i) 
the fact that Reed Taylor seeks to disqualify not only Hawley Troxell, but also counsel for each 
of his other litigation opponents; (ii) the recently served derivative demand that AIA bring suit 
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against its own counsel for "aiding and abetting"; and (iii) his separate direct lawsuits recently 
filed against AIA's counsel. It is significant that the Plaintiffs' motion to disqualify counsel 
contends that defense counsel should be disqualified because ofthe conflicts between counsel 
and client engendered simply by Reed Taylor having made the derivative claims and having filed 
the direct lawsuits. See DQ Motion p. 50. A clearer example of manufacturing a conflict to gain 
an advantage in this underlying litigation can hardly be imagined. 
Reed Taylor's counsel has asserted many times throughout the course of this litigation 
that Reed Taylor has considered bringing claims against Hawley Troxell and the other law firms 
representing the defendants in this case. ill a July 11, 2008 letter, Rod Bond made a settlement 
demand. ill connection with the settlement demand, Rod Bond announced that, unless the case 
settled within days, Reed Taylor would be bringing suit against the law firms representing the 
various defendants in this case. See Babbitt Aff. Ex. 2 (" .... if this case is not resolved in a 
timely manner (days not weeks), then other lawsuits will be filed against numerous other 
defendants")) Mr. Bond then conceded that "I do not believe that this [the lawsuits against the 
law firms] will be productive, but Reed Taylor makes the decisions." Id. (emphasis added). 
In other words, because Reed Taylor "makes the decisions," counsel would bring suit against the 
various law firms even though he questioned the merit of such lawsuits. 
It became immediately apparent that the purpose behind serving the derivative demand 
was to pit client against counsel in an attempt to remove all defense counsel from the case. A 
7 While the letter does not explicitly state that the "other lawsuits" would be brought against the law 
firms, the context of the letter makes clear that Rod Bond was referring to litigation that would be 
brought against Hawley Troxell and the other law firms. Mr. Bond had been telling Hawley Troxell 
for months that Reed intended to bring claims against the various law firms. More tellingly, Reed 
Taylor served his derivative demand that AIA bring suit against the law firms shortly after the July 
11,2008 letter. 
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few days after receiving the above-described letter, AIA's counsel contacted Reed Taylor's 
counsel for a list of available dates for Reed Taylor's deposition. Mr. Bond responded by 
asserting that he would not allow Hawley Troxell to depose Reed Taylor because of the so-called 
conflict manufactured by the derivative demand: 
Mike Bissell's finn will be filing suit against you, John Ashby, 
Dick Riley and Hawley Troxell in the coming days for aiding and 
abetting and violations of various rules of professional conduct, 
among other claims. Reed intends to also forward copies of the 
Complaint to the bar association. In light of these pending events, 
please advise me if your finn intends to remain as counsel on this 
case. Sorry to be so direct, but it does not make sense for me to set 
up depositions when you will probably not be involved much 
longer. 
Babbitt Aff. Ex. 3. The threat to forward copies of the Complaint to the bar association for 
possible disciplinary action, which was clearly intended to induce counsel to withdraw 
voluntarily, is a violation of the spirit ifnot the letter ofLR.C.P. 4.4: "In representing a client, a 
lawyer shall not: (4) threaten to present criminal charges in order to obtain an advantage in a 
civil matter." When Hawley Troxell declined to abdicate its obligations to its clients, the 
threatened suit was indeed filed by Mr. Bissell. Bond Aff. Ex. 38. That the purpose of the 
separate aiding and abetting suit is to obtain a tactical advantage in this case is clearly 
demonstrated by the DQ Motion (p. 25-26), in which Plaintiff asserts that the mere pendency of 
the separate claims against Hawley Troxell is "one additional reason ... why the Attorneys 
should withdraw or be disqualified." 
Finally, the fact that Reed Taylor's motion is no more than a litigation tactic was brought 
out in the July 24, 2008 hearing on AIA's motion for a stay pending AIA's inquiry into the 
derivative demand. At that hearing, Mr. Bond stated that that Reed Taylor would seek to 
disqualify and/or sue all the remaining defense counsel in the case. He followed up that 
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statement, however, with the assertion that Reed Taylor would consent to Hawley Troxell's 
continued representation of ALA if Hawley Troxell would post an $8.5 Million bond with the 
Court. This statement makes clear that Reed Taylor is not concerned with supposed violations of 
ethics rules but rather with his own pecuniary interests. 
It is clear from the timing of this motion and the communications from Reed Taylor's 
counsel that this motion is part of a scheme by Plaintiff and his counsel to manufacture conflicts 
of interest between attorneys and clients on which to predicate Plaintiffs motion to disqualify 
Defendants' counsel, to deprive the defendants of the counsel of their choice, and to obtain an 
unfair advantage in this case. 
4. AlA Would Be Severely Prejudiced By Disqualification Of Its Counsel. While it 
would obviously serve Reed Taylor's personal interests to force each of his litigation opponents 
to find new counsel at this late state of the litigation, Reed Taylor has not proffered any evidence 
that he would be prejudiced ifhis motion to disqualify is denied. Conversely, the defendants will 
be severely prejudiced if they are deprived of their right to counsel oftheir choosing. Idaho 
courts have expressed a strong reluctance to prejudice a party by disqualifying their counsel at a 
late stage in the litigation, especially based on so-called conflicts that existed for a long period of 
time before the filing of the motion. For example, in Weaver, the Idaho Court of Appeals found 
that the moving party had waived any right to disqualify opposing counsel for failing to file the 
motion "with promptness and reasonable diligence once the facts upon which the motion is based 
have become known." Weaver, 120 Idaho at 698. In reaching this conclusion, the Court 
explained: 
Given that discovery was well underway and that motions for 
summary judgment were pending, the district court concluded that 
any possible prejudice to the partnership was far outweighed by the 
possible prejudice to Weaver or Lupher of having to obtain new 
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Id. 
counsel if the motion were granted. The court also concluded that, 
in light of the relatively advanced nature of the proceedings, 
allowing Decker and Hollifield to continue their representation, 
while keeping their clients as separate as possible, was the least 
damaging alternative under the circumstances. 
The fact that this motion is brought at this late stage demonstrates the prejudice that AIA 
and the other defendants would suffer if their counsel were disqualified. In Mr. Bond's own 
words, he has pointed out the alleged conflicts to counsel "from day one" of this litigation. 
Babbitt Mf. Ex. 8. Since "day one", AIA's counsel has spent sixteen months reviewing 
documents, interviewing witnesses, conducting motion practice and discovery and preparing for 
trial. As the Court is keenly aware (having had to read and rule upon the myriad motions filed in 
this case), this case has turned out to be a complex and fact-laden morass. AIA has incurred 
substantial attorney's fees for legal services performed by Hawley Troxell. If Reed's motion is 
granted, AIA (and each of the other defendants) would face the extreme prejudice of having to 
retain and educate new counsel on the procedural history and complex legal issues. Forcing each 
defendant to retain new counsel would require new counsel to get up to speed on this case, 
increase attorneys' fees substantially and significantly delay the trial in this matter. 
As a practical matter, requiring AIA Insurance, AIA Services, CropUSA and John Taylor 
to each retain new and separate counsel would be extremely expensive and may not be feasible. 
Reed Taylor has now brought a direct lawsuit against Hawley Troxell and other counsel and he is 
now attempting to bring a derivative lawsuit against all defense counsel in the case, based in part 
on counsel's mere acceptance of attorney's fees. It would be naIve to believe that all of the 
various defendants will be able to find new (much less qualified) attorneys who are willing to 
step into the mine-field that this litigation has become. Why would any right-minded lawyer 
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agree to represent a defendant in this litigation if that attorney will immediately be sued for 
accepting attorney's fees for the representation,8 especially now that Reed Taylor is taking the 
position that no law firm could represent either AIA Insurance or AIA Services without 
obtaining the consent of Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor? See Section IV.G.3. 
In summary, the Court should conclude that Reed Taylor has waived any right to seek 
disqualification of counsel by waiting sixteen months before filing his motion to disqualify. 
B. Defendants Have a Common Interest Privilege and Are Entitled to Enter Into a 
Joint Defense Agreement. 
1. IRE 502(b) and Common Interest Privilege. The Idaho Rules of Evidence 
specifically provide for a common interest privilege, otherwise known as a joint defense 
privilege. Rule of Evidence 502(b)(3) provides that "[a] client has a privilege to refuse to 
disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications made for 
the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the client which were 
made ... among clients, their representatives, their lawyers, or their lawyers' representatives, in 
any combination, concerning a matter of common interest, but not including communications 
solely among clients or their representatives when no lawyer is a party to the communication." 
The official comment to Evidence Rule 502(b)(3) explains that it is "intended to provide 
that when clients who share a common interest in a legal matter are represented by different 
lawyers they can communicate with each other in an effort to develop ajoint strategy or 
otherwise advance their interests." The official comment further explains the rationale for the 
8 Indeed, Mr. Bond has already threatened suit against the newest attorney to appear in this litigation, 
David Risley, ifhe accepts fees advanced by AIA Insurance or AIA Services. See Babbitt Mf. Ex. 10 
("If you don't want to have Reed Taylor pursue claims against your [sic] and your firm, I recommend 
that you not accept payment of any funds that have been derived directly or indirectly from AIA 
Services or AIA Insurance or any of their assets in which Reed Taylor has a security interest."). 
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privilege as follows: "[P]ersons who share a common interest in litigation should be able to 
communicate with their respective attorneys and with each other to more effectively prosecute or 
defend their claims." Id. (quoting In Re: Grand Jury Subpoenas, 902 F.2d 244,249 (4th Cir. 
1990)). 
J oint defense agreements, like the one entered into among the Defendants in this case, are 
a common practice in cases where multiple defendants share a common adversary. See, e.g., 
Hanover Ins. Co. v. Rapo & Jepsen Ins. Services, Inc., 870 N.E.2d 1105, 1108 (Mass. 2007) 
(recognizing the "longstanding use and validity of joint defense agreements, an exception to 
waiver of the attorney-client privilege under the common interest doctrine."). The courts do not 
impose strict limitations on when parties may enter into joint defense agreements. Instead, the 
only requirement is that the parties have a common interest in the litigation. "Where defendants 
allege a common interest that is no more than a joint effort to establish a common litigation 
defense strategy, the requisite common interest is among the easiest to establish." !d. at 1113. 
Such defendants need only prove that "(1) the communications were made in the course of a 
joint defense effort, (2) the statements were designed to further the effort, and (3) the privilege 
has not been waived." Id. 
2. The Co-Defendants Share Common Interests in the Joint Defense of Reed's 
Claims. Plaintiffs claims themselves make it self-evident that the Co-Defendants in this case 
share common interests in the defense of those claims. The complaint alleges various 
"inappropriate" transactions between or among the Defendants, such as AlA Insurance's 
purchase of AIA Services Series C Preferred Stock from CropUSA for $1.5 million, the parking 
lot and radio station transactions between John Taylor and AIA, and the other "related party" 
transactions identified in the Affidavit of Paul E. Pederson. In each case, two or more 
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Defendants are involved in the transaction. Accordingly, the successful defense against Reed's 
claim of impropriety by one party to a transaction necessarily absolves the other party or parties 
to the transaction. Those parties clearly have a common interest in cooperating with one another 
to defeat Reed's claims. 
Further, Plaintiff has painted the Defendants with the same broad brush, seeking the same 
relief against all Defendants without distinguishing among them. Based on alter-ego and 
conspiracy allegations in the Fifth Amended Complaint ("F AC"), Plaintiff prays for judgment 
against all of the Defendants, jointly and severally, for all sums owed to him under the 
promissory note and for all contract and tort damages in an amount to be proved at trial. F AC 
,,13.2, 13.3, 14.11, 14.12. For example, FAC, 13.2 expressly alleges what is implicit in the 
prior iterations of his complaint, i.e., the claim that all of the Defendants have engaged in a civil 
conspiracy. One element that must be proved to establish a civil conspiracy is that there is an 
agreement among the Defendants to accomplish an unlawful objective or to accomplish a lawful 
objective in an unlawful manner. McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 395, 64 P.3d 317,321 
(2003). If a conspiracy is established, each co-conspirator is liable for the acts of each other co-
conspirator. Dalquist v. Mattson, 40 Idaho 378, 390,233 P. 883,887 (1925). Obviously, each 
Defendant shares with each other Defendant a common interest in refuting Reed's allegations of 
the formation of such an agreement and/or the commission of any act by any other Defendant 
that could give rise to such joint liability; and all Defendants are benefited if any of them is 
successful in that regard. 
In addition, the injunctive relief Plaintiff seeks, if granted, would, among other things, 
limit the corporate Defendants' ability to use or transfer funds and assets, and to borrow money. 
Plaintiff also seeks to enjoin the Defendants from negotiating any substantive contracts without 
3qql? 
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his approval or permission from the court. [FAC, para. 14.2(f), (g), (h), and (k).] The 
Defendants have a common interest in defending against these and other claims Plaintiff has 
asserted against them; and they share common defenses to most, if not all, of these claims. 
The Defendants also share a common interest in coordinating the defense in order to 
eliminate duplication of counsel's efforts on behalf of their respective clients and thereby to 
mitigate the attorney fees which, as discussed in Section ILJ above, AIA Services and AIA 
Insurance are obligated to advance to the individual Defendants. 
3. Propriety of Joint Defense Agreement. Plaintiff alleges that the Joint Defense 
Agreement is "inappropriate" because AIA should, according to Plaintiff, be suing the other 
Defendants. See, e.g., item # 16 in Mr. Bissell's July 21,2008 derivative demand letter (Bond 
Aff. Ex. 16). As noted by Professor Strait, this argument puts the cart before the horse (Strait 
Aff. Sections VILA.3, VILE.2 and VILF.2); and it would deny the Defendants the right to defend 
themselves against Reed's claims. The fact that potential adversity between co-defendants in the 
future may be foreseeable does not prevent the co-defendants from entering into a joint defense 
agreement to pursue their common interest in defending claims by a third party. See In re Grand 
Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated November 26, 1974,406 F. Supp. 381, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
That case involved the exchange of information among counsel and targets of an SEC 
investigation, including counsel for a corporation and counsel for certain individuals. The 
government claimed that the interests of certain of the participants in the conference were 
divergent because the company might have a claim against one of the individual participants, 
who was its former officer and director. The court nonetheless found the common legal interest 
privilege applicable, stating that even if an action by the company against its former officer were 
foreseeable, "[t]hat alone would not have prevented [the] sharing [of] confidential information 
311'1 
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for the purpose of a joint defense against the immediate SEC action .. ,. That a joint defense may 
be made by somewhat unsteady bedfellows does not in itself negate the existence or viability of 
the joint defense." Id. 
Thus, Reed Taylor's assertion that Defendants are not permitted to enter into ajoint 
defense agreement because of purportedly diverging interests is not supported by the law.9 ill 
fact, the Official Comment to Idaho Rule of Evidence 502(b )(3) itself recognizes that the joint 
defense privilege "will survive a later falling-out among the parties," thus recognizing that 
parties with potentially diverging interest can take advantage of the joint defense privilege. See 
also Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 787-88 (3rd Cir. 1985) ("Communications to an 
attorney to establish a common defense strategy are privileged even though the attorney 
represents another client with some adverse interests."); Us. v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 
1336 (7th Cir. 1979) (noting that the "joint-interest privilege is not limited to situations in which 
the positions of the parties are compatible in all respects"); Gallagher v. Office of Attorney 
General, 787 A.2d 777 (Md. App. 2001) ("The divergence of the parties' interests over the 
course of litigation does not necessarily negate the applicability of the common interest rule."). 
Professor Strait concludes that Hawley Troxell is representing the AIA entities under an 
appropriate Joint Defense Agreement, Standstill Agreement, and limited scope of representation 
related to litigation only. Strait Aff. Section IIL2. Further, he opines: "Under Idaho RPC 1.2, 
Hawley Troxell may, after full discussion with the AIA entities and with Crop, undertake such a 
9 Plaintiff cites Evans & Luptak, PLC v. Lizza, 650 N.W.2d 364,370 (Mich. 2002), for the proposition 
that contracts that violate ethical rules violate public policy and are not enforceable. See DQ Motion 
p. 48. That case, however, simply held that a fee agreement that violated ethical rules was 
unenforceable. The case has no application here because the joint defense agreement does not violate 
any ethical rules. 
'I~ 
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joint representation with an appropriately limited scope of representation to the common claims 
as authorized by the control groups and consistent with their authority to defend against Reed's 
claims." Strait Aff. Section VILB.3. 
Defendants' ability to present a unified defense to Plaintiff's claims minimizes 
duplication and legal expense. Joint defense will not result in a loss of any claims the corporate 
Defendants may have against one another or against the individual Defendants because all such 
claims have been expressly preserved by tolling agreements. It is in Plaintiff's interest to divide 
and conquer by insisting that each corporate Defendant have separate counsel and that the 
Defendants assert claims against one another. It is not, however, in the corporate Defendants' 
interest to hire separate counsel to pursue claims against one another while, at the same time, 
defending against Plaintiff's claims. It would defeat their ability to provide a unified and 
consistent defense, divert their attention from the principal object of defeating Plaintiff's claims, 
and result in additional expense they can ill afford. 
4. Joint Defense Is Not Joint Representation. Reed and his attorneys apparently 
labor under the misapprehension that the Joint Defense Agreement is ajoint representation 
agreement, rather than a j oint defense agreement. 1 0 Based on this mischaracterization of the 
Joint Defense Agreement, Plaintiff contends that Hawley Troxell must be disqualified because 
the firm is representing, either directly or indirectly through the Joint Defense Agreement, the 
interests of John Taylor and the other individual Defendants in addition to the interests of the 
corporate Defendants. See, e.g., DQ Motion at pp. 42 (alleged joint representation without 
informed consent of authorized representatives of AIA), 46 (lack of informed consent by Reed 
10 Plaintiffs expert, Peter Jarvis, is similarly mistaken. See, e.g., Jarvis Aff. ~ 5.j. 
'Ito! 
AIA'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISQUALIFY COUNSEL - 30 
40005.0006.1309816.2 
and Donna Taylor to joint representation), 48-50 (alleged improper joint representation, directly 
or indirectly through ajoint defense agreement, of the corporations and their directors/officers, 
without Reed's consent). 
Plaintiff makes a similar argument, again premised on the erroneous concept that the 
Joint Defense Agreement results in joint representation, that Hawley Troxell must be 
disqualified because a lawyer cannot represent both an organization and a director or officer in a 
fraud action against them. DQ Motion p. 48-49. Plaintiff argues that "the Attorneys may not 
directly, or indirectly through any joint defense agreement, represent the interests of John 
Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, AIA Services, AIA Insurance, CropUSA and any other 
interested party or individual defendant with claims of corporate malfeasance against him or 
her." Id. p. 49 (emphasis added.). To the contrary, Hawley Troxell has not ever undertaken the 
representation of any of the individual Defendants in this litigation, either directly or through the 
Joint Defense Agreement; and each of the individual Defendants has at all times been 
represented by hislher own independent counsel in this litigation. Babbitt Aff. 1 11. 
The fact that the parties have entered into a joint defense agreement does not mean that 
Hawley Troxell represents any of the individual director Defendants. As explained recently by 
one Court: 
A joint defense agreement is not synonymous with common 
representation. While common representation creates an attorney-
client relationship between common counsel and each defendant 
being represented by them, a joint defense agreement is a 
mechanism designed to provide confidentiality for 
communications made during joint defense strategy sessions. See 
United States v. Almeida, 341 F.3d 1318, 1323 (11th Cir. 2003) 
(citing Wilson P. Abraham Canst. Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 559 
F.2d 250, 253 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Schwimmer, 892 
F.2d 237, 243 (2d Cir. 1989)). Each defendant, however, retains 
his own attorney, and the duty of loyalty only extends from each 
attorney to the defendant which he represents. !d. 
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Beras v. US., 2007 WL 195352,2 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); see also Us. v. Almeida, 341 F.3d 1318, 
1323 (l1th Cir. 2003) ("A duty ofloyalty, however, does not exist [as a result of a joint defense 
agreement] and it is therefore improper to conclude that all of the attorneys in the joint defense 
strategy session represent all ofthe participating defendants."). 
5. Reed Erroneously Asserts That Hawley Troxell Must Be Disqualified Pursuant To 
IRPC 1.6 Because Of Inability To Protect Confidential Information Received From Each Client. 
Plaintiff argues that Hawley Troxell should be disqualified because the joint defense agreement 
among the Defendants permits sharing of otherwise confidential information, making it 
"impossible for the Attorneys to properly keep and protect each client's confidential information 
.... " DQ Motion p. 38.11 IRCP 1.6 (a) provides that "a lawyer shall not reveal information 
relating to representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent .... ". If Reed's 
argument were given credence, it would be a disqualifying violation of Rule 1.6(a) to enter into 
any joint defense agreement because, by the very nature and purpose ofthe agreement, 
codefendants share otherwise confidential information and waive any confidentiality as among 
themselves. 
To the contrary, the courts acknowledge the common interest privilege of codefendants to 
share information, coordinate discovery and motion practice and contain costs. Joint defense 
agreements are widely utilized and accepted, notwithstanding that each of the participants 
waives, as to each other participant, privilege and confidentiality of shared information. See 
Sections IV.B.1-4. above. 
11 The absurdity of Reed's concern with preservation of confidentiality of each client's information is 
manifested by his contention that, when he takes control of AIA Insurance, he will have access to the 
information shared by other Defendants under the Joint Defense Agreement, thereby making it easier 
for him to pursue the alleged claims against those other Defendants. See DQ Motion pp. 38,51. 
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Further, Rule 1.6(a) does not prohibit sharing of information among co-defendants who 
have given informed consent, whether those co-defendants are represented by the same counsel 
in a joint representation or by different counsel pursuant to a joint defense agreement. Each of 
Hawley Troxell's clients made an informed decision and gave informed consent to proceed with 
the joint representation, in part because ofthe need to keep defense costs in check. The informed 
decision to share information among Hawley Troxell's clients is a matter for their discretion and 
business judgment. Strait Aff. Section VII. D. 2 ("Under RPC 1.6, each client, if properly 
informed of the risks, has a complete authority to waive confidentiality .... This is a proper and 
valid decision for an informed client to make as to whether or not to participate in such a joint 
defense agreement."). 
c. AlA's Attorneys Have No Duty to Plaintiff and Have Neither Right Nor Power to 
Take Action Independently of Their Clients. 
Reed and his attorneys have confused the duties of defense counsel with the duties of 
their clients, asserting without citation to any authority that counsel have duties to Reed, in his 
capacity as a creditor of AIA Services and as a pledgee of AIA Insurance, Inc. stock. Plaintiff 
asserts that: "AIA Services is insolvent and ... the duties of [Hawley Troxell's] representation 
are to Reed in light of the insolvency to protect AlA's assets." Babbitt Aff. Ex. 8. Plaintiff also 
contends that Hawley Troxell owes a duty ofloyalty to Reed in his capacities as a creditor of 
AIA Services and as a pledgee of the stock of AIA Insurance. See, e.g., DQ Motion p. 37 
("[T]he Attorneys owe the beneficiary of AIA Services' limited remaining assets, Reed Taylor, 
fiduciary duties to preserve the assets by not representing the interests of John Taylor and other 
indi viduals.") 
Those contentions are simply wrong. Hawley Troxell's obligation as lawyers for AIA 
Services and AIA Insurance runs to the corporations, which include the following "authorized 
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constituents": directors, officers, shareholders and employees. See IRCP 1.13 and cmt 1. 
Neither the law nor the IRCP require Hawley Troxell, as lawyers, to prefer either a creditor or a 
pledgee over the recognized constituencies of the corporate clients (for example, the common 
shareholders of AlA Services, whose investments are worth less to the extent AlA Services is 
obligated to Reed). If Reed's assertion were true, it would be a complete perversion of the 
adversarial system on which our jurisprudence is based. 
Plaintiff s counsel also makes the outlandish argument that AlA's lawyers owe Reed a 
duty to take action, independent of their clients, to protect Reed's interests. In his May 11, 2007 
letter (quoted in DQ Motion p. 22), Bond states: "As the counsel for the corporations, [Hawley 
Troxell has] a duty to bring claims for the benefit of the corporations, their shareholders and their 
creditors in light of insolvency." DQ Motion p. 22; Bond Aff. Ex 29. This argument 
misperceives the roles of attorneys. Lawyers serve as advisors and advocates. See Preamble to 
the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct cmt 2: 
"As a representative of clients, a lawyer performs various 
functions. As advisor, a lawyer provides a client with an informed 
understanding of the client's legal rights and obligations and 
explains their practical implications. As advocate, a lawyer 
zealously asserts the client's position under the rules of the 
adversary system .... " 
As lawyers, Hawley Troxell cannot "bring claims for the benefit of the corporations". At most, 
Hawley Troxell can advise the AlA boards of their duties; and Hawley Troxell ensured, as a 
condition of representation of the corporate Defendants, that each of the corporate Defendants 
and all of the individual Defendants signed a standstill and tolling agreement preserving all 
claims among the Defendants pending the outcome of Reed's lawsuit. 
Defense counsel have no obligation to prove Reed's case for him. See IRCP l.13(d), 
which provides that the lawyer's obligation under IRCP 1. 13(c) to report up the ladder to the 
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organization's "highest authority" (i.e., the board of directors, in the case of a corporation) that 
an officer or employee "is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a matter related to 
the representation that is a violation of a legal obligation to the organization, or a violation of law 
that reasonably might be imputed to the organization" and to reveal otherwise confidential 
information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent substantial injury 
to the organization "shall not apply with respect to information relating to a lawyer's 
representation of an organization to investigate an alleged violation of law, or to defend the 
organization ... against a claim arising out of an alleged violation of law." Comment 8 observes 
that this rule "is necessary in order to enable organizational clients to enjoy the full benefits of 
legal counsel in conducting an investigation or defending against a claim." Reed's theory that 
AIA Services and AIA Insurance should be suing the other Defendants would emasculate this 
.. 
fundamental principle of our legal system. 
The argument that Hawley Troxell is obligated to take action to protect Reed's interests 
also misperceives the scope of the firm's engagements by the corporate Defendants. Hawley 
Troxell has not served as outside general counsel with oversight and comprehensive knowledge 
of AIA's or CropUSA's activities. Hawley Troxell's previous representation of those entities 
was limited to specific matters referred to the firm from time to time. Hawley Troxell has never 
exercised internal supervision ofthe legal or other affairs of any of these entities; and the firm's 
familiarity with their businesses, ownership, governance, employees, operations, accounting and 
other matters is accordingly limited to information received in connection with matters as to 
which it was specifically engaged and as to which it devoted substantive attention. In particular 
(but without limitation), Hawley Troxell was not consulted in connection with the alleged self-
dealing transactions alleged in Reed's complaint or any of the "related party" transactions 
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identified in the Affidavit of Paul E. Pederson other than the legal opinion ofborrower's local 
counsel provided to the lender on behalf of Crop USA in connection with the Surge loan in late 
2006. Riley Aff. ~~ 5, 11. 
The finn's engagement for the purpose of defending this lawsuit brought by Reed Taylor 
is similarly limited in scope to the specific matter for which the finn has been retained. Hawley 
Troxell has not been asked to advise, and has not advised, the AIA entities or CropUSA in 
connection with potential claims against one another or against the individual Defendants, in 
light of insolvency or otherwise, as such advice is not necessary to the finn's representation of 
the corporate Defendants in common defense of the allegations in Reed's complaint. As opined 
by Professor Strait: "Under Idaho RPC 1.2, Hawley Troxell may, after full discussion with the 
AIA entities and with Crop, undertake such a joint representation with an appropriately limited 
scope of representation to the common claims as authorized by the control groups and consistent 
with their authority to defend against Reed's claims." Strait Aff. Section VILB.3. 
Attorneys engaged to defend a client are not expected to detennine the outcome of the 
case before undertaking the defense. Reed asserts that the lawyers have knowingly advanced 
frivolous arguments in opposition to Reed's obviously true and indefensible allegations. See 
Complaint filed in Civ. No. CV08-01765 (Bond Aff. Ex. 38 at ~~ 32,36 and 53). To the 
contrary, Hawley Troxell has had a reasonable belief, at the time of accepting the AIA 
engagement and at all times thereafter, that valid defenses to Reed's note exist. Babbitt Aff. 
~ 12. 
D. Hawley Troxell's Representation Of AlA Services, AlA Insurance And CropUSA 
Does Not Violate IRPC 1.7. 
Rule 1.7 of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct ("IRCP") provides: 
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(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not 
represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent 
conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if: 
(1) the representation of one client will be directly 
adverse to another client; or 
(2) there is a significant risk that the representation of 
one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's 
responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person 
or by the personal interests of the lawyer, including family and 
domestic relationships. 
(b) Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of 
interest under paragraph (a), a lawyer may represent a client if: 
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will 
be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each 
affected client; 
(2) the representation is not prohibited by law; 
(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of 
a claim by one client against another client represented by the 
lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal; 
and 
(4) each affected client gives informed consent, 
confirmed in writing. 
Throughout his DQ Motion, Plaintiff contends that Hawley Troxell has violated this Rule in its 
representation ofthe three corporate Defendants. See sections 2,6,8,9, 13-18,22 and 25 of the 
DQ Motion. For the following reasons, these contentions are wrong. 
1. The Representation Agreements Eliminate Any Direct Adversity Between 
Defendants During This Litigation. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if the representation 
of one client will be directly adverse to another client. lRCP 1.7 (a)(1). There is no direct 
adversity between or among Hawley Troxell's clients for the purposes ofthis litigation, however, 
because they are all co-defendants and share common interests in defending against Reed's 
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claims in this litigation and because they agreed to toll all claims between or among them. See 
Section IV.B.2 above; Strait Aff. Sections III.2 and VII.B.l ("There is no l.7(a)(1) adversity 
which has not been reserved and tolled or which is outside the current scope of representation of 
Hawley Troxell. RPC 1.7(a)(l) simply does not apply to the current scope of Hawley Troxell's 
litigation counsel common defense representation under the agreements."). 
A concurrent conflict also exists under IRCP 1.7(a)(2) if "there is a significant risk that 
the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibility 
to another client .... " Therefore, a conflict of interest might arise when an attorney 
simultaneously represents two parties in litigation, such as codefendants. 
However, even if a lawyer represents codefendants that might have adverse interests in 
future litigation, there is no conflict of interest when an attorney represents "two clients (a) for 
their joint purpose, (b) to accomplish a common end result, and (c) to implement their joint plan . 
. . . " See Buehler v. Sbardellati, 34 Cal.AppAth 1527, 1540 (1995). In Buehler, the attorney was 
aware that the two clients had some concerns regarding the structure of their partnership 
agreement, but was hired solely to determine whether the agreement complied with California 
law. Id. at 1534. The attorney informed the clients that he could represent them to this extent, 
but could not represent either of them if the dealings between the two became adversarial. Id. 
The attorney further clarified that he could not participate in any negotiation of one partner 
contrary to the other. !d. Because the attorney limited his representation to the extent that the 
two partners shared common goals in the attorney's simultaneous representation, their interests 
were not adverse. Id. at 1540. 
AIA submits that the Representation Agreements between and among Hawley Troxell 
and its clients, as well as the other Defendants, assure that Hawley Troxell's representation of the 
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corporate Defendants is limited to their common interests in defending Reed's complaint, so that 
even if there is any concurrent conflict of interest among the corporate Defendants, that conflict 
can be waived under IRPC 1.7(b). 
2. Reed Erroneously Contends That "Irreconcilable" Or "Nonwaivable" Conflicts 
Of Interest Require That Hawley Troxell Be Disqualified From Representing Any of the 
Corporate Defendants. Plaintiffs DQ Motion and the Affidavit of his expert, Peter Jarvis, 
contain vague and unexplained assertions that unspecified conflicts of interest among the 
corporate Defendants are "irreconcilable", "unconsentable" or "not waivable". Reed generalizes 
that "there can be no joint representation because each of the defendant's interests are 
irreconcilably divergent and are in direct conflict." DQ Motion p. 33. Citing IRPC 1.7 cmt. 14 
that some conflicts are unconsentable, but without identifying any such conflicts, Plaintiff 
concludes that "the conflicts between Hawley Troxell's clients are so irreconcilable that such 
conflicts are nonconsentable under RPC 1.7." !d. p. 38. Again without elucidation, Reed 
reiterates his contention that "the interests of all three corporations are irreconcilably divergent 
and there is no possible way that Hawley Troxell ... could have reasonably believed that the 
interest of the corporations would not be adversely affected by joint representation." Id. p. 45. 
See also Jarvis Affidavit ~~ 4.a., S.c., S.d. 
Neither Plaintiffs counsel nor Mr. Jarvis bothers to inform the Court or opposing counsel 
(i) what are the standards for determining whether a concurrent conflict is waivable or non-
waivable, (ii) what conflicts plaintiff perceives to be non-waivable, or (iii) why such conflicts 
supposedly cannot be waived. Their conclusory declarations are unaccompanied by 
identification of any particular alleged conflict or any explanation of why such conflict is 
"irreconcilable" rather than being waivable with informed consent of each client confirmed in 
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writing, as was obtained in this case by Hawley Troxell in accordance with IRPC 1.7(b)(4). See, 
e.g., Jarvis Aff. ~ S.c. 
Non-waivable Conflicts. Under Rule 1. 7(b), concurrent conflicts of interest cannot be 
waived through informed client consent: (i) ifthe representation is prohibited by applicable law; 
or (ii) if the representation involves a claim by one client against another client represented by 
the lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding before the tribunal i.e., when the clients 
are directly adverse in the same proceeding. IRCP 1.7(b )(2), (3) and cmts 16, 17. Self-
evidently, neither ofthese two situations exists in the present case. 
Waivable Conflicts. Absent a legal prohibition or direct adversity in the same 
proceeding, the representation of codefendants with similar interests in litigation is proper if the 
requirements of Rule 1.7(a)(2), (b)(1) and (4) are met. IRCP 1.7 cmt. 23 states: 
Paragraph (b)(3) prohibits representation of opposing parties in the 
same litigation, regardless of the clients' consent. On the other 
hand, simultaneous representation of parties whose interests in 
litigation may conflict, such as coplaintiffs or codefendants, is 
governed by paragraph (a)(2). 
Rule 1.7(a)(2) provides that a concurrent conflict of interest exists if "there is a significant risk 
that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's 
responsibilities to another client .... ,,12 However, Rule 1.7(b) provides that, even if a 
concurrent conflict of interest exists, the lawyer may nevertheless represent two or more 
codefendants if, under Rule 1.7(b)(l) and (4), the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will 
be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client, and each 
12 As discussed above, the Representation Agreements assure that Hawley Troxell's representation of 
the corporate Defendants is limited to their common interests in defending Reed's complaint, so that 
there is no significant risk under Rule 1.7(a)(2) and therefore no concurrent conflict of interest. 
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affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. See !RCP cmt. 23 ("[C]ommon 
representation of persons having similar interests in litigation is proper if the requirements of 
paragraph (b) are met."). 
Generally, a lawyer can represent multiple parties "where the clients are generally 
aligned in interest even though there is some difference in interest among them." !RCP 1.7, cmt. 
28 (addressing nonlitigation conflicts). Client consent is sufficient to waive both actual and 
potential conflicts of interest if the lawyer can reasonably conclude that the lawyer is able to 
provide competent and diligent representation. IPRC 1.7(b)(1); see Zador Corp. v. Kwan, 31 
Cal.AppAth 1285, 1295 (1995). A client can give informed consent as long as the client is 
aware of the circumstances and the "reasonably foreseeable ways that the conflict could have 
adverse effects on the interests of that client." !RCP 1.7 cmt. 18. 
Informed Conflict Waivers Obtained. Before undertaking joint representation of AIA 
Services and AIA Insurance in May 2007, and before proposing that the co-Defendants enter into 
a Joint Defense Agreement, Hawley Troxell carefully considered whether such representation 
could be undertaken in accordance with the applicable Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct and 
concluded that, with carefully designed disclosures, informed consents to waive conflicts, and 
tolling agreements among the Defendants, such representation and joint defense arrangement are 
proper. Based on that consideration, and on the conflict waivers and tolling agreements among 
the Defendants included in the Representation Agreements, Hawley Troxell reasonably believed 
that the firm would be able to provide competent and diligent representation to both AIA 
Services and AIA Insurance. Babbitt Aff. ~~ 8-12. In addition, Hawley Troxell reasonably 
believed, and continues to reasonably believe, that viable defenses to Plaintiffs claims exist. 
Babbitt Aff. ~ 12. See, e.g., Section IV.DA of this Memorandum. 
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Reed's motion to disqualify Hawley Troxell under IRCP 1.7 is misinformed and 
misguided. Even ifthere exist concurrent conflicts of interest among the three corporate 
defendants, Hawley Troxell's representation of its clients in this case is based on the informed 
consent of the firm's clients and the lawyers' reasonable belief that, under the circumstances 
detailed in Section IV.R2 above, the lawyers in this firm are able to provide competent and 
diligent representation to each affected client as required by Rule 1. 7(b )(2). Those 
circumstances include the Representation Agreements, particularly (i) written conflict waivers by 
the three corporations and by each of the individual Defendants in accordance with Rule 
1.7(b)(4) and (ii) standstill and tolling agreements between and among the three corporate 
Defendants and all of the individual Defendants, thereby preserving all claims between or among 
the Defendants pending the outcome of this case. I3 
Plaintiffs counsel's mantra is that Hawley Troxell should not have represented both AIA 
Services Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc. See, e.g., Babbitt Aff. Ex. 6 (Mr. Bond's August 
3, 2008 email asserting "I have advised you all time and time again that AIA Insurance should 
have separate counse1."). Hawley Troxell carefully considered this question before undertaking 
joint representation of AIA Services and AIA Insurance and concluded that, under the 
circumstances, such joint representation is proper under the applicable Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct. Babbitt Aff. ~ 12. Even if there exists a concurrent conflict of interest 
13 It is clear that plaintiff s expert, Peter Jarvis, is unaware of the existence of the Representation 
Agreements and did not take them into account in reaching his opinions. See Jarvis Aff. ~ 4.a. (The 
Law Firms "are laboring under severe conflicts of interest that either have not been waived or are 
nonwaivable."); ~ S.d. ("It does not appear that any, let alone all, of these conflicts can be and have 
effectively been waived by disinterested individuals.") 
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between the AIA entities, IRCP 1.7(b) provides that the conflict is waivable if - as is the case 
here - each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. 
IRPC 1.2( c), relating to limited representations, provides an appropriate way of analyzing 
whether Hawley Troxell's joint representation of the corporate Defendants is permissible in light 
of the claims the corporate Defendants may have against one another. See Restatement of the 
Law Governing Lawyers § 121, Comment c (iii) ("Some conflicts can be eliminated by an 
agreement limiting the scope of the lawyer's representation if the limitation can be given effect 
without rendering the remaining representation objectively inadequate") (citations omitted); N.Y. 
City Bar Formal Opinion 2001-3 at 2-3 (decided under New York's version of the Model Code) 
("representation may be limited to eliminate adversity and avoid a conflict of interest"); 
Indianapolis Podiatry, P.e. v. Efroymson, 720 N.E.2d 376,380-81 (Ind. App. 1999) (because 
law firm limited the scope of its engagement, there was no direct conflict of interest). 
The requirements for limiting a representation are similar to those that exist for obtaining 
a waiver of a concurrent conflict of interest. Under Rule 1.2( c), there is both a reasonableness 
test (the limitation must be reasonable under the circumstances), and a client consent requirement 
(the client must give informed consent). Hawley Troxell limited its engagement by AIA to 
representation of its clients in Reed's lawsuit and its engagement by CropUSA to local counsel 
representation in this suit; and all claims between or among the corporate Defendants and/or the 
individual Defendants have been preserved by tolling agreements. Further, each of the 
Defendants gave informed consent to the representation. Under these circumstances, the limited 
representation was reasonable, and in fact necessary, to enable the corporate Defendants to 
defend themselves against Reed's claims. According to Professor Strait: "Under Idaho RPC 1.2, 
Hawley Troxell may, after full discussion with the AIA entities and with Crop, undertake such a 
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joint representation with an appropriately limited scope of representation to the common claims 
as authorized by the control groups and consistent with their authority to defend against Reed's 
claims." 
Plaintiff asserts that Hawley Troxell must be disqualified in order "to ensure fairness to 
Reed Taylor in prosecuting his claims, and uphold the integrity of the legal system". While 
Plaintiffhas taken issue with Hawley Troxell's defense of the corporate Defendants - alleging, 
for example, that the attorneys are making "inappropriate" arguments and implying lack of good 
faith or reasonable basis in fact (DQ Motion p. 10, 12,25,39-40,46), Plaintiff has made no 
showing whatsoever that replacing AIA's counsel and/or obtaining separate counsel for AIA 
Services and AIA Insurance would in any way change the fairness or unfairness of the defense or 
the ability of Reed Taylor to prosecute his claims. 
For example, if separate counsel had been obtained for AIA Insurance, would they have 
played any different role than Hawley Troxell? Reed presumably would contend that separate 
counsel would have brought claims against AIA Services and the individual Defendants for 
alleged self-dealing transactions. But this argument suffers from the same defects as above, 
including the fact that the same directors and officers manage both the parent company and its 
wholly-owned subsidiary; those directors and officers are Defendants in this lawsuit; and any 
attorneys for AIA Insurance - whether Hawley Troxell or other counsel -- are entitled, pursuant 
to IRCP 1.13( a), to rely on those directors and officers for direction in the conduct of the 
litigation. See Section IV.F of this Memorandum below. The likelihood that such management 
of AIA Insurance would direct separate counsel to sue themselves is remote. 
Fairness or integrity of judicia I process are not Plaintiffs real concerns. Rather, the crux 
of Reed's argument is that Plaintiffs claims are so self-evident that the Defendants should not be 
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pennitted to defend against Plaintiff s claims. Instead, Reed contends that Defendants and their 
counsel should take him at his word that his claims are unassailable, that Plaintiff and his 
attorneys are entitled to act as judge and jury, that Defendants have no right to defend against the 
claims, that counsel has no right to serve as an advocate for the Defendants, and that AIA 
Services and AIA Insurance should now be suing the other Defendants rather than defending 
against Reed's claims. See, e.g., Bond's May 11, 2007 letter (Bond Aff. Ex. 29) ("A careful 
review of the pleadings, briefs, oral testimony and hearing exhibits clearly demonstrates that the 
corporations have been operated for years for the benefit of John Taylor and others to the 
detriment of Reed Taylor and other creditors."); DQ Motion p. 33. Reed and his counsel have 
characterized any defense raised by Defendants' counsel as frivolous and as aiding and abetting 
allegedly wrongful actions of other Defendants. DQ Motion p. 25; Bond Aff. Ex. 38. 
Professor Strait has characterized Plaintiffs premise as absurd. See Strait Aff. Section 
VILA.1. ("The heart of the motion to disqualify is the claim, repeated in multiple forms and 
multiple times, that the control group of AIA Services, AIA Insurance and Crop are all conflicted 
because they have been named in Reed Taylor's suit and, therefore, cannot take a position with 
regard to Reed Taylor'S claims. That position is absurd."); see also Strait Aff. Section VII.E.l, 
in which Professor Strait observes: "Under [Reed's] theory, no Board could oppose his claims 
since he has named every Board member and, therefore, under his theory (unique arid absurd), 
the conflicted Board members cannot act on behalf of a closely-held corporation ... to oppose his 
theories asserted in his Complaint. Any counsel who cooperates with such a Board and allows 
themselves to be hired as litigation counsel is therefore a co-bad actor. Accordingly, no 
litigation counsel, whether representing one or more of the entities jointly or solely, could take 
an adverse position to Reed's claims on behalf of the entity." 
1./011, 
AIA'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISQUALIFY COUNSEL 45 
40005.0006.1309816.2 
In addition, Reed chose to sue AIA Insurance, Inc., making AIA Insurance a Defendant 
and giving it and its parent company a common interest in ajoint defense against a "hostile 
takeover". Cf. Strait Aff. Section VILE. 1. Reed did NOT attempt to assert derivative claims on 
behalf of AIA Insurance against AIA Services and/or the individual Defendants, in which case 
AIA Insurance would have been a plaintiff, rather than a Defendant, and would have been 
represented by Plaintiffs counsel rather than Hawley Troxell. This bed is of Reed's and his co-
counsels' own making 
3. Reed Erroneously Contends That Hawley Troxell Cannot Represent The Three 
Corporations Without Breaching The Attorneys' Duty Of Loyalty To Each Client. In the 
conclusory manner that permeates the DQ Motion, Reed asserts that "it is impossible for Hawley 
Troxell ... to simultaneously represent the interest of Crop USA, AIA Services and AIA 
Insurance, while at the same time giving each corporation their undivided loyalty" as required by 
IRCP 1.7. DQ Motion p. 36. For the same reasons detailed above, Hawley Troxell reasonably 
believes, based on the Representation Agreements, that the three corporations share a common 
interest in defending against Reed's Complaint, that the clients' interests are aligned for that 
purpose, and that the tolling agreements which preserve claims inter se the Defendants removes 
any direct adversity that would purportedly make it "impossible" for Hawley Troxell to give 
each corporation its undivided loyalty in the context of the defense of the limited engagement to 
defend the corporate Defendants against Reed's claims in this litigation. 
4. Plaintiff Is Not A Creditor But Rather A Redeemed Shareholder Subject To 
Statutory Payment Restrictions Because Of AlA Services' Insolvency. Plaintiff contends that 
Hawley Troxell has not represented the interests of AIA Insurance and AIA Services (Amended 
Motion at p. 23), by which Plaintiff apparently means that Hawley Troxell has not represented 
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Reed Taylor's interests as a creditor of AlA Services and a pledgee of AIA Insurance stock. The 
motion to disqualify Hawley Troxell, both directly and by reference to the separate lawsuit that 
Plaintiff has filed against the firm, alleges that the attorneys' conduct of the defense of this case 
has been "inappropriate" and that Hawley Troxell has aided and abetted the Defendants in 
tortious conduct. See, e.g., Bond Aff. Ex. 38 ~~ 32,36,53; DQ Motion p. 25, 50. To the extent 
Plaintiff seeks disqualification of counsel on this basis, AIA incorporates by reference the 
Memorandum In Support ofLR.C.P. Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss filed and pending for 
hearing in Case No. CV08-01765. Babbitt Aff. Ex. 13. 
In a similar vein, Plaintiff complains that Hawley Troxell participated in ceasing all 
payments to Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor. Again, this assertion impermissibly conflates 
counsel with client. See Section IV.C above. 
More significant, however, is the fact - as explained below - that AlA Services 
Corporation cannot legally pay Reed Taylor because, as Plaintiff himself alleges, AIA Services 
has been insolvent. DQ Motion p. 43. Under the Idaho Business Corporation Act, redemption 
of a common shareholder like Reed Taylor is illegal, and the redemption obligations are void and 
unenforceable, to the extent AIA Services was insolvent or would be rendered insolvent by the 
redemption obligation. Idaho Code § 30-1-6 (as in effect prior to July 1, 1997) provided: "A 
corporation shall have the right to purchase ... or otherwise acquire ... its own shares, but 
purchases of its own shares, whether direct or indirect, shall be made only to the extent of 
unreserved and unrestricted earned surplus available therefor, and, ... with the affirmative vote 
of the holders of a majority of all shares entitled to vote thereon, to the extent of unreserved and 
unrestricted capital surplus available therefor. ... No purchase of or payment for its own shares 
shall be made at a time when the corporation is insolvent or when such purchase or payment 
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would make it insolvent." (Emphasis added.) Idaho Code § 30-1-46 similarly provided: "The 
board of directors of a corporation may ... distribute to its shareholders out of capital surplus of 
the corporation a portion of its assets, in cash or property, subject to the following provisions: 
(a) No such distribution shall be made at a time when the corporation is insolvent or when such 
distribution would render the corporation insolvent . ... " (Emphasis added.) 
It is crucial to recognize that Reed Taylor is NOT a creditor who loaned funds to AIA 
Services, but rather is a former shareholder. The common stock interest being redeemed from 
Reed is on a par with the interest of the other common shareholders. Especially as the 
controlling shareholder of AIA Services at the time of the Stock Redemption Agreement in 
1995, Reed cannot simply leap into a preferred position as a creditor, to the detriment of the 
other common shareholders. 
In granting partial summary judgment that AIA Services' note payable to Reed is 
currently in default, the Court relied on cases involving creditors. However, AIA Services is not 
a borrower; and Reed Taylor is not a lender. Rather, he was a common shareholder whose 
interests were redeemed. His rights as a redeemed shareholder are subj ect to the restrictions in 
the Idaho Business Corporation Act on a corporation's right to redeem its own shares, 
restrictions that are designed to prohibit a shareholder from re-characterizing his common equity 
interest in the corporation to a creditor's interest with priority over all other shareholders. See 
Idaho Code §§ 30-1-6 and 30-1-46 as in effect in 1995 and 1996. Those statutory rules are 
designed to prevent exactly what Reed Taylor is attempting to do in this litigation. 
Reed admits that, at least since 2001, AIA Services has been insolvent. See DQ Motion 
p. 44; ~ 12 of Reed's Complaint against Hawley Troxell in Civ. No. CV 08-01765. Defendants 
contend that AIA Services was also insolvent in 1995 and 1996. Consequently, under Idaho 
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Code §§ 30-1-6 and 30-1-46, the redemption agreement is void and unenforceable; and, as a 
matter oflaw, Reed is not a creditor entitled to any special duties or remedies because of AIA 
Services' insolvency. 
5. Acceptance Of Fees For Legal Services Does Not Breach The Lawyer's Duty Of 
Loyalty. The DQ Motion (pp. 40, 52) alleges that the attorneys' "sole purpose" in multiple 
representation is to earn fees, constituting self-interest in violation ofIRCP 1.7(a)(2». This view 
cannot be countenanced. 
It is well settled that a conflict of interest requiring disqualification under Model Rule 1.7 
does not exist merely because an attorney may be personally interested in the outcome of the 
litigation. Lowe v. Experian, 328 F. Supp.2d 1122, 1129 (D. Kansas 2004); Main Events Prod., 
LLe v. Lacy, 220 F. Supp. 2d 353, 358 (D.N.J. 2002). In Lowe, the court recognized that many 
attorneys have financial interests in the outcome of litigation, such as attorneys that enter into 
contingency fee arrangements with their clients. Lowe, 328 F. Supp. 2d at 1129. Contingency 
fee arrangements necessarily mean that the attorney has a personal interest in the outcome of the 
litigation because their payment is premised on their client's recovery. Id. However, this 
personal interest in receiving a payment has been deemed ethical and would not warrant 
disqualification. Id. 
Further, the examples set forth under IRPC 1.7(a)(2) do not consider the receipt of 
attorneys' fees to be a personal interest for purposes of that rule. Rather, the lawyer has an 
impermissible "personal interest" only when the lawyer's interests have an adverse effect on the 
representation of the client. See IRPC 1.7, cmt 10. The examples set forth in that comment 
include personal interests such as discussions concerning possible employment with opposing 
counselor "referring clients to an enterprise in which the lawyer has an undisclosed financial 
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interest." Id. Other potential conflicts based on a lawyer's personal interest deal with the 
lawyer's personal relationship, such as when the lawyers representing adverse clients are related 
by blood, marriage or other domestic relationship, or entering a business transaction with the 
client or acquiring an interest adverse to a client. IRPC 1.7(a)(2) cmt 11; IRPC 1.8. 
The examples set forth in the IRCP and the cases addressing personal conflicts of interest 
support the conclusion that an attorney's interest in fees does not create a conflict of interest 
under IRPC 1.7(a)(2). An interest in receiving fees for legal services performed is ethical; and 
the acceptance of such fees is not an action that is contrary to the interest of a client. Therefore, 
the mere acceptance of fees for legal services cannot constitute a personal conflict of interest 
under IRPC 1.7(a)(2). If it were, Mr. Bond and Mr. Bissell would also have an IRPC 1.7(a)(2) 
conflict. 
Further, Professor Strait notes that "the AIA entities may enter into transactions designed 
to assure adequate financing to fulfill the entities' obligations to indemnify and defend against 
Reed's claims since Reed has sued directors individually under the bylaws of the respective 
corporations." Strait Aff. Section VILB.3. Accordingly, Hawley Troxell did not breach any 
duty ofloyalty to AIA by drafting documentation of the loan by CropUSA to AIA Services. See 
Section II.! above. 
E. The "Hot Potato" Doctrine Has No Application to Hawley Troxell. 
Citing IRPC 1.9 (Duties to Former Clients), Plaintiff seeks disqualification of all 
attorneys "because they cannot drop the representation of anyone or more of the defendants to 
remain counsel for another defendant." DQ Motion p. 34. Because joint representation of the 
corporate Defendants by Hawley Troxell is appropriate under the circumstances of this case, the 
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firm has no intention of dropping representation of any of its clients in order to represent another 
preferred client. The "hot potato" doctrine has no relevance to Hawley Troxell. 
F. Hawley Troxell's Conduct Of This Case Is Directed By AlA's Authorized 
Constituents Under IRCP 1.13 And Idaho Code § 30-1-801. 
Reed complains that Hawley Troxell knows that John Taylor is directing the litigation in 
his own interests and alleges that the lawyers are not proceeding in the best interest of the 
corporation as required by IRCP 1. 13 (b). See DQ Motion (at pp. 40-42, 47-48). Similarly, in a 
May 11, 2007 letter (Bond Aff. Ex. 29), Plaintiffs counsel asserts that "it is inappropriate for 
John Taylor to direct litigation on behalf ofthe corporation in light of the substantial claims 
already alleged against him." 
Under IRCP 1.13 as applied to the circumstances of this case, this argument cannot be 
countenanced. Hawley Troxell is authorized and directed by both the Idaho Business 
Corporation Act and the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct to represent AIA Services 
Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc. through their duly authorized constituents - i.e., the board 
of directors and the duly appointed officers of the corporations. 
IRCP 1.13(a) confirms that a lawyer employed or retained by an organization "represents 
the organization acting through its authorized constituents". Comment 1 states that officers, 
directors, employees and shareholders are "constituents" of the corporate organizational client. 
John Taylor is the chief executive officer and president ofthe two corporations, duly appointed 
by the respective boards of directors. As such, John Taylor is an authorized "constituent" of the 
AIA entities, as are the boards of directors of the two corporations. Further, the boards have 
taken an active role in directing Hawley Troxell in this litigation. As IRCP Rule 1.13 comment 5 
makes clear, in a corporation "[t]he organization's highest authority to whom a matter may be 
referred ordinarily will be the board of directors" or, under certain circumstances, "the 
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independent directors of the corporation." This Rule is consistent with Idaho corporate law. See 
Idaho Code § 30-1-801(2) ("All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of, 
and the business and affairs of the corporation managed by or under the direction of, its board of 
lrectors .... . d· ") 
Other than the ludicrous suggestions (DQ Motion at pp. 42-47, 49-50) that Plaintiff 
himself is the only "disinterested" person entitled to choose counsel for the AIA entities, waive 
conflicts, approve joint representation of the AIA entities, approve the joint defense agreement 
and direct the defense,14 it is unclear who Reed thinks should be directing the AIA defense. As 
a practical matter, who else is there to direct the defense of this case besides the Defendant 
directors and officers of the corporations? With Reed suing newly appointed directors (i.e., 
Connie Taylor and Jim Beck) and the companies not having directors and officers insurance, 
there is no realistic possibility of finding independent directors to direct the litigation. See 
Minutes of the August 7, 2008 meeting of the AIA boards of directors (Bond Aff. Ex. 41). 
Professor Strait observes: "Under [Reed's] theory, no Board could oppose his claims since he 
has named every Board member and, therefore, under his theory (unique and absurd), the 
conflicted Board members cannot act on behalf of a closely-held corporation ... to oppose his 
theories asserted in his Complaint." Strait Aff. Section VII.E.1. 
Reed's partial quotation ofIRCP 1. 13 (b) is misleading (DQ Motion pp. 41-42): He 
quotes only the first sentence of the Rule, which provides that "the lawyer shall proceed as is 
reasonably necessary in the best interest ofthe corporation" if the lawyer knows that an officer or 
employee is engaged in action that is a violation of a legal obligation to the corporation or a 
14 See Section IV.G.3 below. 
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violation oflaw that is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization." However, he 
omits the second sentence, which explains that the lawyer normally should report such conduct 
up-the-Iadder "to higher authority in the organization, including, if warranted by the 
circumstances, to the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization .... " Rule 1.7 
acknowledges the fundamental principle of corporate law that the boards of directors of AIA 
Services and AIA Insurance are the highest authorities in those organizations. IRCP Rule 1.13 
cmt 5. Where, as here, the directors themselves are the persons accused of malfeasance, there is 
no higher authority which could direct Hawley Troxell in defense of Reed's claims. 
From his misconceived argument that interested directors cannot direct the defense 
against his claims, Reed contends that AIA Services and AIA Insurance should somehow have 
found disinterested directors to give direction to defense counsel. However, IRCP Rule 1.13 
does not distinguish between interested and disinterested directors or officers, or between inside 
and independent directors or officers. The fact is that, in this case, Reed's own actions have 
resulted in every director and officer of AlA Services and AIA Insurance being "interested" 
because they are all being sued by Reed. Absent independent directors or officers, there's no 
independent person to direct the defense. 
In a related but equally misconceived argument, Reed contends (DQ Motion at pp. 47-48) 
that "the Attorneys have taken instructions from R. John Taylor in violation ofthe Rules of 
Professional Conduct and failed to notify disinterested parties or shareholders of the improper 
acts ofR. John Taylor." To the contrary, IRCP 1.13( d) expressly negates any obligation to 
.reveal confidential information to any person other than the organization's highest authority (in 
this case, the corporations' boards of directors) where the lawyer's representation relates to the 
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investigation of an alleged violation oflaw or the defense of the organization against a claim 
arising out of an alleged violation oflaw. As stated in Comment 7: 
Paragraph (d) makes clear that the authority of a lawyer to disclose 
information relating to a representation in circumstances described 
in paragraph (c) does not apply with respect to information 
relating to a lawyer's engagement by an organization to investigate 
an alleged violation of law or to defend the organization ... against 
a claim arising out of an alleged violation of law. This is necessary 
in order to enable organizational clients to enjoy the full benefits of 
legal counsel in conducting an investigation or defending against a 
claim. 
The gravamen of Reed's complaint in this litigation is that the corporations, through their 
directors and officers, have engaged in violations oflaw. Reed's claims bring IRCP 1.7(d) 
directly into play. IRCP L 7 is clearly not violated by any alleged failure by Hawley Troxell to 
reveal to "disinterested parties or shareholders" otherwise confidential information concerning 
alleged misconduct by the Defendants. 
G. Reed Erroneously Contends That It Is Impossible For Hawley Troxell To Have 
Obtained Required Consents. 
1. Hawley Troxell's Representation Agreements Were Approved By the AlA Boards, 
Which Are the Corporations' Highest Authority Under lRPC 1.13. Mr. Bond's May 11,2007 
letter (Bond Aff. Ex. 29) states: "I am surprised that you would not require direction and consent 
from a disinterested board of directors prior to your representation of both corporations because 
ofthe substantial claims alleged against John Taylor." As a matter of fact, Hawley Troxell 
ensured that the AIA Services and AIA Insurance boards approved the Representation 
Agreements in connection with the firm's appearance for the two corporations. At the time 
Hawley Troxell was retained, JoLee Duclos and Bryan Freeman had resigned as directors. AlA 
Services and AIA Insurance re-constituted their boards and approved engagement of Hawley 
Troxell pursuant to the Representation Agreements. Connie Taylor and Jim Beck were added to 
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the boards with the intention that they serve as independent directors precisely because of the 
potential conflict between the corporations and John Taylor given Reed's allegations of self-
dealing by John. (At that time, Jim Beck was not a defendant. Connie had been sued, but only 
with respect to her community property interest as John's former spouse; and John Hally filed a 
motion to dismiss her in that capacity. After Connie joined the AIA boards, Reed then sued her 
as a director, and the motion to dismiss was mooted.) Before Connie and Jim were named as 
defendants by amended complaint, the two boards approved the Representation Agreements. 
2. Independent Shareholder Approval of Hawley Troxell's Engagement By AlA Is 
Not Required. Plaintiff contends that disinterested shareholder approval is required to authorize 
Hawley Troxell's engagement by the AIA entities and to authorize the joint defense agreement 
among the Defendants. Babbitt Aff. Ex. 8 (Bond's August 5, 2008 email: "[N]o 'true' 
independent shareholder approval was ever obtained for your representation, let alone any full 
and fair disclosure."); DQ Motion pp. 8-9 (John Taylor "did not seek approval of any joint 
retainer or joint defense agreements, and did not obtain votes only from disinterested 
shareholders .... "). This contention is unsupportable. 
The representation of AIA Services and AIA Insurance by Hawley Troxell, as well as the 
conflict waiver letters, the standstill and tolling agreements and the joint defense agreement, 
were approved by the AIA Services and AIA Insurance boards. Contrary to Reed's assumption, 
there is no obligation to obtain disinterested shareholder approval of such representation. Idaho 
Code Sections 30-1-861, -863 provide a safe harbor if a director's conflicting interest transaction 
is approved by the disinterested shareholders; but failure to obtain such a vote is not wrongful. 
Also, Hawley Troxell had no involvement in AIA Services' solicitation of the vote of AIA 
AIA'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISQUALIFY COUNSEL - 55 t.to~ 
40005.0006.1309816.2 
Services shareholders to approve the advance of litigation expenses to the individual defendants. 
See Babbitt Aff. ~ 13. 
Plaintiff argues that all of the Attorneys should be disqualified because they "failed to 
obtain shareholder or disinterested party consent of the joint representation, joint defense and 
joint retainer as required by the Rules of Professional Conduct." DQ Motion p. 43. This 
argument is based on two fundamental errors: First, it is premised on the mistaken assumption 
(id. p. 42) that a joint defense agreement is equivalent to "dual representation" under RPC 1.7 
and 1. 13(g). This erroneous assumption is dispelled in Section IV.B.4 ofthis Memorandum. 
Second, Plaintiff cites IRPC 1. 13 (g) for the supposed proposition that "the consent shall 
be given by an appropriate official of the organization other than the individual who is to be 
represented, or by the shareholders", incorrectly implying that Rule 1.13(g) requires shareholder 
approval of the lawyers' representation of the corporation ifthe directors and officers are also 
being sued. Id. This reliance on IRCP 1.13(g) is misplaced, as Reed has quoted only a portion 
of the Rule out of context and thereby misrepresented its limited scope and purpose. IRCP 
1. 13 (g) provides, in full: 
A lawyer representing an organization may also represent any of 
its directors, officers, employees, members, shareholder or other 
constituents, subject to the provision of Rule 1.7. If the 
organization's consent to the dual representation is required by 
Rule 1.7, the consent shall be given by an appropriate official of 
the organization other than the individual who is to be represented, 
or by the shareholders. 
Under RPC 1.13(g), if an attorney were representing a corporation, and if the corporation's 
consent to dual representation of a director or officer were required by RPC 1.7, authorization to 
undertake dual representation might require written consent "given by an appropriate official of 
the organization other than the individual who is to be represented, or by the shareholders." 
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However, IRCP 1.13(g) does not purport to address the question of who is entitled to engage the 
attorneys for the corporation itself. In this case, the Rule is inapplicable because no attorney of 
record represents both a corporation and any individual director/officer Defendant; and in 
particular, Hawley Troxell has not undertaken the representation of any of the individual 
Defendant directors or officers of its corporation clients. Babbitt Aff. , 11. Hawley Troxell 
represents only AIA Services, AIA Insurance and (as local counsel) CropUSA. Because Hawley 
Troxell does not represent any of the individual Director Defendants, IRPC 1.13(g) is not 
implicated. 
3. Hawley Troxell's Representation Of Its Clients Does Not Require Reed Taylor's 
Consent. Reed Taylor asserts throughout his DQ Motion that Hawley Troxell must be 
disqualified because Reed Taylor and/or Donna Taylor have not consented to Hawley Troxell's 
representation of AIA Services and AIA Insurance, and that Reed is the only person with 
authority to waive conflicts of interest. See DQ Motion, pp. 9,41,46,50. This argument is 
premised on the proposition that Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor are entitled to seats on the AIA 
Services Board of Directors (see id., p. 41) and that Reed Taylor is entitled to immediate 
possession of AIA Insurance (see id., p. 50). As an initial matter, the question of whether Reed 
Taylor and/or Donna Taylor are entitled to a seat on the AIA Services Board of Directors is a 
disputed issue which has not yet been addressed in this litigation. 
More importantly, Reed Taylor's argument that he is entitled to decide which law firm(s) 
will represent AIA Services and AIA Insurance in this litigation is inimical to the very nature of 
the adversary court system. Reed Taylor cannot possibly be entitled to chose who will represent 
the parties that he has sued in this litigation. If Reed Taylor is entitled to make the decision, then 
AIA Services and AIA Insurance would be without counsel: Reed Taylor has repeatedly 
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asserted in this litigation that it is improper for any attorney to accept attorney's fees from AIA 
Services or AIA Insurance, because any funds used to pay attorney's fees should instead be paid 
to Reed Taylor. Further, Plaintiff would not consent to any counsel that did not agree with his 
position. Thus, Reed Taylor would not consent to any law firm defending AIA Services and 
AIA Insurance against his claims, leaving both companies without legal assistance in defending 
themselves in this litigation. 
H. The Possibility That A Hawley Troxell Attorney Might Be A Witness Concerning 
Certain Matters Does Not Require Disqualification ofthe Firm Under IRCP 3.7. 
1. Disqualification of the Entire Firm Is Unwarranted. Reed apparently seeks 
disqualification of the entire Hawley Troxell law firm, pursuant to IRPC 3.7, because Mr. Riley 
is allegedly a witness in connection with an opinion given by his former firm, Eberle Berlin, in 
1995. 15 DQ Motion pp. 39-40. IRPC 3.7, which is identical to the American Bar Association's 
Model Rule of Professional Conduct ("Model Rule") 3.7, provides (in pertinent part): 
(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the 
lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness unless: 
*** 
(3) Disqualification of the lawyer would work 
substantial hardship on the client. 
(b) A lawyer may act as advocate in a trial in which another 
lawyer in the lawyer's firm is likely to be called as a 
witness unless precluded from doing so by Rule 1.7 or 
Rule 1.9. 
As a preliminary matter, note the express equitable exception to the application of Rule 
3.7: The lawyer, or in this case the entire firm of Hawley Troxell, should not be disqualified 
15 Contrary to the assertion in the DQ Motion (p. 28), Plaintiffs expert expressly disclaimed any 
opinion based on IRCP 3.7. See Jarvis Affidavit ~ 4.b.("I therefore do not base my opinion on 
attorney-witness considerations .... "). 
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from acting as AIA's advocate at a trial, even if a lawyer in the firm is likely to be a necessary 
witness, if disqualification of the firm would work substantial hardship on the client. See Section 
AA above, addressing the prejUdice to AIA if Reed's motion to disqualify Hawley Troxell is 
granted. 
Plaintiffs counsel argues that "Richard Riley issued an opinion letter to Reed and 
[Hawley Troxell is] now tying [sic] to disingenuously argue the $8.5 Million is not owed to 
him", referring to the 1995 Eberle Berlin opinion on enforceability of the 1995 stock redemption 
agreement. Babbitt Aff. Ex. 8. Plaintiff apparently believes that Mr. Riley would testify 
adversely to AIA Services, based on the 1995 opinion, that AIA Services was not insolvent at the 
time and that the stock redemption agreement between Reed Taylor and AIA Services was not 
unlawful. Comment 6 to IRCP 3.7 recognizes a conflict of interest ifthere is a substantial 
conflict between the testimony of the client and that of the lawyer who appears as an advocate 
for the client at trial. 
However, Plaintiff has not shown why Mr. Riley is necessarily a witness to any relevant 
facts; and there is no basis in the record for suggesting that Mr. Riley's testimony will conflict 
with the interests of Hawley Troxell's clients.1 6 As discussed below, the 1995 Eberle Berlin 
opinion is not in any way dispositive of (or even relevant to) the question whether AIA Services 
Corporation was insolvent at the time of the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement or the 1996 
Stock Restructuring Agreement or whether, as a consequence of such insolvency, the redemption 
16 For example, the enforceability opinion is expressly qualified by the usual bankruptcylinsolvency 
exception. See Bond Aff. Ex. 2 (Opinion #2). 
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note and stock pledge agreement are illegal and void under the Idaho Business Corporation 
Act. 17 
The application of former Idaho Code § 30-1-6 is a question of law for the Court. Even if 
Mr. Riley could be required to state his personallegal opinion concerning the meaning or 
application of the statute, that testimony would not be either relevant or admissible. Further, the 
financial condition of AIA Services is an issue of fact which is best determined from AIA's 
financial records. Plaintiff, who was the majority stockholder at the time the 1995 Redemption 
Agreement was executed, was aware of AIA's financial condition; and there are financial 
statements and other records from which the solvency or insolvency of AIA Services can be 
determined. 
Ifin fact the corporation was insolvent at the time of the 1995 Stock Redemption 
Agreement and/or the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement, the redemption is 
unlawful under Idaho Code § 30-1-6 and void regardless whether or not the 1995 Eberle Berlin 
opinion was correct and regardless whether Mr. Riley might be a witness. The existence of the 
Eberle Berlin opinion that the 1995 agreement is enforceable does not negate the efficacy of the 
illegality defense if in fact the company was insolvent and the Agreement (including both the 
redemption note and the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement) therefore void. 
17 As a fallback position, Plaintiff s counsel threatens that, "even if the illegality argument had merit, 
Donna Taylor and Reed Taylor would be suing Hawley Troxell (and Richard Riley) in such an 
instance regardless of any circumstances." Babbitt Aff. Ex. 8. See also DQ Motion p. 39 sub~ (6). 
The assertion that there could be any claim against Hawley Troxell for an opinion given by Eberle 
Berlin in 1995 is frivolous. Further, the opinion was not rendered by Richard Riley or any other 
Eberle Berlin lawyer, but rather by the firm itself. Riley Aff. ~ 2. Even if Reed may have a 
malpractice claim against Mr. Riley and his former firm if the opinion was negligently given and the 
claim is not time-barred, this possibility does not creates a conflict of interest that would prevent 
Hawley Troxell from continuing to represent AIA. 
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More importantly, even if Mr. Riley were a necessary witness and therefore pursuant to 
IRPC 3.7(a) could not act as a trial advocate for the firm's clients18, Hawley Troxell would not 
be disqualified under IRPC 3.7. The issues of disqualification of a lawyer-witness to act as an 
advocate at trial and the disqualification of the lawyer's law firm are addressed separately under 
IRCP 3.7(a) and (b), respectively. The Rule does not automatically extend the trial lawyer-
witness prohibition to the partners and associates of a testifying lawyer who does not act as an 
advocate for the client at trial. Rather, subsection (b) specifically allows a lawyer-litigator to act 
as an advocate at trial even where it is likely that the litigator's colleague in the firm will be a 
witness, unless Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9 precludes the litigator from doing so. As stated in Comment 
7 to both IRCP 3.7 and Model Rule 3.7: 
Paragraph (b) provides that a lawyer is not disqualified from 
serving as an advocate because a lawyer with whom the lawyer is 
associated in a firm is precluded from doing so by paragraph (a). 
If, however, the testifying lawyer would also be disqualified by 
Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9 from representing the client in the matter, 
other lawyers in the firm will be precluded from representing the 
client by Rule 1.10 unless the client gives informed consent under 
the conditions stated in Rule 1.7. 
Thus, unless Mr. Riley is disqualified by Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9, there is no requirement that any of 
the Hawley Troxell lawyers who have appeared in this case be disqualified from representing 
AIA Services Corporation as trial advocates in this case. Moreover, comment 7 makes it clear 
that, even if it is assumed that the testifying lawyer would be disqualified under IRPC 1.7 or 1.9, 
other lawyers in the firm may act as trial advocates, notwithstanding IRPC 1.10, with the 
informed consent of the client. 
18 Mr. Riley has not appeared in this action and will not serve as an advocate for AlA Services 
Corporation at trial in this case. Therefore, disqualifying him from acting as an advocate at the trial 
in this case pursuant to IRCP 3.7(a) is unnecessary. 
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In any event, neither Rule 1.7 nor Rule 1.9 is applicable in this situation. Other than the 
"hot potato" argument (which, as explained in Section IV.E above, does not apply to Hawley 
Troxell), Plaintiffs motion to disqualify counsel contains no reference to Rule 1.9 (dealing with 
duties to former clients) in connection with Hawley Troxell's role as counsel in this case. 
Rather, Reed contends that Hawley Troxell should be disqualified under Rule 1.7. However, for 
the reasons discussed in Section IV.D of this Memorandum, that contention must fail. 
Accordingly, in the absence of disqualification under either Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9, the fact that 
Mr. Riley might be a witness does not preclude other Hawley Troxell attorneys from serving as 
trial advocates for the corporate Defendants. 
Courts addressing the issue since the promulgation of Model Rule 3.7 have consistently 
concluded that there is no requirement that an entire law firm be disqualified because one or 
more of its lawyers will be witnesses. See e.g., Ayus v. Total Renal Care, Inc., 48 F.Supp.2d 714, 
717-19 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (attorney's firm not disqualified because attorney will be a witness); 
Harter v. University of Indianapolis, 5 F.Supp.2d 657,667 nA (S.D. Ind. 1998)(attorneys in 
same firm not disqualified because attorney in firm will testify); Brown v. Daniel, 180 F.R.D. 
298,301-02 (D.S.C 1998)(in light of drastic nature of disqualification, Rule 3.7 (b) does not 
require disqualification of the entire firm even though the partner will be a necessary witness); 
Kubin v. Miller, 801 F. Supp. 1101, 1113-14 (S.D.N.Y 1992)(imputing disqualification to fellow 
members of lawyer-witness' firm is extremely harsh and should be limited to special 
circumstances); Ramsay v. Boeing Welfare Benefit Plan, 662 F. Supp. 968, 970-71 (D. Kan. 
1987) (Rule 3.7(b) precluded disqualification of law firm). 
2. Courts Disfavor Attempts To Transform Opposing Attorneys Into Witnesses. 
Plaintiff seeks disqualification of the entire Hawley Troxell law firm pursuant to IRCP 3.7 based 
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on the assertion that all ofthe named attorneys are witnesses to one or more of various actions 
taken during the course of representing AIA in this litigation that Reed alleges to be wrongful, 
aiding and abetting, conspiracy to prevent Reed from exercising his contractual rights, etc. See 
DQ Motion pp. 39-40. Plaintifflists 13 topics on which Hawley Troxell attorneys are 
supposedly witnesses (most of which deal with the very arguments being asserted by counsel in 
this litigation or transactions in which Hawley Troxell was not even involved). DQ Motion pp. 
39-40. The topics listed by Plaintiff are not topics on which any Hawley Troxell attorney could 
ever be deposed, much less on which a Hawley Troxell attorney could ever be required to testify 
at trial. 
Courts generally refuse attempts to depose opposing counsel, both on privilege grounds 
and also as too disruptive of the litigation process and the attorney-client relationship. The long-
accepted standard for whether attorneys involved in the case can be deposed was set by the 
Eighth Circuit in Shelton v. American Motors Corp., 805 F.2d 1323,1327 (8th Cir. 1986).19 In 
that case, a party sought to depose in-house counsel of its opponent to determine whether 
document production was complete. The appellate court refused to permit the deposition, stating 
that such attempts are disfavored because: 
Taking the deposition of opposing counsel not only disrupts the 
adversarial system and lowers the standards of the profession, but 
19 Neither the Idaho courts nor the Ninth Circuit have addressed whether they would apply the Shelton 
factors when determining whether an attorney could be deposed. See DiLonrenzo v. Costeo 
Wholesale Corp. 243 F.R.D. 413, 415 (W.D. Wash. 2007). However, the district courts in the Ninth 
Circuit have applied the factors in these circumstances. See, e.g., id.; Lloyd Lifestyle Ltd. v. Soaring 
Helmet Corp., No. C06-0349C, 2006 WL 753243, at *2 (W.D.Wash. March 23,2006) (unpublished); 
Am. Cas. Co. v. Kreiger, 160 F.R.D. 583, 589 (S.D. Cal. 1995). Additionally, the Idaho Bankruptcy 
court also applied the Shelton factors when it encountered this issue. See In re Wiggins, No. 99-
40458,2000 WL 33712300, at *2 (Bankr. D. Idaho April 10,2000). In fact, most courts that have 
addressed this issue have followed Shelton. [d. 
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it also adds to the already burdensome time and costs oflitigation. 
It is not hard to imagine additional delays to resolve work-product 
and attorney-client objections, as well as delays to resolve 
collateral issues raised by the attorney's testimony. Finally, the 
practice of deposing counsel detracts from the quality of client 
representation. Counsel should be free to devote his or her time 
and efforts to preparing the client's case without fear of being 
interrogated by his or her opponent." 
The court identified the following factors to be used in determining whether to permit an 
opposing attorney to be deposed: (1) No other means exist to obtain the information; (2) The 
information sought is relevant and non-privileged; and (3) the information is crucial to the 
preparation of the case. Reed lists thirteen matters in which the individual named attorneys have 
allegedly been involved and as to which he contends "the Attorneys are witnesses." But Plaintiff 
makes no showing why testimony of Hawley Troxell attorneys would be necessary or proper 
with respect to any of these matters, or what relevant, non-privileged information the attorneys 
might provide, or why any non-privileged information could not be obtained from other persons 
or through other means of discovery. 
The potential disruption to the judicial process may be illustrated by putting the shoe on 
the other foot: If Reed's argument i.e., that attorneys should be disqualified because they are 
witnesses to meetings and other actions occurring during their representation of their client is 
given credence, then AlA could file a counterclaim against Reed and his counsel for abuse of 
process though the concoction oftheir multi-faceted scheme to manufacture conflicts on which 
to base Plaintiffs' motion to disqualify counsel. Under Plaintiffs theory, Roderick Bond and 
Michael Bissell would be subject to disqualification under IRPC 3.7 because they are witnesses 
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to their "inappropriate" and conspiratorial meetings between themselves and with Reed to plan 
their scheme.20 
I. There Is No Appearance Of Impropriety In Hawley Troxell's Representation Of 
The Three Corporate Defendants. 
Plaintiff contends that Hawley Troxell's representation of the corporate Defendants has 
the appearance of impropriety. DQ Motion pp. 52-53. While mouthing the words, Plaintiff has 
failed to demonstrate any appearance of impropriety under the pertinent tests. 
The Court should apply the four-part test the Idaho courts have developed "to determine 
whether an appearance of impropriety alone will give a party standing to interfere with an 
adverse party's choice of counsel." Foster v. Traul, 145 Idaho 24, 32, 175 P.3d 186, 194 (2007). 
Under that test, the Court considers the following factors: 
(1) Whether the motion is being made for the purposes of 
harassing the defendant, 
(2) Whether the party bringing the motion will be damaged 
in some way if the motion is not granted, 
(3) Whether there are any alternative solutions, or is the 
proposed solution the least damaging possible under the 
circumstances, and 
(4) Whether the possibility of public suspicion will 
outweigh any benefits that might accrue to continued 
representation. 
20 Plaintiff even goes so far as to assert that Hawley Troxell should be disqualified because Hawley 
Troxell attorneys are witnesses to the very arguments they have made in this litigation. See, e.g., DQ 
Motion pp. 39-40 (asserting that Hawley Troxell "Attorneys are witnesses to ... arguing against 
naming Mike Cashman as a defendant ... [and] improperly restraining Reed Taylor, when they knew 
he had the contractual rights and that the corporations were not being operating properly." This 
assertion demonstrates the absurdity of Plaintiffs argument. As a participant in hearings on these 
matters, Mr. Bond is a "witness" to those arguments as well and, under Plaintiff s theory, would also 
be disqualified under IRPC 3.7. 
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Id. at 32-33, 175 P.3d at 194-95. Each factor favors allowing Hawley Troxell to continue to 
represent the three corporate Defendants in this action. 
First, the combination of Plaintiffs derivative demand that the boards of directors of AIA 
Services and AIA Insurance sue the corporations' attorneys, the threats by Plaintiff to file a 
malpractice action against AIA's counsel and to furnish a copy of the complaint to the Idaho 
State Bar, and Plaintiffs actual filing of that separate lawsuit against AIA's attorneys 
demonstrates that Plaintiff s motion to disqualify counsel is part of a scheme to harass AIA and 
gain for Plaintiff an unfair tactical advantage in this litigation by manufacturing a basis to seek 
Hawley Troxell's disqualification. Plaintiffs own brief constitutes unequivocal evidence of this 
scheme: He contends that disqualification of Hawley Troxell should be based on the mere filing 
of his separate lawsuit against Hawley Troxell, involving claims of aiding and abetting of the 
breach of fiduciary duties, fraud, conversion and other claims which are supported by the same 
documents and subject matter of this lawsuit. DQ Motion p. 53. Given that Plaintiff, who 
Hawley Troxell has never represented and is not a current or former client ofthe firm, is the de 
facto source of the disqualification effort, the Court should be wary of the increased risk that 
mischief is afoot. See Weaver v. Millard, 120 Idaho at 697. 
Second, Plaintiff fails to explain, in any meaningful way, either (i) how he has already 
been damaged as a result of any alleged conflicts of interest between Hawley Troxell's clients, or 
(ii) how he would be damaged in the future if Hawley Troxell is not disqualified. Even if AIA 
Insurance had had separate counsel from AIA Services and CropUSA, the same directors and 
officers would still be directing the defense of AIA Insurance. There would be no difference in 
the direction given to counsel in the conduct ofthe defense against Reed's claims. The only 
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practical consequence of separate representation of AIA Insurance would be the additional fees 
and costs incurred by yet another set of attorneys. 
Third, given Plaintiff's failure to identify any legitimate risk of prejudice by Hawley 
Troxell's continued representation of the corporate Defendants, the least damaging alternative to 
disqualification is to confirm the right of those Defendants to engage counsel of their choosing 
and allow the representation to continue. 
Fourth, none of the corporate defendants is a public company; and this dispute is not of 
public significance. Hawley Troxell's continued representation ofthe corporate Defendants will 
not arouse public suspicion about the integrity of the legal process. Discontinuing AIA's right 
to the counsel of its choice, however, will impose on AIA the needless cost and inconvenience of 
changing counsel. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct guide lawyers, among other ways, in deciding 
whether representing a client is ethical and not in breach of a duty to another current or former 
client. Hawley Troxell has taken its obligations under the Rules seriously. At the inception of 
its engagement as defense counsel for AIA, the firm reviewed and analyzed the pertinent Rules 
and reached the considered decision that it ethically can represent its clients in this action. Had 
Hawley Troxell reached a contrary decision, the firm would not have undertaken the 
representation in the first place, or would have withdrawn voluntarily had conflicts arising during 
the representation required it. 
The Rules' preamble expresses a cautionary note worth remembering here: "[T]he 
purpose of the Rules can be subverted when they are invoked by opposing parties as procedural 
weapons." See Foster v. Traul, 145 Idaho 24, 32, 175 P.3d 186, 194 (2007) (quoting LR.P.C. 
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pmbl. ~ 20 with approval). In other words, opposing parties may "misuse[ ]" the Rules "as a 
technique for harassment." Weaver v. Millard, 120 Idaho 692, 697,819 P.2d 110,115 (Ct. App. 
1991). Because parties have a fundamental right to choose their own counsel, disqualifYing a 
party's chosen counsel at the request of an opposing party is a "drastic" step. Arkansas Valley 
State Bankv. Phillips, 171 P.3d 899,911 (Okla. 2007); In re Estate of Wright, 881 N.E.2d 362, 
366 (TIl. Ct. App. 2007). Not surprisingly, then, "motions to disqualify are generally 
disfavored." Foster, 145 Idaho at 33, 175 P.3d at 195. Courts are particularly wary of motions 
to disqualify that come "not from a client or former client of the attorney, but from an opposing 
party." Weaver, 120 Idaho at 697,819 P.2d at 115. By all appearances, Plaintiffs DQ Motion is 
a gambit in a concerted scheme to gain an unfair advantage for Plaintiff in this litigation. 
It is also important to note that disqualification is not mandatory even if the 
representation creates a technical violation of one of the Rules. Foster, 145 Idaho at 33, 175 
P .3d at 195. Instead, disqualification is warranted only if necessary to "assure fairness to the 
parties and the integrity of the judicial process"; and a court considering a motion to disqualify 
"should endeavor to reach a solution that is least burdensome to the client." Id. at 32, 175 P.3d 
at 194(quoting Weaver, 120 Idaho at 697, 819 P.2d at 115). 
Plaintiff contends that Hawley Troxell should be disqualified (i) to ensure fairness to 
Reed Taylor in prosecuting his claims, but fails to explain how substituting new counsel would 
in any way change the way in which Plaintiff s counsel presents their case or in which the 
Defendants would defend those claims; (ii) to uphold the integrity ofthe legal system, again 
without explaining how representation of the corporate Defendants by Hawley Troxell has been 
conducted other than in conformity with the rules of the judicial process and the obligation to 
zealously represent the firm's clients within the bounds of the law; and/or (iii) to prevent the 
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appearance of impropriety, which as shown above does not exist in this case. Just as Plaintiff's 
whole case assumes that his claims are indefensible and that Defendants and counsel should bow 
to his superior wisdom and analysis, Plaintiff's motion to disqualify Hawley Troxell is similarly 
predicated on his opinion that nonwaivable conflicts of interest exist. Asserting over and over 
again that "irreconcilable and nonconsentable conflicts of interest" exist does not make it so. To 
the contrary, as demonstrated above, the supposed conflicts of interest between or among the 
Defendants are waivable and have been waived pursuant to informed consent of all Defendants 
obtained in accordance with IRCP 1.7; and none ofthe Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct 
have been violated by Hawley Troxell under the circumstances under which the firm undertook 
to represent the corporate Defendants in this case. 
Plaintiff bears the burden of proving his charge that grounds exist for disqualifying 
Hawley Troxell. Id. AlA respectfully submits that Plaintiff has failed to bear that burden, that 
Plaintiff's motion to disqualify Hawley Troxell must be denied, and that fees and costs should be 
assessed against Plaintiff and his co-counseL 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS LiJ.- day of October, 2008. 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
c:::JL~- -,/9. ~~ 
Gary D. Ba\ili:rSB No. 1486 
Attorneys for AIA Services Corporation, 
AIA Insurance, Inc., and CropUSA 
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CERTlFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTlFY that on this ~ day of October, 2008, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing AIA'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO 
DISQUALlFY COUNSEL by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the 
following: 
Roderick C. Bond 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
[Attorneys for Plaintiff] 
Michael S. Bissell 
Campbell, Bissell & Kirby, PLLC 
416 Symons Building 
7 South Howard Street 
Spokane, W A 99201 
[Attorneys for Plaintiff] 
David A. Gittins 
Law Office of David A. Gittins 
P.O. Box 191 
Clarkston, W A 99403 
[Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman] 
Michael E. McNichols 
Clements Brown & McNichols 
321 13th Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
[Attorneys for Defendant R. John Taylor] 
David R. Risley 
Randall, Black & Cox, PLLC 
POBox 446 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
__ Telecopy 
~Email 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
V Email 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
__ Telecopy 
---lL. Email 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
__ Telecopy 
V Email 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
Telecopy 
7 Email 
AIA'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISQUALIFY COUNSEL - 70 LID Lf I 
40005.0006.1309816.2 
James J. Gatziolis 
Charles E. Harper 
QUARLES & BRADY LLP 
500 West Madison Street, Suite 3700 
Chicago, Illinois 60661-2511 
[Attorneys for Crop USA Insurance] 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
__ Telecopy 
~Email 
c==)~ 
Gary D. Babbitt 
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Gary D. Babbitt, ISB No. 1486 
D. John Ashby, ISB No. 7228 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, ID 83701-1617 
Telephone: (208) 344-6000 
Facsimile: (208) 342-3829 
Email: gdb@hteh.com 
j ash@hteh.com 
Attorneys for AIA Services Corporation, 
AIA Insurance, Inc., and CropUSA 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho ) 
corporation; AIA INSURANCE, INC., an ) 
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and ) 
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the ) 
community property comprised thereof; ) 
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; JOLEE ) 
DUCLOS, a single person; CROP USA ) 
INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., an Idaho ) 
Corporation; and JAMES BECK and ) 
CORRINE BECK, individually and the ) 
community property comprised thereof, ) 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
----------------------------) 
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho ) 
corporation; and AIA INSURANCE, INC., an ) 
) 
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Idaho corporation, 
Counterclaimants, 
vs. 
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person, 
Counterdefendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
The undersigned, Richard A. Riley, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am over the age of eighteen years and competent to attest to the following 
matters of my own personal knowledge. I am a partner in Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP. 
2. In connection with the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement, the law firm of Eberle 
Berlin Kading Turnbow & McKlveen, Chtd. ("Eberle Berlin") rendered an opinion dated August 
15, 1995 and addressed to Reed.Taylor. See Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond in Support of 
Plaintiffs Motion to Disqualify, etc. ("Bond Aff.") Ex. 2. At that time, I was a shareholder and 
employee of Eberle Berlin and, as one of the attorneys for AIA Services Corporation, worked on 
the AIA Services stock redemption agreement with Reed Taylor, who was represented by 
separate counsel, the Seattle firm of Cairncross Hempelmann. The Eberle Berlin opinion on the 
1995 stock redemption agreements was given by the law firm, not by any individual attorney in 
the firm. 
3. Eberle Berlin did not render an opinion in connection with the restructured 1996 
stock redemption agreements between AIA Services Corporation and Reed Taylor. 
4. I first joined Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP ("Hawley Troxell") on March 
1, 1999, after over twenty years with Eberle Berlin. I left Eberle Berlin on good terms. By 
agreement, I brought certain clients with me to Hawley Troxell. But I did not attempt to solicit 
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AIA Services Corporation or any of its subsidiaries, and did not bring any AIA files to Hawley 
Troxell. 
5. Since joining Hawley Troxell, the firm has been sporadically engaged to provide 
legal services to AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc. and CropUSA Insurance 
Agency, Inc. However, neither I nor Hawley Troxell has ever been engaged or served as general 
counsel for any of those entities. Our representation of those entities has been limited to specific 
matters referred to us from time to time. We have never exercised internal supervision of the 
legal or other affairs of any of these entities; and our familiarity with their businesses, ownership, 
governance, employees, operations, accounting and other matters is accordingly limited to 
information received in connection with matters as to which we have been specifically engaged 
and as to which we devoted substantive attention. 
6. According to the records of the Idaho Secretary of State, Crop USA Insurance 
Agency, Inc. ("CropUSA") was originally incorporated under the name AlA Crop Insurance, 
Inc. in November 1999. Hawley Troxell was not engaged to render, and did not provide, any 
advice or other legal services or other assistance in connection with the formation, ownership 
structure, governance or start up of Crop USA. In particular (but without limitation), Hawley 
Troxell was not engaged to provide, and did not provide, any advice or other legal services or 
other assistance concerning the issuance of CropUSA common stock to the AIA Services 
Corporation Series C Preferred Stockholders. Hawley Troxell was first engaged by CropUSA in 
February 2001, to provide legal services in connection with a proposed Regulation A offering of 
CropUSA stock. 
7. At no time has Hawley Troxell been engaged to provide any advice or other legal 
services or other assistance, and at no time has Hawley Troxell provided any advice or other 
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legal services or other assistance, to AIA Services, AIA Insurance, Crop USA or any other person 
concerning the allocation of or accounting for salaries, other expenses, employees, assets or other 
resources between or among AIA Services, AIA Insurance and/or CropUSA. 
8. The Amended Motion to Disqualify (p. 12) references transactions involving a 
parking lot purchased by John and Connie Taylor. Hawley Troxell was not engaged to provide 
and did not provide any legal services or other assistance to John or Connie Taylor, AIA 
Services, AIA Insurance, Crop USA or any other person in connection with any facet of any such 
transaction. 
9. Plaintiffs Amended Motion to Disqualify (p. 4) references an August 2004 
transaction in which AIA Insurance purchased from CropUSA shares of Series C Preferred Stock 
of AlA Services for $1,510,693. Hawley Troxell was not engaged to provide and did not 
provide any legal services or other assistance to AIA Services, AIA Insurance, Crop US A or any 
other person in connection with any facet of this transaction. In particular (but without 
limitation), Hawley Troxell was not engaged to advise any person in connection with the source 
of funding for the purchase, the effect (if any) of Reed's security interest in the commissions 
earned by AIA Insurance, or the accounting for this transaction. 
10. Plaintiff's Amended Motion to Disqualify (p. 13) references transactions 
involving Pacific Empire Radio Corporation. Hawley Troxell was not engaged to provide and 
did not provide any legal services or other assistance to AIA Services, AIA Insurance, CropUSA 
or any other person in connection with any facet of any transaction involving Pacific Empire 
Radio Corporation. 
11. Plaintiff s Amended Motion to Disqualify (p. 16) references "related party' 
transactions identified in the Affidavit of Paul E. Pederson. Other than the legal opinion of 
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borrower's local counsel provided to the lender on behalf of Crop USA in connection with the 
Surge loan in late 2006, Hawley Troxell was not engaged to provide and did not provide any 
advice or other legal services or other assistance to AlA Services, AIA Insurance, CropUSA or 
any other person in connection with any of the transactions identified in paragraph 11 ofthe 
Pederson Affidavit. 
12. Contrary to the assertion in Plaintiffs Amended Motion to Disqualify (p. 6), Reed 
Taylor's December 2006 notice of default was not in fact delivered to me. After leaving Eberle 
Berlin in early 1999, I did not receive any mail addressed to me at Eberle Berlin's mailing 
address; and any notice delivered to Eberle Berlin Kading Turnbow & McKlveen, Chtd., PO Box 
1368, Boise, Idaho Attn: Richard A. Riley in December 2006 in accordance with the notice 
provision in the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement (Bond Aff. Ex. 4 p. 12) was not 
delivered to me at Hawley Troxell. 
13. In 1993, The Universe Life Insurance Company ("ULIC"), a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of AIA Services, sold the Lewis Clark Plaza office building (the old Lewis Clark 
Hotel in Lewiston) to Washington Bank Properties. See documents included in Bond Aff. Ex. 
32. The purchase price included a note payable by Washington Bank Properties secured by a 
deed of trust on the building. Id. At all times since the 1993 sale transaction, the note and deed 
of trust, sometimes referenced by the parties in this litigation as the "Mortgage", have been held 
in escrow by an independent escrow agent. Title to the note and deed of trust was vested by 
operation oflaw in the ULIC Liquidator when the insurer was placed in liquidation. Idaho Code 
§ 41-3318(1). During the liquidation proceedings, AIA Services and the Liquidator negotiated 
settlement of certain claims against one another. The settlement included mutual releases and 
the assignment ofULIC's rights in the note and deed oftrust to AIA Services, ULIC's parent 
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company. See documents included in Bond Aff. Ex. 32. Hawley Troxell worked with the UUC 
Liquidator in 2007 to document the settlement agreement and to prepare the assignments of the 
note and deed oftrust and related documents necessary to transfer the Mortgage to AIA Services 
Corporation in accordance with the settlement agreement. At no time has Hawley Troxell ever 
had possession or control ofthe Washington Bank Properties note or deed oftrust. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
SUBSCRlBED AND SWORN before me this /O~ay of October, 2008. 
AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD A. RILEY - 6 
am .~~~~~ __ ~~~~~ 
Notary Public for 
Residing at -J=~~~-:J-9~~!4-~-:;:-jr..-r~~ 
My commission expires --"'''''--s.....L-'=?--=..==~L...-_=--~ 
40005.0006.1306650.4 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this day of October, 2008, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD A. RILEY by the method indicated below, 
and addressed to each of the following: 
Roderick C. Bond 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
[Attorneys for Plaintiff] 
Michael S. Bissell 
Campbell, Bissell & Kirby, PLLC 
416 Symons Building 
7 South Howard Street 
Spokane, W A 99201 
[Attorneys for Plaintiff] 
David A. Gittins 
Law Office of David A. Gittins 
P.O. Box 191 
Clarkston, W A 99403 
[Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman] 
Michael E. McNichols 
Clements Brown & McNichols 
321 l3th Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
[Attorneys for Defendant R. John Taylor] 
David R. Risley 
Randall, Black & Cox, PLLC 
P.O. Box 446 
1106 Idaho Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
[Attorneys for Defendants Connie Taylor, James Beck 
and Corrine Beck] 
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James J. Gatziolis 
Charles E. Harper 
QUARLES & BRADY LLP 
500 West Madison Street, Suite 3700 
Chicago, Illinois 60661-2511 
[Attorneys for Crop USA Insurance] 
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Gary D. Babbitt, ISB No. 1486 
D. John Ashby, ISB No. 7228 
HA WLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise,ID 83701-1617 
Telephone: (208) 344-6000 
Facsimile: (208) 342-3829 
Email: gdb@hteh.com 
j ash@hteh.com 
Attorneys for AlA Services Corporation, 
AlA Insurance, Inc., and CropUSA 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED 1. TAYLOR, a single person, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho ) 
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an ) 
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and ) 
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the ) 
community property comprised thereof; ) 
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; JOLEE ) 
DUCLOS, a single person; CROP USA ) 
INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., an Idaho ) 
Corporation; and JAMES BECK and ) 
CORRINE BECK, individually and the ) 
community property comprised thereof, ) 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho ) 
corporation; and AlA INSURANCE, INC., an ) 
) 
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Idaho corporation, 
Counterclaimants, 
vs. 
REED 1. TAYLOR, a single person, 
Counterdefendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
I, Patrick V. Collins, being duly sworn on oath, depose and state: 
1. I am over the age of eighteen years and competent to attest to the following 
matters of my own personal knowledge. I am a partner in the law firm of Hawley Troxell Ennis 
& Hawley LLP. 
2. In connection with an October 2006 loan to CropUSA Insurance Agency, Inc. 
("CropUSA") by an unrelated lender, Surge Capital (referenced in the opinion letter as Lancelot 
Investors Fund), Hawley Troxell was engaged by CropUSA to provide the legal opinion of 
borrower's local Idaho counsel on certain aspects of the transaction. Hawley Troxell did not 
provide legal services or other assistance to CropUSA or AlA Insurance, Inc. in connection with 
the negotiation or documentation of the loan. Hawley Troxell was retained as local Idaho counsel 
solely for purposes of opining on Idaho law issues that could not be addressed by Quarles & 
Brady, counsel for CropUSA. 
3. The Surge loan documents included guarantees of the debt by AlA Insurance, Inc. 
and John Taylor. AlA Services Corporation was not a party to the loan. In the opinion letter, 
Hawley Troxell opined that the execution, delivery and performance of the AlA Insurance 
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guaranty were duly authorized. The due authorization opinion was based in part on certified 
copies of resolutions adopted by the AlA Insurance, Inc. Board of Directors. The AlA Insurance 
board resolutions authorizing its guarantee were drafted by the lender's counsel, not Hawley 
Troxell; were adopted by the AlA Insurance Board of Directors without involvement by Hawley 
Troxell; and were delivered to Hawley Troxell for the firm's reliance in giving the opinion. 
5. Because AlA Services Corporation was not a party to the Surge loan transaction, 
the legal opinion sought by the lender did not seek any legal opinions regarding AlA Services 
Corporation and, therefore, I did not review the articles of incorporation of AlA Services in 
preparing the opinion. 
6. In September 2007, AlA Services Corporation arranged to borrow up to $500,000 
from CropUSA. The loan is secured by the assignment to CropUSA, for security purposes, of an 
asset of AlA Services Corporation - the promissory note payable by Washington Bank 
Properties and secured by a deed of trust on One Lewis Clark Plaza. I did not have any role in 
negotiating or determining the terms of the loan arrangement but rather acted as scrivener to 
document the loan terms as agreed by AlA Services Corporation and CropUSA. 
J Patrick V. Collins 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me this IOfJ--.. day of October, 2008. 
~ .::j;y ~===  d C-,pouu 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at 1b ;JJJLr!-,"--
My commission expires _"C--,-/!-, "7--'-+(-1.1..><0 _____ _ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 10 day of October, 2008, I caused to be served a true 
copy ofthe foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF PATRICK V. COLLINS by the method indicated below, 
and addressed to each of the following: 
Roderick C. Bond 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
[Attorneys for Plaintiff] 
Michael S. Bissell 
Campbell, Bissell & Kirby, PLLC 
416 Symons Building 
7 South Howard Street 
Spokane, W A 99201 
[Attorneys for Plaintiff] 
David A. Gittins 
Law Office of David A. Gittins 
P.O. Box 191 
Clarkston, W A 99403 
[Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman] 
Michael E. McNichols 
Clements Brown & McNichols 
321 13th Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
[Attorneys for Defendant R. John Taylor] 
David R. Risley 
Randall, Black & Cox, PLLC 
P.O. Box 446 
1106 Idaho Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
[Attorneys for Defendants Connie Taylor, James Beck 
and Corrine Beck] 
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James 1. Gatziolis 
Charles E. Harper 
QUARLES & BRADY LLP 
500 West Madison Street, Suite 3700 
Chicago, Illinois 60661-2511 
[Attorneys for Crop USA Insurance] 
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~ Gary D. Babbitt, ISB No. 1486 
~ D. John Ashby, ISB No. 7228 c:a HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
--.. 877 Main Street, Suite 1000 ex:: P.O. Box 1617 
c:::::. Boise, ID 83701-1617 
Telephone: (208) 344-6000 
Facsimile: (208) 342-3829 
Email: gdb@hteh.com 
jash@hteh.com 
Attorneys for AIA Services Corporation, 
AlA Insurance, Inc., and CropUSA 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED J . TAYLOR, a single person, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho ) 
corporation; AIA INSURANCE, INC., an ) 
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and ) 
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the ) 
community property comprised thereof; ) 
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; JOLEE ) 
DUCLOS, a single person; CROP USA ) 
INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., an Idaho ) 
Corporation; and JAMES BECK and ) 
CORRINE BECK, individually and the ) 
community property comprised thereof, ) 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
----------------------------) 
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho ) 
corporation; and AIA INSURANCE, INC., an ) 
) 
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Idaho corporation, 
Counterclaimants, 
vs. 
REED J . TAYLOR, a single person, 
Counterdefendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
-----------------------------------
JOHN A. STRAIT, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am an Associate Professor of Law at Seattle University School of Law with 
teaching responsibilities in the fields of legal ethics and legal malpractice. I have held this 
position since 1976. I am admitted to practice law in the states of California, Oregon and 
Washington. I am currently inactive in California and Oregon. My practice includes the 
representation of attorneys in disciplinary matters and legal malpractice cases. My practice also 
includes consulting, counseling and representing attorneys on issues involving compliance with 
the Rules of Professional Conduct. I have represented attorneys both in defending and 
prosecuting claims for disqualification arising from conflicts of interest and have consulted 
approximately three times a month as a retained consultant and/or attorney since the late 1970s 
on such issues. I have appeared by declaration or by live testimony in more than 100 motions to 
disqualify. In addition to my for-fee representation and consulting, I consult on a pro bono basis 
an average of once or twice a day with various lawyers throughout the Northwest, the 
Washington State Bar Office of Disciplinary Counsel and others on a variety of ethical and 
malpractice issues. My consulting practice includes giving advice on attorneys' obligations 
under the Rules of Professional Conduct and their compliance with the minimum standards of 
care with regard to the duties they owe to clients to avoid conflicts of interest. I have provided 
such advice an average of two or three times a week since approximately 1976. I have advised 
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lawyers on issues regarding potential and actual conflicts of interest between clients, as well as 
between current and former clients, on numerous occasions. I have counseled Idaho 
practitioners on many occasions with regard to these matters. 
2. I have lectured throughout the United States on the subjects of legal ethics and 
discipline for attorneys. I have lectured in some fifteen states and participated in CLE 
presentations on the law of ethics and standards for legal malpractice. I have lectured at 
numerous Bar presentations on issues arising under the American Bar Association Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct and the minimum standard of care for attorneys and law firms with 
regard to their ethical obligations to clients. I have done numerous CLE presentations on 
conflicts of interest. I average at least one CLE presentation per month and have done so since 
the late 1970s. Since the beginning of2004, I have appeared in more than one hundred CLE 
programs as a speaker and/or co-chair. Most of these programs included material on the 
minimum standards of care for lawyers to comply with their duties to avoid conflicts of interest. 
I have lectured to the Idaho bankruptcy bar and judiciary on the application of the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct in federal and state bankruptcy and receivership practice at the request of 
the Idaho bankruptcy judiciary. 
3. I have testified in court as an expert witness in the fields oflegal ethics and 
malpractice in sixteen counties in the State of Washington, and in the federal district courts 
located in Washington, Oregon, Wyoming, California, Alaska, Hawaii, New Mexico, Idaho and 
others. I have testified regarding the duties owed by attorneys and law firms to their clients to 
avoid conflicts of interest in most of these jurisdictions. I have appeared in Idaho federal 
bankruptcy court and filed declarations or affidavits in Idaho state proceedings as well as 
participated in arbitrations of conflicts of interest disputes involving the Idaho Rules of 
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Professional Conduct and Idaho practitioners. I have also appeared on related effective 
assistance of counsel issues under the Federal Sixth Amendment in Idaho post-conviction relief 
proceedings. 
4. I have published articles and performed professional research and writings in 
these fields. I served on the Rules of Professional Conduct Committee for the Washington State 
Bar Association for most of the last twenty years. I created and directed a clinical program in 
legal discipline through Seattle University School of Law from 1999 through 2006. In this 
clinical program, law students investigated bar complaints under my direction and made 
recommendations to the Washington State Bar Office of Legal Discipline on probable cause. 
The program was awarded the 1995 Gambrell Award by the American Bar Association for 
service to the profession. I also serve as Adjunct Investigative Counsel investigating Bar 
complaints for the Washington State Bar Association. As Adjunct Investigative Counsel, I have 
investigated Bar grievances involving the ethical responsibilities of attorneys to avoid conflicts 
arising from simultaneous adverse representation, and/or from duties owed to former clients, in 
more than twenty investigations since 1994. 
5. My resume, a list of some of my CLE presentations, and a list of some of the 
cases I have appeared in by deposition or testimony are attached as Exhibits A, B and C. I am 
compensated at $300.00 per hour. 
II. 
SCOPE OF OPINION 
I have been retained by the law firm of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP ("Hawley 
Troxell") and asked to opine whether that firm should be disqualified in this litigation as 
requested by Plaintiff Reed Taylor's motion to disqualifY. I have been asked to provide an 
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opinion whether the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct require the disqualification of Hawley 
Troxell under the circumstances of this case. 
III. 
SHORT OPINION 
In my view, disqualification should not be allowed for a variety of reasons: 
1. The disqualification motion is, in effect, an effort to end run the actual issues in 
litigation in the underlying litigation by disarming AlA Services Corporation, AlA Insurance, 
Inc. and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., who are among the targets of Reed Taylor's 
litigation, by removing their litigation counsel at a critical point in the proceedings. If this tactic 
were to be successful, it would leave AlA Services and AlA Insurance, Inc. unable to adequately 
defend the simultaneous motions and/or appeal from the prior orders of this Court which the AlA 
entities challenge. Because the disqualification motion is an effort to avoid the litigation on the 
merits of Mr. Reed Taylor's claims and is, instead, a tactical use of disqualification to 
disadvantage his opponents, the motion to disqualify Hawley Troxell should be denied. 
2. Idaho RPC 1.7(a)(1) does not allow for disqualification of Hawley Troxell, which 
is representing the AlA entities under an appropriate Joint Defense Agreement, Standstill 
Agreement, and limited scope of representation related to litigation only. Given the nature of the 
interlocking directorates, ownership and control of AlA Services Corporation (hereafter 
"Services"), AlA Insurance, Inc. (hereafter "Insurance"), and CropUSA Insurance Agency, Inc. 
(hereafter "Crop") and the control groups' proper estimate of and informed consent to the risks 
of entering into a Standstill Agreement and a Joint Defense Agreement with the other defendants 
in this litigation, the circumstances do not present an RPC 1.7(a) concurrent conflict of interest 
for Hawley Troxell. 
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3. Idaho RPC 3.7 authorizes Hawley Troxell to continue to represent its clients 
under the conditions they have properly established (see above ~ 2) and allows Hawley Troxell 
to be trial counsel even if Richard Riley is called as a witness by either side. 
4. Concepts of confidentiality among Hawley Troxell's litigation clients comply with 
Idaho RPC 1.6 and are not a basis for disqualification. 
5. Disqualification of Hawley Troxell would not result in any change in the litigation 
posture of this case other than to disarm Hawley Troxell's corporate litigation clients precisely 
when the underlying issues ofthe case are being moved forward and would resolve the ultimate 
issues raised by Reed Taylor subject to appellate review which Hawley Troxell's clients are 
entitled to obtain if the results are unfavorable at the trial court level. 
6. I disagree with the analysis of Reed Taylor's experts Peter Jarvis and Joe Knight. 
IV. 
MATERIALS RELIED UPON IN ORDER TO RENDER OPINION 
I have reviewed the following materials for purposes of formulating my opinions in this 
Affidavit: 
1. Docket Sheets of all Pleading Books. (1-17) 
2. Fifth Amended Complaint. 
3. Answer to Fifth Amended Complaint (Hawley Troxell) 
4. First Amended Answer to Fifth Amended Complaint (Hawley Troxell) 
5. Answer to Fifth Amended Complaint (McNichols) 
6. Answer to Fifth Amended Complaint (Gittins) 
7. Answer to Fifth Amended Complaint (Hally) 
8. Motion for Partial Summary Judgment - Memo attached (Hally) 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN A. STRAIT - 6 
40005.0006.1283919.4 
9. Motion to Amend Amended Answer to Fifth Amended Complaint (Hawley 
Troxell) 
10. Opinion and Order on Plaintiff s Motion for Reconsideration, Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction, and Motion for Restraining Order (dated 5/31/07) 
11. Opinion and Order on Pending Motions (Plaintiffs motions: Compel Audit, 
Supplement Complaint, and Bifurcate; Defendants AlA motions: to Dismiss and for Protective 
Order; Defendant Connie Taylor's motion: to Dismiss 2nd and 3rd Complaints) (dated 8/2/07). 
12. Opinion and Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and 
Motion for Injunction (dated 2/8/08). 
13. Opinion and Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment for Amount Due 
on the Promissory Note and Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification of Judgment (dated 5/8/08). 
14. Order Denying Motion for Permissive Appeal (Supreme Court) (dated 6/12/08). 
15. Correspondence dated June 26, 2008, from Michael S. Bissell. 
16. Correspondence dated June 30, 2008, to Michael S. Bissell. 
17. Correspondence dated July 21, 2008, from Michael S. Bissell. 
18. E-Mail Correspondence dated July 21,2008, from Roderick C. Bond. 
19. E-Mail Correspondence dated July 17, 2008, from Roderick C. Bond. 
20. Affidavit of John Taylor in Support of Motion for Reconsideration and 
Clarification and, in the Alternative, Request for Certification for Interlocutory Appeal (filed 
February 28,2008). 
21. Affidavit of John Taylor in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment against AIA Services Corporation for Amount Due on the Promissory Note (dated 
February 28, 2008). 
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22. Draft of AlA's Petition for Court Appointed Independent Inquiry Pursuant to I.e. 
§ 30-1-743 and I.e. § 30-1-744 and for Grant of Pending Motion to Stay Proceedings (prepared 
August 2008). 
23. Draft of Affidavit of Gary D. Babbitt in Support of AIA's Petition for Court 
Appointed Independent Inquiry Pursuant to I.C. § 30-1-743 and I.e. § 30-1-744 (prepared 
August 2008). 
v. 
ADDITIONAL MATERIALS RELIED UPON IN ORDER TO RENDER OPINION 
WHICH ARE PRIVILEGED AND SUBMITTED TO THE COURT FOR THE PURPOSE 
OF IN CAMERA INSPECTION 
1. Correspondence dated May 1,2007, from Hawley Troxell to Directors of 
AlA Services Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc. 
2. Correspondence dated May I, 2007, from Hawley Troxell to Directors of Crop 
USA Insurance Agency, Inc. 
3. Correspondence dated April 19, 2007, from Hawley Troxell to John Taylor c/o 
Michael McNichols. 
4. Correspondence dated April 18, 2007, from Hawley Troxell to JoLee Duclos and 
Bryan Freeman c/o David A. Gittens. 
5. Standstill and Tolling Agreement dated May 2, 2007 among AIA Insurance, Inc., 
AIA Services Corporation and R. John Taylor. 
6. Standstill and Tolling Agreement dated May ---" 2007 among AlA Insurance, 
Inc., AIA Services Corporation, JoLee Duclos and Bryan Freeman. 
7. Joint Defense Agreement effective as of May 17, 2007 among AIA Insurance, 
Inc., AIA Services Corporation, R. John Taylor, JoLee Duclos and Bryan Freeman. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN A. STRAIT - 8 
40005.0006.1283919.4 
8. Correspondence dated as of November 1, 2007, from Hawley Troxell to Directors 
of AlA Services Corporation. and AIA Insurance, Inc. 
9. Correspondence dated as of November 1, 2007, from Hawley Troxell to Directors 
of Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. 
10. Correspondence dated as of November 1, 2007, from Hawley Troxell to R. John 
Taylor c/o Michael McNichols. 
11. Correspondence dated as of November 1, 2007, from Hawley Troxell to David A. 
Gittens. 
12. Correspondence dated as of November 1, 2007, from Hawley Troxell to Jonathan 
D. Hally 
13. Amended Joint Defense Agreement dated as of November 1,2007 among AIA 
Insurance, Inc., AIA Services Corporation, Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., R. John Taylor, 
JoLee Duclos, Bryan Freeman, Connie Taylor, James Beck and Corrine Beck. 
14. Amended and Restated Standstill and Tolling Agreement among AlA Insurance, 
Inc., AIA Services Corporation, Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., R. John Taylor, JoLee 
Duclos, Bryan Freeman, Connie Taylor, James Beck and Corrine Beck. 
15. Addendum to Amended Joint Defense Agreement dated as of July 24, 2008 
among AIA Insurance, Inc., AIA Services Corporation, Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., R. 
John Taylor, JoLee Duclos, Bryan Freeman, Connie Taylor, James Beck and Corrine Beck. 
I also rely on my teaching experience, practice experience, research and writing in the 
field of professional duties owed by attorneys under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 
the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct and the obligations ofIdaho lawyers under Idaho law. 
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VI. 
FACTS ASSUMED IN ORDER TO RENDER OPINION 
For the purposes of rendering the opinions I accept as true the following: 
1. Reed Taylor was a former shareholder and principal officer of the AIA entities 
(AIA Services is the parent corporation of AIA Insurance which is a wholly owned subsidiary). 
In 1995, Reed Taylor entered into contractual agreements whereby he relinquished his control 
and his ownership interests in the AIA entities in return for a security interest which would allow 
him to vote stock of AIA Insurance ifhis buyout and redemption agreements were breached. All 
ofthe current litigation represents Reed Taylor attempting to gain control of AIA Insurance in 
order to obtain what he claims is the value of his redemption contract. 
2. John Taylor is the current major shareholder and CEO of the AIA entities and also 
a principal and substantial owner of Crop, a separate entity with substantially the same 
ownership and management structure as the AlA entities. Subject to the resolution ofthe Taylor 
v. AlA Services, et al. litigation, Reed Taylor is, from the perspective of AlA entities and Crop, a 
creditor who has brought creditor claims against the entities and claimed a right as a creditor to 
vote the shares which would give him control of AIA Insurance pursuant to his creditor contract. 
From the AIA entities' perspective, Reed Taylor is simply a creditor asserting a claim against the 
corporate entities. Stripping away the invective and the multiple claims and causes of action, 
Reed Taylor's claim essentially is that he has a right, because of the claimed breach of his 
contractual creditor status, to assert control over the remaining solvent AlA entity, AIA 
Insurance, which is the wholly-owned subsidiary of AIA Services. He wishes to do so in order 
to obtain what he considers to be the value of his original 1995 stock redemption agreement, 
which took him out of ownership and control of the entities and put him in a creditor status. 
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3. All of Reed Taylor's claims depend on his status as a creditor changing to one of 
de facto ownership and control ifhe prevails. The AlA entities view Reed Taylor as an 
attempted hostile takeover and have denied that AlA Services is in default of its contractual 
obligations to Reed as a creditor and have defended that he has no right to exercise his 
contractual right to vote the stock which would give him control of AlA Insurance and allow him 
to transfer ownership or have access to its remaining assets. 
4. All of Reed's allegations -- that he is entitled to vote the AlA Insurance stock and 
that all actions taken by the AlA and Crop interlocking Boards were taken in order to defraud 
him of his rights -- ultimately depend on the resolution of these underlying claims. 
5. The motion to disqualify and the separate malpractice action against Hawley 
Troxell filed by Reed Taylor as an individual direct (not derivative) action appear to be largely 
tactical ,and designed to make impossible Hawley Troxell's representation of AlA Services and 
Insurance adverse to Reed's claims. Reed incorrectly assumes Hawley Troxell to be general 
corporate counsel, a position which Hawley Troxell has never occupied; and Reed has alleged a 
conspiracy, in effect, between Hawley Troxell and John Taylor and every member of the Board 
of the AlA entities, whom he alleges have engaged in misconduct premised on his prevailing in 
his underlying claims. Ifhis underlying claims are invalid as AlA asserts, then all ofthe 
allegations of fraud, misrepresentation, exploitation ofthe corporate interest to the benefit of 
external interests, etc. also fail. 
6. The tactical nature of the pleadings on the motion to disqualify is further revealed 
by the claim of conflict of interest premised on the view that Reed's claims are true, as opposed 
to being allegations which must be proven and ultimately reviewed on appeal. Allegations of 
conflict of interest derivative from these claims which have been asserted in letters since Hawley 
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Troxell joined the litigation have not resulted in a motion to disqualify until shortly before or 
simultaneously with other critical motions and an impending trial date. In short, if Reed loses 
the underlying litigation, then there is no conflict of interest, no misconduct on the part of 
Hawley Troxell and no hypothetical conflict of interest. If Reed prevails and ultimately takes 
control of AIA Insurance by voting his contractual stock rights, then the litigation becomes moot 
and the role of Hawley Troxell is equally moot because Reed will now control the critical entity. 
7. Hawley Troxell is not general corporate counsel for AIA entities and has never 
served in that capacity. The same is true for Crop. All of the entities, as well as the individual 
defendants, have entered into a Joint Defense Agreement consistent with each defendant's view 
of Reed Taylor's claims; entered into an Amended and Restated Standstill and Tolling 
Agreement tolling and preserving potential claims among Crop, AlA Insurance, AIA Services 
and the individual defendants; and Hawley Troxell has a limited scope of employment as 
litigation counsel, not general counsel. 
8. In light ofthese documents, which are consistent with AlA entities' and Crop's 
view of Reed as an outside creditor attacking them, the position that Reed asserts in the motion 
to disqualify is essentially an argument that no lawyers can represent any of these entities 
adverse to Reed's claims because Reed's claim establishes the improper relationships so that no 
lawyer on the other side for any of the three entities could resist. The motion to disqualify is, 
instead, a tactical ploy which would equally exclude new counsel as well as existing counsel 
from individual representation since it is premised on the position that disagreement with Reed 
Taylor's positions is, per se, fraudulent or otherwise inappropriate. For the specific facts relied 
upon in support of my opinion, in addition to the items identified above, I assume that the AlA 
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entities have raised and desire to fully litigate the following non-frivolous theories as to the 
invalidity of Reed Taylor's underlying claims. 
9. First, there is a substantial question oflaw subject to appeal as to whether or not 
Services' obligation to Reed under the Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement is in default. 
The trial court granted partial summary judgment to Reed on this point and certified his order for 
interlocutory appeal. Although the Idaho appellate court denied that interlocutory appeal, there 
would be a right of appeal of the partial judgment available to the AIA entities to determine the 
correctness of the trial court's rulings, which would be a non-frivolous appeal. 
10. Further, although by granting Reed's motion for partial summary judgment the 
Court has rejected allegations raised by the AlA entities that the 1996 Stock Redemption 
Restructure Agreement was subsequently modified by Reed, barring his current assertions in the 
underlying litigation, Reed has avoided discovery, moved to continue the trial date, and brought 
motions to disqualifY the litigation counsel, Hawley Troxell, which would avoid his having to 
submit to discovery which might support the AlA entities' claims. 
11. Second, there is a substantial question oflaw subject to appeal as to whether or 
not the original 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement or the 1996 Restructuring Agreement 
complies with Idaho law in light of the insolvency of AlA Services at that time. On this issue, 
there is a pending motion for partial summary judgment and a pending motion to intervene by 
the AlA ERISA plans, which are technically third parties, not party to, the Stock Redemption 
Agreements with Reed Taylor. 
12. Third, if Reed Taylor gains control of AIA Insurance by virtue of his claim to be 
able to vote the shares of AlA Insurance stock, he could essentially avoid any appellate review of 
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the trial court's ruling by voting the shares and, in practical effect, killing the right of the entities 
to appeal. 
13. Fourth, the analysis of the underlying claims, once appellate review has 
completed, will resolve all the matters that relate to the conflict of interest allegations whereas 
resolution of the conflict of interest allegations at this time will not resolve the underlying claims 
on the merits but, rather, if the theory ofthe disqualification motion is granted, make it difficult 
if not impossible for the AIA entities to resist Reed Taylor's claims. 
VII. 
DETAILED ANALYSIS OF OPINIONS 
A. The Motion To Disqualify Hawley Troxell As Litigation Counsel For The AlA 
Entities Is A Tactical Motion Which Will Not Alter The Merits Litigation Of Reed's 
Claims But Only Serve To Disrupt The Ability Of The AlA Entities To Defend 
Against Them. 
1. The heart of the motion to disqualify is the claim, repeated in multiple forms and 
multiple times, that the control group of AlA Services, AIA Insurance and Crop are all conflicted 
because they have been named in Reed Taylor's suit and, therefore, cannot take a position with 
regard to Reed Taylor's claims. That position is absurd. If this argument is given credence, then 
literally in every relatively closely-held corporation not covered by Sarbanes-Oxley (since none 
ofthese corporations are publicly traded), all an outside creditor needs to do to hamstring the 
ability of a closely-held corporation which the creditor sues from defending is to name each of 
the control group and/or directors ofthe corporation as additional parties defendant and then 
claim that the Board cannot make a decision to defend. That is the heart of Reed Taylor'S claim 
leading to his conspiracy theories and fraud theories. I am aware of no law which states that an 
outside creditor of the corporation can create such an impasse simply by the election to sue 
individual board members as well as the corporate entity. This is not a situation in which an 
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insider to the corporation, a minority owner or other owner, is asserting a control dispute with the 
corporation and where general counsel to the corporation is under an obligation to remain 
neutral. As in any other contract dispute, the corporation is free to assert non-frivolous defenses. 
In light ofthe case law cited by Hawley Troxell as litigation counsel on behalf of the AIA 
entities, it cannot be said that the defenses against Reed as a creditor are frivolous. Although the 
Court may ultimately rule against AlA, AIA is entitled to appellate review of that decision. 
2. The effect of excluding Hawley Troxell based on the allegations in the motion to 
disqualify would be to effectively bar AIA, since it has no "unconflicted" directors, from 
defending Reed Taylor's claims regardless of who the counsel is. 
3. By seeking to disqualify AlA's counsel prior to establishing the right of Reed to 
vote the stock he claims he has a contractual right to vote, Reed puts the cart before the horse. 
Independently of how that issue is resolved, the AIA entities should be able to keep the status 
quo, including their counsel, so that the legitimate issues can be reviewed on appeal. The effect 
of the motion to disqualify followed by the lifting of the preliminary injunction will be to 
completely change the ownership control of AIA Insurance to Reed Taylor. Reed will then have 
avoided the trial court's initial decision and appellate review and will have prevented AlA from 
asserting its legitimate interests under AIA's view that Taylor is a third party creditor, at best, 
without a right claim to vote the stock. 
4. It also will completely avoid the illegality public policy issue which is a 
substantial public policy issue of whether a corporation can provide a stock share redemption 
agreement to Reed Taylor if the corporation itself is insolvent. It has long been recognized that 
disqualification motions, because of their disruptive effect on the courts, orderly processing of 
underlying litigation and the harm they do to the disqualified counsel's client by disrupting their 
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position in the litigation, should be viewed with suspicion by the Court. In the circumstances of 
Reed's disqualification motion, both its timing and its underlying assumptions that any counsel 
on behalf of the AlA entities who disagrees with Reed Taylor's position must be a co-conspirator 
even though their role is limited to litigation counsel suggests the real purpose of this motion is 
to avoid the underlying litigation by making it moot. 
B. Idaho's RPC 1.7(a)(1) And (a)(2) Have Been Fully Complied With By Hawley 
Troxell In Its Joint Defense Of The AIA Entities And Its Partial Representation Of 
Crop Against Reed Taylor's Claims. 
1. Unknown to Reed Taylor and his counsel and experts, Hawley Troxell has never 
been general corporate counsel to any ofthe entities involved in this litigation. They have never 
been outside general counsel to the corporation. Instead, their scope of representation is defined 
by privileged agreements which can be reviewed in camera ex parte by the Court but which 
ought not be disclosed to the adverse parties: The AlA and Crop entities entered into a Joint 
Defense Agreement against the common adversary, from their perspective, Reed Taylor, and 
have tolled any adverse claims that may exist among the three entities and/or the individual 
defendants pending defense against the common adversary. Under RPC 1.7(a)(1), the scope of 
representation is the common defenses against Reed Taylor. The interlocking and substantially 
overlapping Boards and ownership of all three entities and their common defenses against Reed 
Taylor's claims makes such a joint defense and tolling agreement not only reasonable but 
desirable in the context of this litigation. Because Hawley Troxell has never been general 
counsel to any of the entities and has only performed limited services on a specific topic basis, 
once the control group of each corporation has made its decision of what its litigation posture is, 
it is free to direct Hawley Troxell and Hawley Troxell is free to follow that direction as litigation 
counsel to oppose Reed's claims based on those common defenses and/or counterclaims. There 
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is no 1.7(a)(1) adversity which has not been reserved and tolled or which is outside the current 
scope of representation of Hawley Troxell. RPC 1.7(a)(I) simply does not apply to the current 
scope of Hawley Troxell's litigation counsel common defense representation under the 
agreements. 
2. RPC 1.7(a)(2) might be involved if Hawley Troxell actually had been general 
counsel with regard to the transactions from which Reed asserts his claims. Hawley Troxell was 
not. Hawley Troxell is not, contrary to the allegations of Reed, a participant in the underlying 
subject matter of the litigation as general counsel or otherwise. Any involvement they had with 
any aspect of the AlA entities or Crop was solely on an individual assigned topic basis unrelated 
to the claims raised by Reed Taylor in the motion to disqualifY and in the underlying pleadings. 
3. Under Idaho RPC 1.2, Hawley Troxell may, after full discussion with the AlA 
entities and with Crop, undertake such a joint representation with an appropriately limited scope 
of representation to the common claims as authorized by the control groups and consistent with 
their authority to defend against Reed's claims. Similarly, the AlA entities may enter into 
transactions designed to assure adequate financing to fulfill the entities' obligations to indemnifY 
and defend against Reed's claims since Reed has sued directors individually under the bylaws of 
the respective corporations. 
4. Neither RPC 1.7(a)(I) or 1.7(a)(2) has been violated by the current scope of 
representation which Hawley Troxell has under Idaho RPC 1.2 or by their following the 
directions of the appropriate control groups in each corporation. Claims to the contrary by Reed 
all depend on the underlying claims of Reed being sustained and cannot be binding unless and 
until that has occurred, he has taken control, and those issues have been reviewed on appeal. 
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C. Idaho RPC 3.7 And The Potential Testimony Of Richard Riley Or Other Individual 
Members Of Hawley Troxell Does Not Offer A Basis For Disqualification. 
1. Plaintiffs' expert, Peter Jarvis, has opined that Idaho RPC 3.7 would require the 
disqualification of Hawley Troxell as litigation trial counsel because a lawyer who was formerly 
with another firm and now a member of Hawley Troxell may be a necessary witness to one or 
more sides in the litigation. With all due respect to Mr. Jarvis, that opinion is simply wrong or 
misleading. Idaho RPC 3.7, which tracks the ABA's Model Rule 3.7, Rule 3.7(b) specifically 
allows Hawley Troxell to remain as trial counsel even though a member of the firm is called as a 
witness. Mr. Jarvis is either citing to an erroneous and predecessor version ofRPC 3.7, such as 
used to exist in Washington State, which vicariously disqualified all other members of the finn if 
a lawyer witness was called to the stand at trial, or in fact it is a redundant RPC 1.7 cite and 
misleading. 
2. If Mr. Jarvis is referring to the portion ofRPC 3.7(b) which says that, ifRPC 1.7 
would prevent the law firm or other lawyers in the law finn from continuing the representation, 
then the firm could be disqualified, he is simply redundantly citing Rule 1.7, which I have 
already addressed supra. Because, contrary to Mr. Jarvis' assumptions, Hawley Troxell is not 
general counsel for any of the involved entities but only litigation counsel, for the reasons 
described above, RPC 1.7 does not apply or require disqualification of Hawley Troxell. Idaho 
RPC 3.7 is simply irrelevant to disqualification in this case. 
D. Allegations That Idaho RPC 1.6, Duties To Maintain Confidentiality, Have Been 
Breached By Hawley Troxell's Representation Of Its Clients As Litigation Counsel 
Are Simply Wrong. 
1. As part of the Joint Defense Agreement, the Standstill and Tolling Agreement, 
and the scope of representation documents under which Hawley Troxell undertook these 
representations, there is a specific and knowing waiver of confidentiality among the represented 
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clients, as proper joint defense agreements would require. While Reed Taylor should not be 
entitled to review these documents since they are clearly confidential and it is his motion to 
disqualify which has made it necessary to review these matters, the Court can examine them 
in camera and determine whether or not they adequately, as I have opined, addressed the 
confidentiality and conflict issues. 
2. Joint defense agreements on common defense theories obviously require that each 
independent client be advised of how that shared information might be adverse to their interests. 
Under RPC 1.6, each client, if properly informed of the risks, has a complete authority to waive 
confidentiality. Each client in the current situation has done so by its authorized control group. 
That is a proper and valid decision for an informed client to make as to whether to participate or 
not in such a joint defense agreement. 
E. Reed Taylor's Theory Of His Motion To Disqualify Would Bar Any Counsel From 
Defending Reed's Claims On Behalf Of Any Of Hawley Troxell's Clients, Whether 
Separately Represented Or Not. 
1. Under the Joint Defense Agreement and the Standstill and Tolling Agreement, 
and given the common control groups and interest in defending against Reed Taylor's claims to 
avoid a hostile takeover and related damage or injury to the entities, the AlA entities have chosen 
a joint defense represented by Hawley Troxell as litigation counsel. Crop has subsequently 
associated independent counsel as well. Because of the theory of fraud and essentially civil 
conspiracy asserted by Reed Taylor because Hawley Troxell, according to his pleadings, has 
conspired to defeat Reed Taylor's claims, separate representation would not alter his theory. 
Under his theory, no Board could vote to oppose his claims since he has named every Board 
member and, therefore, under his theory (unique and absurd), the conflicted Board members 
cannot act on behalf of a closely-held corporation which is not publicly traded to oppose his 
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theories asserted in his Complaint. Any counsel who cooperates with such a Board and allows 
themselves to be hired as litigation counsel is therefore a co-bad actor. Accordingly, no 
litigation counsel, whether representing one or more ofthe entities jointly or solely, could take 
an adverse position to Reed's claims on behalf of the entity. 
2. The thrust of his argument on the disqualification motion is that independent 
counsel on behalf of each entity would decide to agree with him if directed to do so by a 
"unconflicted Board" meaning a Board which agrees with Reed. The disqualification motion 
literally puts the cart before the horse. It is precisely the purpose ofthe underlying litigation to 
determine these issues, not appropriate for a motion to disqualify as a de facto way of avoiding 
litigating the underlying issues. 
F. I Have Reviewed The Expert Opinions Of Peter Jarvis, Joe Knight, And Steven 
CalandriIlo. I Disagree With Their Respective Opinions. 
1. I have known and worked with Peter Jarvis for years, and Joe Knight is currently 
a colleague at Seattle University School of Law where I am a Professor. Professor Calandrillo is 
a respected expert in the field of corporate law, as is Professor Knight. All three expert opinions 
rely on the assumption that Reed Taylor is properly voting the shares of stock and is, therefore, 
an insider, at least in authority, to the corporation. But that is the underlying issue of the 
litigation. The conflicts of interest analysis, which each asserts, derives from the assumptions of 
the correctness of Reed Taylor's underlying litigation position. 
2. That is an assumption which experts cannot make in analyzing the conduct of 
Hawley Troxell as litigation counsel. Hawley Troxell is certainly entitled to follow the 
directions ofthe control group as litigation counsel as to the litigation posture they choose. They 
are not under a general duty to advise the Boards of the respective entity clients of their legal 
authority as general counsel to the corporation, which they are not. Litigation counsel is entitled 
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to rely upon the control group's directions when operating under the scope of representation as 
documented in this case and which can be reviewed by the Court in camera to defend against the 
claims of Reed Taylor. Assuming the truthfulness of Reed's claims is, again, putting the cart 
before the horse. 
3. Secondly, I note that the materials reviewed by Peter Jarvis, a professional 
colleague and friend whom I respect, are only the allegations of Reed Taylor. They do not 
include any of the contravening material and, of course, cannot include the confidential and 
privileged material which the Court should, if the Court deems it necessary, review in camera 
and ex parte. With all due respect to my colleague, Peter Jarvis, he simply doesn't have the 
relevant infonnation from which to opine. As is often the case when qualified experts in the 
field of conflict of interest, attorney as witness, etc., disagree, most often it is because the 
assumptions which they are given differ rather than that their analysis of conflicts differs 
substantially. Each of the experts, including the respected experts in the field of corporate law, 
Professors Knight and Calandrillo, assume the propriety of Reed's claims that he is entitled to 
vote the stock and therefore should be treated as a corporate insider rather than as an outside 
creditor with a claim against the corporations. Again, that assumption begs the issue which 
really is before the Court, which is controverted and which should be not only subject to the 
Court's ruling but, appellate review. Professors Knight and Calandrillo essentially echo the 
statements in Mr. Jarvis's Declaration and are similarly based on a one-sided perspective of the 
evidentiary and the legal claims in this case and obviously cannot include the privileged material 
which the Court, if it deems necessary, should review in camera and ex parte. 
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VIII. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the material that I have reviewed, Hawley Troxell's scope of representation 
and its representation as litigation counsel only of its various corporate clients do not present a 
basis for disqualification. This disqualification motion is, in fact, an effort to avoid the litigation 
on the merits by substituting a disqualification motion premised on a theory which would bar all 
corporate representation as litigation counsel ofthe various clients of Hawley Troxell even if 
they had separate litigation counsel. For the reasons stated, I do not believe a legal basis for 
disqualification of Hawley Troxell exists. 
Further your affiant sayeth naught. 
SSO late Professor of Law 
tile University School of Law 
STATE OF WASHINGTON) 
) ss. 
County of King ) 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me th~ day of October, 2008. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN A. STRAIT - 22 
Not Public for Washington 
Residing at '/4~~ / ~ 
My commission expjfeSY09jC 0 
40005.0006.1283919.4 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 1 ()t-Lday of October, 2008, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN A. STRAIT by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to each ofthe following: 
Roderick C. Bond 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
[Attorneys for Plaintiff] 
Michael S. Bissell 
Campbell, Bissell & Kirby, PLLC 
416 Symons Building 
7 South Howard Street 
Spokane, W A 99201 
[Attorneys for Plaintiff] 
David A. Gittins 
Law Office of David A. Gittins 
P.O. Box 191 
Clarkston, W A 99403 
[Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman] 
Michael E. McNichols 
Clements Brown & McNichols 
321 13th Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
[Attorneys for Defendant R. John Taylor] 
David R. Risley 
Randall, Black & Cox, PLLC 
P.O. Box 446 
1106 Idaho Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
[Attorneys for Defendants Connie Taylor, James Beck 
and Corrine Beck] 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN A. STRAIT - 23 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
__ Telecopy 
~Email 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
~mail 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
__ Telecopy 
~mail 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
__ Telecopy 
~mail 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
__ Telecopy 
~mail 
40005.0006.1283919.4 
James J. Gatziolis 
Charles E. Harper 
QUARLES & BRADY LLP 
500 West Madison Street, Suite 3700 
Chicago, Illinois 60661-2511 
[Attorneys for Crop USA Insurance] 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN A. STRAIT - 24 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
__ Telecopy 
2::::::::::... Email 
40005.0006.1283919.4 
Personal: 
Mailing Address: 
Phone: 
Marital Status: 
Birthdate: 
Presently: 
JOHN AVROM STRAIT 
1154 - 15th Avenue East 
Seattle. \Vashington 98112 
Home: (206) 323-0273 
Seattle University: (206) 398-4027 
Married to Barbara A. Isenhour 
3 sons: Sascha (5/31/Bl), 
Noah and Andrew 00/14/87) 
Associate Professor of Law - Seattle U. School of Law 
Areas of Specialization: 
Professional Responsibility 
Criminal Law 
Trial and Appellate Advocacy 
Evidence 
Educational History: 
Primary and Secondary 
Education: San Francisco, California 
College: 
Law School: 
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University of California, DaviS, B.A. (History), 1966 
Departmental Honors; 
Honors in Political Science; 
University Service Award; 
Officer in student and university government; 
four-year lettennan 
Yale Law School, L.L.B. (J.D.) 1969 
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John Avrom Strait 
Employment History: Garry. Dreyfus, McTernan & Brotsky 
San Francisco, California 1969-1970 
Admission to Bar: 
Exhibit A 
Reginald Heber Smith Fellow 
Multnomah County Legal Services 
Portland, Oregon 1970-1971 
Public Defender Association 
Seattle, Washington 1971-1974 
Seattle University (University of Puget Sound) 
School of Law 1974 to present 
Private Practice 1974 to present 
Special Deputy District Attorney 
Alameda County District Attorney's Office 
Oakland. California 
Fall 1980 - Spring 1981 
(white collar crimes; serial rape cases) 
Assistant Supervisor of Felonies 
Public Defender Association 
Seattle, Washington 
Fall 1989 - Fall 1990 
California State Bar 1970 
Oregon State Bar 1970 
Washington State Bar 1972 
Federal District Courts: 
Northern California; Oregon; Washington, D.C.; 
Wyoming; 
Western District of Washington; 
Eastern District of Washington 
Ninth Circuit. D.C. Circuit 
United States Supreme Court 
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John Avrom Strait 
PARTIAL RESUME OF EXPERIENCE IN 
LEGAL MALPRACTICE. LEGAL DISCIPLINE, AND LEGAL ETHICS 
Admitted to Practice: 
JOHN AVROM STRAIT 
Attorney at Law 
1154 - 15th Avenue East 
Seattle, Washington 98112 
California {l970}' Oregon (1970), Washington (l972) 
Currently: 
Private practice/consultant and Seattle University School of Law 
Law School Teacbin&t and Research: 
Professional Responsibility (including legal ethics, judicial ethics and legal 
malpractice) 1976 to present 
Selected Publications in Field of Professional Responsibility: 
1. Scenarios and problems as a method for teaching problems in 
professional responsibility, University of Detroit School of Law, 1977 
2. Materials on ethics for Legal Services lawyers. The Legal Services 
Corporation 1976, 1977, 1978 and 1980 (these materials are used in the 
initial lawyer training for newly hired legal services attorneys). 
3. Materials on ethics for professional responsibility for the State Bar 
Associations of Alaska, Washing10n. HaWaii. New Mexico and California. 
These materials were developed for presentations on various aspects of 
Professional Responsibility for CLE programs and State Bar speaker 
programs for attorneys in each jurisdiction. 
4. "Too Much Law," an unpublished set of materials for my Professional 
Responsibility course at the University of Puget Sound School of Law 
consisting of 700 pages of excerpts of cases, readings and problems in 
Professional Responsibility. 
5. Problems in Judicial Ethics 1981, 1982. 1983 and 1984. These are 
materials which were prepared for presentation to the judicial 
conferences of Alaska and Washington dealing with the Judicial Code of 
Conduct. 
6. A set of video tape scenarios raising problems in conflict of interest. duty 
to avoid misrepresentation. and competence generally for use in law 
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schools and for bar associations in training la\\yers in legal ethical 
responsibility. The current inventory is 13 separate scenarios ranging 
from 5 to 15 minutes in length which have been presented to the Bar 
Association of Alaska, in CLE progranls in \Vashington and in California. 
7. Lawyers Liability Review: 'Written Fee Agreements," January 1987. 
8. Lawyers Liability Review: "Avoiding Conflict ofInterest--Repairing It 
Once Recognized, II May 1986. 
9. "So Your Client Wants to Lie," Washington State Bar News. Volume 41, 
No.4, April 1987. 
10. The Ethical Limits of Advertising and SoliCitation, 1988, CLE materials. 
11. 'The Trial of Clarence Darrow: Ethics Then and Now." Article for the 
Washington State Bar Association annual convention for 1991 as part of 
a presentation and dramatization of Clarence Darrow's trial for perjulY 
arising from the bombing of the Los Angeles Times. 
12. "Voir Dire in Washington: The Constitution, Statutes and Cases," 
Prepared for the Washington State Trial Lawyers Association and for the 
Washington State Bar Association in 1991 and 1992. 
13. "Review of Evidence Case Law" for the year of 1991. repeated in 1992 and 
in 1993 for the Washington AsSOCiation of Criminal Defense Lawyers and 
for the Litigation Section of the Washington State Bar Association. 
14. "Deposition Practice in Alaska." Materials including a case file, witness 
statements, a review of Alaska law and deposition practice for use in a 
two-day training program in deposition practice including ethical 
behavior in deposition practice in which I was the program director and 
leader of 14 faculty (l992). 
15. "Ethics for Legal Assistants." An article written for the Washington State 
Trial Lawyers Association and for the Washington State Bar Association 
(l992). 
16. "Ethics for CPAs." Materials written for the Tacoma Community College's 
continuing CPA program (1992). 
17. "Scenarios in Ethics and Professionalism." Written for the Washington 
State Bar Association annual convention in September 1992. 
18. "Ethics for Alaska Attorneys. II A set of materials written for the Alaska 
State Bar Association, including an annotation of Alaska cases from 
territorial days to the present, covering concepts of professional 
responsibility and legal malpractice. 
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19. The Seattle Port Authority. Appointed to an ethics advisory committee 
for which I wrote a definition of ethics and a procedural manual to 
address ethics complaints involving commissioners and employees of the 
commission. 
20. 'The Ethics of Marketing. Advertising and Solicitation in Washington." 
For the Washington State Bar Association (1993). 
21. "Ethics for Legal Assistants." For use in training advocates for mentally 
disabled or other institutionalized individuals for the federally funded 
Protective Advocacy System (1991). 
22. "Ethics for the Sole Practitioner." For the first annual convention of the 
ABA's General Practice section. 
23. "Ethical Close Calls and the New Rules of Professional Conduct." A set of 
materials for the Alaska State Bar Association covering its 1993 adoption 
of the Rules of Professional Conduct with Alaska variants and a digest of 
all relevant Alaska case law. 
24. "Professionalism and Ethics in Sentencing." For the 1993 Washington 
State Bar Association Bar Convention. 
Past Bar Association Activities Relevant to Professional Responsibility: 
1. Washington State Bar Association lawyer representative to the Judicial 
Ethics AdviSOry Committee as appointed by the Washington State Bar 
Governors and the Washington State Supreme Court. 
2. Funded member, Rules on Professional Conduct Committee, Washington 
State Bar ASSOCiation. 
3. Frequent speaker on Lawyer and Judicial Ethics for the Washington 
State Bar Association. 
4. Member King County Bar Association Campaign Ethics Committee. 
5. Member Seattle-King County Bar Association Committee on Advertising. 
6. Co-Chair Seattle-King County Bar Association Selection Committee II. 
1992-93. 
Qther Professional Associations Regarding Responsibility: 
1. The American Association of Law Schools Professional Responsibility 
section; speaker and organizer for presentations on how to teach 
professional responsibility and problems in professional responsibility for 
lawyers. 
2. Ex-Board member Puget Sound Legal Assistance Foundation; 
professional responsibility subcommittee of the board; duties include 
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reviewing problems of professional responsibility which arise from 
National Legal Services Corporation: Regulations and Rules applicable to 
legal services attorneys and reviewing cases that arise within the Puget 
Sound Legal Assistance Foundation for ethical problems and solutions. 
3. Board member, Washington Chapter American Judicature SOCiety; 
4. Executive Committee Member, Washington State Bar Association 
Crinlinal Law Section; 
5. Special District Counsel, appointed by the Board of Governors of the 
Washington State Bar Association to investigate disciplinary complaints; 
6. Washington State Bar Association Board of Governor's appointee to the 
Statute Law Commission supervising the code revisor's office publishing 
cases statutes and administrative regulations for the State of 
Washington. 
7. Member. Seattle Port Authority, Ethics Advisory Committee. 
Other Past Professional Associations Regarding Responsibility: 
1. Society for American Law Teachers subcommittee on professional 
responsibility. 
2. Currently Board Chair Washington Appellate Defenders Association With 
responsibility for ethical problems at W.A.D.A. 
3. Co-chair, Seattle King County Bar Association Judicial Screening Panels; 
4. Co-chair, Seattle King County Bar Association Campaign Fair Practices 
Committee; 
5. Member. Steering Committee. Seattle King County Bar ASSOCiation 
Martin Luther King Commemorative Event; 
6. The Rules of Professional Conduct Committee (member for the last 10 
years) issuing adviSOry opinions on the Washington Rules of Professional 
Conduct. 
Others Activities Since January 1999: 
1. Member, Innocence Project working on The Wenatchee Child Sexual 
Abuse Cases. 
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2. The Washington State Bar Association InterProfessionalism Committee 
coordinating professional relationships with medical and other forensic 
professional organizations. 
3. The Washington State Bar Association Professionalism Committee trying 
to upgrade the professionalism of lav.yers in Washington. 
Lecturer and Consultant: 
1. National Institute for Trial Advocacy; 1974 to present. 
2. Hastings College of Trial Advocacy; 1977 to 1991. 
3. Hastings College of Civil Advocacy, personal injury programs 1985. 1987, 
1988, 1990. 
4. Washington State Bar Association Bar convention speaker, 1980. 1982, 
1983. and 1987-92. 
5. American Judicature Society and National Appellate conference speaker. 
6. King County Bar Association speaker in numerous CLE programs on 
ethics. 
7. The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, speaker. 1979-81, 
1987, 1989 and 1992. 
8. National Legal Aid and Defender Association speaker and panel 
coordinator on legal ethics, 1980 convention. 
9. Alaska Bar Association speaker for CLE programs on legal ethics. 
1983-85, and 1988-93. 
10. Alaska Attorney General's Office and District Attorneys Association 
speaker on legal ethics, 1982, 1983 and 1986. 
11. Hawaii Public Defender Association speaker on legal ethics 1975, 1988 
and 1990. 
12. New Mexico District Attorney Association speaker 1978 and 1979. 
13. National Legal Services Corporation speaker, 1977-84, 1987, 1989, 1991 
and 1993. 
14. Washington State Judicial Conference, 1983 and 1984. 
15. Washington State District Court Judges Association speaker 1978, 1984 
and 1988. 
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16. Alameda County District attorneys office speaker on legal ethics, 
1980-81. 
17. Traveler's Assurance Company house counsel training progTarn 1981-86 
(this includes specific training on the trial of legal malpractice cases and 
legal ethics for insurance defense counsel). 
18. The National Endowment for the Humanities, 1979. 
19. World Affairs Conference, Boulder, Colorado, 1979 and 1980. 
20. House counsel training program for the law firm of Baker and Botts in 
Houston, Texas, 1985. 1986. 1988, 1990-93. 
21. Washington Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, 1986 to present. 
Litigation: 
Between 1978 and 1996, I have represented an average of three cases per year 
before the Washington State Bar on attorney discipline; and am retained as an 
expert witness an average of two to three times a month on professional 
responsibility issues with practitioners in the states of Alaska. Washington and 
California. 
Expert Witness Q1JaUfied in the Field of Professional Responsibility: 
Since 1980, I have testified in an average of three cases per year as an expert 
witness for either plaintiff or defendant in legal malpractice cases. I have been 
qualified as an expert witness in the Superior Courts for Skagit County, King 
County, Kitsap County. Whatcom, Clark, Spokane, Walla Walla, SnohOmish, 
Mason, Thurston, and Kittitas Counties and in the Federal District Court for 
the Western District of Washington. I have testified in the states of Alaska, 
Hawaii, California and Wyoming. Among other cases of note in which I have 
been either an expert witness or involved as a consultant are Ross v. Seannell, 
97 Wn.2d 598 (1992) and Demopolis v. Short and Cressman, 103 Wn.2d 52 
(1985). 
Arbitration: 
I have testified as an expert witness in arbitrations in King and Pierce County 
and have sat as an arbitrator in legal malpractice or professional ethics related 
claims in Pierce County in approximately 20 cases. 
Consultant: 
Since 1978 I have consulted regularly with attorneys on legal ethics and legal 
malpractice related matters. I receive an average of one to two such calls daily 
at. the current time. 
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Exhibit B 
2002 Northwest Deposition Program 
2002 Real Property, Probate and Trust 
Section Midyear Seminar and 
Meeting 
A Civil Action: Civility and 
The Duty of Representation 
Advanced Real Estate Purchases & 
Sales 
Advertising and Solicitation and the 
Constitution and Ethics Codes 
Advocacy and Ethics 
Advocating for Immigrants 
Advocating for Immigrants 
Alaska Rules of Ethics 
Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct 
and New Ethical Issues in Fees. 
Billing, and Malpractice 
ALJ Code of Conduct? 
Amanda Kumar's Case: An Interactive 
Discussion of the Ethical Issues that 
Attomeys Face in their Day-to-Day 
Practice 
An Attorney's Duty to Investigate and 
Disclose 
Annual Ethics Advisory 
Annual Ethics Advisory: A Review of all 
Washington Cases and Opinions on 
Ethics 
Annual Ethics Round Up Review 
Annual Ethics Teleconference 
Annual Review of Criminal Law Cases 
For The State of Washington 
National Institute for Trial Advocacy 
WSBA 
Seattle University School of Law 
Law Seminars International 
W A State Bar Association 
HI Public Defenders Office 
SU-Access to Justice 
SU-Access to Justice 
AK Bar Association 
AK Bar Association 
WALJAlNAA'S September CLE 
Conference: COMMITMENT TO 
EXCELLENCE IN PUBLlC SERVICE 
Seattle University School of Law 
Oregon State Bar Association's 16th 
Annual Northwest Bankruptcy 
Institute 
University of Washington 
Washington Law Institute 
Washington Legal Education Institute 
WSTLA 
The Year 2000 Criminal Justice 
Institute 
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Appellate Ethics W A State Trial Lawyers Association 
A Single Shot of Ethics WDTL Practice Development 
Committee 
Attorney and Ethics: Representing the The ADL Lawyers' Roundtable and 
Dissenters the Jewish Federation of Greater 
Seattle's Cardozo Society for 
Lawyers 
Attorney-Client PrivilegelWork Product W A State Bar Association 
And Ethics 
Avoiding Ethical and Liability Issues in HALF MOON SEMINARS PRESENTS: 
Real Estate Transactions WASHINGTON COMMERCIAL REAL 
EST A TE TRANSACTIONS 
Avoiding Malpractice: What Every King County Bar Association 
Lawyer Needs To Know Continuing Legal Education 
Business of Lawyering: Managing Your Small Business Legal Services 
Solo or Small Practice 
Changes Made to the Washington State KCBNs Ethics Workout 
Supreme Court to the Committee's 
Proposed Rules and Rationale 
Child Abuse and Disclosure WA State Bar Association Criminal 
Requirements and the Ethics of Law & Family Law Joint Sections 
Attorneys 
Civil Division Ethics Program on RPC King County Prosecutor's Office 
4.2 
Civil Litigation Institute WA State Bar Association Litigation 
Section 
Commentary on the Comments 4th Annual WSBA Conference on the 
Law of Lawyering 
Conflicts for Defense Counsel WA Defense Lawyers' Association 
Conflicts of Interest in Insurance and Annual Washington State Bar 
Coverage Insurance Law Section CLE 
Conflicts of Interests in Employment WSTLA Teleconference 
Cases: Minimize Your Risk When 
Representing Multiple Parties 
Conflicts With Other Professionals WSBA 
Common Prosecution and Defense WSBA Criminal Law Section 
Ethics Issues Under the New Rules 
of Professional Conduct 
Criminal Justice & Psychiatric Western State Hospital Graduate 
Testimony Fellow Program 
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Criminal Justice Institute Ethics W A State Bar Association 
Program 
Criminal law - Ethics in Sentencing WA State Bar Association 
Criminal Law: The Year in Review WA Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers 
Dances with Wolves and Other W A State Bar Association 
Predators: Ethics of Advocacy 
Deposition of Experts AK Bar Association 
Deposition Practice in Alaska AK Bar Association 
Discipline & Ethics Caselaw Review WA State Bar Association 
Disciplinary Training Special District WA State Bar Association 
Counsel 
Discovery: A Tool, Not a Club: The W A State Bar Association Business 
Ethics of Discovery Practice Law Section 
Disqualification Motions and Ethics University of Washington 
Eastside Criminal Practitioners Ethical Washington State Bar Association 
issues; Co Chair and Presenter Criminal Law Section 
Effective Assistance of Counsel and Innocence Project Northwest Training 
Post Conviction Relief Program for lawyers Assisting in 
the Project 
Election Ethics NW legal Foundation 
Essentials of Evidence: Ethical W A State Bar Association 
Obligations in Discovery 
Essentials of Washington Civil WA State Bar Association 
Procedure and Ethics 
Ethical Issues in Capital Appointments WDPAC: The Changing Tide in 
Capital Punishment 
Ethical Issues in Transfers of Property King County Bar Association Planning 
by the Elderly for the Elderly: A Seminar for 
General Practitioner 
Ethical and Professional Responsibility W A State Bar Association 
Issues in Representing Property 
Owners and Property Managers 
Ethical Close Calls and the New Alaska AK Bar Association 
Rules of Professional Conduct 
Ethical ConSiderations 6th Annual Labor and Employment 
Law Conference 
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TITLE 
Ethical Considerations 
Ethical Considerations 
Ethical Considerations 
Ethical Considerations In Motion 
Practice 
Ethical ConSiderations - Multi-
Profession Discussion of Ethical 
Issues Regarding Ethics in Domestic 
Violence Cases, and Ethics in 
Sexual Abuse Cases 
Ethical Dilemmas for the Practicing 
Lawyer 
Ethical Dilemmas for the Practicing 
Lawyer 
Ethical Dilemmas In Handling Civil 
Litigation 
Ethical Dilemmas in Handling Civil 
Settlement 
The Ethical Implications Of Taking An 
Equity Interest In Your Client 
Ethical Issues 
Ethical Issues and Civil Litigation 
Ethical Issues for Supervision of 
Paralegals 
Ethical Issues In A Real Estate Practice 
Ethical Issues of Concern 
Ethical Issues of Concem 
Ethical Issues Regarding White Collar 
Crime And Whistleblowing 
Ethical Limits on the Use of Non-lawyer 
Staff 
SPONSORING ORGANIZATION 
WA State Bar Association 
The Seminar Group: Raising the Bar 
of Continuing Education 
South Asian Law Student Association 
Presents: Civil Rights within the 
Local Muslim Community 
WSBA Making the Most of Motion 
Practice 
WSBA 
W A State Bar Association 
Seattle University Alumni CLE 
Washington State Bar Association 
And The Federal Bar Association 
Of The Western District Of 
Washington Fifth Annual Civil 
Litigation Institute: Your Guide 
For A Successful Trial Practice 
WA State Bar Association 
Intellectual Property Law Society and 
the ABA Law Student Division 
Housing Justice Project Volunteer 
Legal Services Program 
The Annual Civil Law Litigation 
Section of the State Bar 
Association 
W A State T rial lawyers Association 
Seattle King County Bar Association 
Real Property Section 
W A State Bar Association 
WSBA Elder Law Issues In Estate 
Planning 
W A State Bar Association 
WA State Trial Lawyers Association 
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TITLE SPONSORING ORGANIZATION DATE 
Ethical Pitfalls of the In-house and 2006 Ethics Teleconference 2006 
Outside Counsel Relationship 
Ethical Pitfalls: Strategies to Avoid the WSBA 2003 
Problems Attorneys Face in Day-to-
Day Practice 
Ethical Program W A State Bar Association Convention 2000 
Ethical Responsibilities of Judges to 10th Annual Conference for Judicial 1986 
Disqualify Conduct Organizations, American 
Judicature Society, Chicago, IL 
Ethics SU School of Law 1st Annual Golf 
Tournament 2007 
Ethics The Year 2000 Millennium Convention 2000 
for the State Bar Association 
Ethics The Access to Justice Foundation 2000 
Ethics Washington State Bar Association in 2000 
Spokane 
Ethics Loren Miller Bar Association 2002 
Ethics 3rd Annual Labor and Employment 2003 
Law Section Meeting and Seminar 
Ethics 7th Annual Labor & Employment Law 2004 
Conference 
Ethics Asian Bar Association of Washington 2004 
Ethics THE WSBA CRIMINAL LAw SECTION 2005 
PRESENTS: Crim inal Law Update 
Ethics ACCESS TO JUSTICE INSTITUTE: 2005 
Advocating for Immigrant Victims 
CLE 
Ethics WASHINGTON DEFENSE TRIAL LAWYERS 2005 
Assoc. C.LE. 
Ethics Washington Defense Trial Lawyer'S 2006 
Construction Seminar 
Ethics WSBA CRIMINAL LAw SECTION 2006 
Ethics Access to Justice Institute: 2006 
Advocating for Immigrant Victims 
Ethics AdviSOry 2001 , 2002, 2003 Washington Law Institute 2001,2002,2003 
Ethics and Landlord Tenant Practice WSBA Residential Landlord -Tenant 2002 
Law 
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TiTLE 
Ethics and Landlord Tenant Practice 
Ethics and The Public Defender 
Ethics and The Rules of Professional 
Conduct 
Ethics and Professionalism -- Revisiting 
the Basics 
Ethics and Professionalism Issues in 
Civil Litigation 
Ethics and Professionalism: The 
Changing Views of Loyalty and 
Disclosure for Professionals 
Ethics and Strategies 
Ethics Considerations 
Ethics - Ex Parte Communications with 
School District Personnel 
Ethics: Fee Disputes 
Ethics for Accountants 
Ethics for Administrative Law Judges 
Ethics for Advocates 
Ethics for an Adversary System 
Ethics for Appellate Practice 
Ethics For Appellate Practitioners 
Ethics for Attorney Generals 
Ethics for Business Practitioners 
Ethics for Civil Utigators 
Ethics For Civil Practitioners 
SPONSORING ORGANIZATION DATE 
WSBA Residential Landlord -Tenant 2002 
Law 
Washington Defender Association 2003 
77th Annual Meeting Association of 2006 
Transportation Law Professionals 
Professionalism Committee of the 2002 
King County Bar Association 
WaShington Defense Trial Lawyer's 2003 
Association 
Jewish Federation of Greater Seattle 2006 
CLE 
18th Annual Advanced Conference on 2006 
Commercial Real Estate Leases 
The Seminar Group: Washington's 2004 
Annual Corporate and Securities 
Law Update 
Washington State Council of School 2006 
Attorneys' Fall Workshop 
WSTLA Legal Educational Seminars 2007 
& New Member Committee 
Tacoma Community College 1989 
W A State Bar Association 2006 
National Institute for Trial Advocacy 2001 
Regional program sponsored by 
Seattle University and the National 
Institute Trial Advocacy 
American Bar Association 2000 
Washington Supreme Court 1999 
Washington State Trial Lawyers 2000 
Association Appellate Practice 
CLE 
Government Lawyers Bar Association 1999 
W A State Bar Association Business 1999 
Law Section 
WSBA Civil Litigation Annual Institute 2000 
Seattle King County Bar Association 2000 
Professionalism Committee 
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TITLE SPONSORING ORGANIZA nON 
Ethics for CPAs WA Association of CPAs 
Ethics for Criminal Defense and Lorman Foundation. 
Prosecuting Attorneys Handling 
Driving while Under the Influence 
And Related Criminal Cases 
Ethics For Criminal Law Practitioners, Washington State Bar Association 
Co-chair and presenter Crimina! Law Section Program 
Ethics for Defense and Prosecutors W A State Bar Association Crim inal 
Law Section 
Ethics for Elder Law W SBA Elder Law Section 
Ethics for Federal Attorneys After U.S. Attorney Western District 
McDade 
Ethics for Federal Practitioners Federal Bar Association 
Ethics for Govemment Attorneys in The Alaska Department of Law 
Alaska 
Ethics for Insurance Practitioners Washington Defense Lawyers 
Association 
Ethics For Investigators Washington State Police Training 
Program 
Ethics For Investigators NIT A 2002 Deposition Program 
Ethics for Investigators University of Washington 
Ethics for Labor Lawyers King County Bar Association Labor 
Law Section 
Ethics for Landlord Tenant Practice Washington Law Institute 
Ethics for Lawyers Practicing Criminal WSBA CRIMINAL LAw SECTION 
Law 
Ethics for Legal Assistants WA State Trial Lawyers Association; 
WA Ass'n of ParalegalS 
Ethics for Legal Services Practitioners Columbia Legal Services 
Working With Child Clients 
Ethics For Legal Services And Clinical Annual Clinical Education Conference 
Programs Supervisors at Sleeping Lady Resort, 
Washington 
Ethics for Litigators WSBA Section On Litigation 
Ethics For Utigators National Institute for Trial Advocacy 
Northwest Regional Conference 
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TITLE SPONSORING ORGANIZATION 
Ethics For Multiple Client Washington legal Education Institute 
Representation ClE for Landlordl Tenant! 
Commercial Landlords 
Ethics for NAlS National Association of legal 
Secretaries 
Ethics for Non-lawyers W A State Trial lawyers Association 
Ethics for Paralegals Catholic Community Services 
Ethics For Police, Probation Officers, 2001 Criminal Justice Institute 
Prosecutors and Defense Counsel 
Ethics For Post Conviction Innocence Project Northwest CLE 
Representations 
Ethics for Prosecutors Washington Criminal Justice Center 
Ethics for Prosecutors Washington Association Of 
Prosecuting Attorneys, Spring 
Training Program 
Ethics for Prosecutors and Defense The Washington State Bar 
Counsel Association Criminal Law Section 
Ethics for Practitioners SKBA Real Property, Probate And 
Trusts Section 
Ethics for Prosecutors Washington Association Of 
Prosecuting Attorneys Support 
Enforcement Project 
Ethics for Public Defenders The Defender Association 
Ethics for the Sole Practitioner American Bar Association Section on 
General Practice 
Ethics for Wills and Trust Practitioners Seattle King County Bar Association 
Wills and Trust Section 
Ethics: Getting to Know the New RPCs Chelan 2005 Annual Conference 
Ethics: Getting to Know the New RPCs YAKIMA THIRD ANNUAL VOLUNTEER 
ATTORNEY SERVICES CONTINUING 
LEGAL EDUCATION SEMINAR FOR 
CENTRAL WASHINGTON 
Ethics In Appellate Advocacy Washington State Supreme Court 
Washington Historical Society 
Ethics in Bankruptcy Practice Annual NW Bankruptcy Conference 
Ethics In Business Law And Tax Washington State Bar Association 
Practice Business lawlTax Sections CLE 
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TITLE SPONSORING ORGANIZATION 
Ethics In Criminal Representation, Washington State Bar Association 
Co-chair and Presenter Criminal Law Section 
Ethics in Deposition Practice NITA 
Ethics in Discovery W A State Bar Association 
Ethics in Drafting and Using Trusts W A State Bar Association 
Ethics In Federal Practice After McDade The Federal Bar Association for the 
Western District of Washington 
Ethics in Health Law Health Lawyers' Association 
Ethics in Legal Malpractice W A State Bar Association 
Ethics in Pro Bono Cases Access to Justice Institute 
Ethics in Review University of Washington 
Ethics In Representing The Elderly The Elder Law Section of the WSBA 
Ethics In Sentencing Proceedings For Washington State Bar Association 
Practitioners, Co chair and Presenter Criminal Law Section sentencing 
CLE 
Ethics Issues in International Practice King County Bar Association 
International Law Section Meeting 
Ethics Issues in Purchase & Sales Law Seminars International: Advanced 
Real Estate Purchases & Sales 
Ethics of Advertising University of Puget Sound School of 
Law 
Ethics of Advocacy Master Advocates Program. University 
of California, Boalt Law School, 
Berkeley, CA 
Ethics of Advocacy Baker & Botts, Houston, TX 
Ethics of Business and Insurance In-house Training Program for Gordon 
Defense Representation Thomas Honeywell in Tacoma, 
Washington 
Ethics of Civil Litigation University of Washington 
Ethics of Dissolution Trial Practice WSBA Handling Your First or Next 
Dissolution Trial with Confidence 
Ethics of Federal Litigation Federal Bar Association 
Ethics of Gray Areas in the Intersection Washington State Bar Association 
of Professions Inter-Professionalism Committee 
Ethics of Insurance Representation Insurance Law Institute 
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2001 
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2006 
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2000 
2000 
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TITLE SPONSORING ORGANIZATION 
Ethics of Lawyers in Employment Cases Third Annual Employment Law 
Institute -- Washington State Bar 
Association 
Ethics of Legislative Staff Counsel Senior Legislating Drafting 
Conference, Seattle University 
School of Law 
Ethics of Marketing, Advertising, and WA State Bar Association 
Solicitation 
Ethics of Public Defenders and WA State Bar Association Criminal 
Prosecutors Justice Institute 
Ethics of Subpoenas THE 2006 OFFENDER UNIT RETREAT: 
SOCIETY OF COUNSEL 
Ethics of Supervision The WSPA Fall Conference 
Ethics of SuperviSing Attorneys W A State Trial Lawyers Association 
Ethics of Trial Advocacy University of Washington 
Ethics of Tribal Entity Representation Nineteenth Annual Federal Bar 
Association Indian Law 
Conference 
Ethics Program Washington Defense Association 
Ethics Panel NIT A NORTHWEST REGIONAL 
Ethics Panel NIT A NORTHWEST REGIONAL 
ETHICS, Part One: AddreSSing 11th Annual Washington Criminal 
Changes to the Washington Rules Justice Institute 
of Professional Conduct 
Ethics Presentation to Business & Betts, Patterson, and Mines, P.S 
litigation Practice Groups 
Ethics Roundup Washington Law Institute 
Ethics Seminar Criminal Law Section Members 
Ethics: The Hard Questions #1 AK Bar Association 
Ethics: The Hard Questions #2 AK Bar Association 
ETHICS UPDATE: CONFIDENTIALITY AND AK Bar Association 
CLIENT MISCONDUCT 
Evidence and Ethics Seminar Yakima County 2nd Annual Volunteer 
Attorney Service 
c;straitIResumeJExhibit B Publications & ClEs 2oo7.doc 
8113/20084:28 PM 
AFFIDA VIT OF JOHN A. STRAIT 
DATE 
1996 
1993 
1986, 1988, 1989, 
1990, 1992, 1994 
1994 
2006 
2003 
1989 
1986 
1994 
2001 
2006 
2007 
2004 
2004 
1997, 1998, 1999 
2004 
1991 
1994 
2005 
2004 
Page 10 of 15 
TITLE 
Evidence: Obtaining, Preserving, 
Presenting 
Expert Witnesses in the Courtroom 
Exposing a Judge or Getting Even? And 
Other Recent Moral Tales in 
Washington Ethics Caselaw 
Federalism Implications of Recent US 
Supreme Court Decisions And The 
Role of the Government Lawyer 
Fifth Annual Civil Litigation Institute: 
Your Guide For A Successful Trial 
Practice 
Fifth Annual Labor & Em ployment Law 
Conference 
Honesty and Collaborative Law: 
Pushing Honesty to Its Umits? 
SPONSORING ORGANIZATION 
Washington State Trial Lawyers 
Association 
WA State Bar Association Criminal 
Law Section 
11th Annual Professional 
Responsibility Institute 
Washington State Government 
Lawyers Bar Association 
Washington State Bar Association 
And The Federal Bar Association 
Of The Western District Of 
Washington 
WSBA Labor Law Section 
Seattle University School of Law 
presents: HONESTY AND THE LAw: 
HONESTY AS ADVOCACY 
DATE 
2002 
1987 
2003 
1999 
1999 
2002 
2007 
Hospital & Health Law Seminar Washington State Society of Healthcare 2000 
Attorneys 
How Legal Supervisors Are Affected by 
Changes to the RPCs 
Hypotheticals 
In-House Ethics Program 
In-House Ethics Program 
In-House Ethics Program 
Insurance Defense Ethics 
Judicial Ethics 
Judicial Ethics and the Judicial Conduct 
Commission 
Law of Search & Seizure in W A, Justice 
Robert Utter (edited) 
Legal Ethics and Litigation 
Seattle University School of Law 
WSBA12th Annual Criminal Justice 
Institute 
Halverson Applegate, P.S. 
Seed Intellectual Property Law Group 
PLCC 
Stanislaw Ashbaugh. LLP 
WA State Bar Association 
WA State Judicial Conference 
Annual Joint Education Session for 
judges and court administrators 
sponsored by the Office of 
Administrator of the Courts for the 
State of Washington 
University of Puget Sound Law 
Review 
Battelle Institute, Seattle, W A 
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TITLE SPONSORING ORGANIZATION 
Legally Bound: Supervised Visitation King County Bar Association 
And Domestic Violence Protection 
Orders In Family Law Case 
Legal Malpractice in Washington University of Washington 
Malpractice: Case Law Survey and WA State Bar Association 3rd Annual 
Update Conference on the Law of 
Lawyering 
Malpractice: Washington Case Law WA State Bar Association 
And Current Trends 
Malpractice Pitfalls and Prevention: American Academy of Marriage 
Emerging Areas of Concern, Lawyers 
Practice Tips and Recognizing and 
Minimizing Risks 
Making and Meeting Objections: Ethics University of Washington 
of Trial Practice 
Marketing and Ethics W A State Bar Association 
Marketing for Lawyers W A State Bar Association 
McDade Amendments U.S. Attorney's Office for the Western 
District of Washington 
Methods of Teaching Ethics Association of American Law Schools 
Western Meeting 
Minimizing Conflicts of Interest in Multi- The American Bar Association 
Party Representation Section of Labor and Employment 
Law and the ABA Center for 
Continuing Legal Education 
Present a Live SO-minute 
TeleConference and Live Audio 
Webcast 
Misuse of Motions to Disqualify in University of Washington 
Litigation 
Multidisciplinary Practice and Seattle University School of Law Fall 
Representing Clients in a Limited 2002 CLE PROGRAM 
Capacity: How Will the Practice of 
Law Change? 
Navigating The Maze - A Checklist WSBA Environment & Land Use Law 
Approach Toland Use And Section 
Environmental Law, #03741 
New Discipline Rules and the Impact on 2nd Annual WSBA Conference on the 
Ethics Behavior Law of Lawyering 
New Rules of Professional Conduct DNA-PEOPLE'S LEGAL SERV1CES 40TH 
ANNIVERSARY 
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TITLE SPONSORING ORGANIZATION DATE 
New Rules of Professional Conduct: SEATTLE UNIVERSITY LAw REVIEW 2005 
How Might Your Life Change? ALUMNI ETHICS 
NW Regional Ethics For Litigations NITA 1999 
Plenary Session: A Smorgasbord of 11 th Annual WSBA Employment Law 2004 
Practical Ethical Issues - Tegman, Institute 
Brown, Joint and Several Liability; 
Individual and Entity Defenses 
Plenary Session On Ethics: Giving Washington State Bar Association 2003 
Legal Advice In The Shadow Of Continuing Legal Education 10th 
Enron Annual Employment Law Institute 
Professional Responsibility -- Tribal Seattle University Continuing Legal 2006 
Attorneys and Tribal Members Education: UNDERSTANDING 
Conflicts of Interests in Estate AIPRA: THE AMERICAN INDIAN 
Planning PROBATE REFORM ACT 
Proposed Changes to the Rules of Washington State Society of 2004 
Professional Conduct Healthcare Attorneys Annual 
Spring Hospital & Health Law 
Seminar 
The Proposed Rules of Professional VOLUNTEER LAWYER PROGRAM 2005 
Conduct and False Testimony SKAGIT COUNTY CoMMUNITY ACTION 
AGENCY 
Proposed Rules of Professional AK Bar Association 1990 
Conduct for Alaska 
Prosecuting, Defending. and Avoiding University of Washington 1987 
Malpractice Claims 
Recent Changes to Washington's Legal WA State Bar Association 2003 
Ethics and Discipline Procedures 
and Potential 2003 Changes 
Recent Rule Changes In Ethics University of Washington Annual 2000 
Nationally and Locally Ethics Review Program 
Review of Criminal Law and Evidence Second Annual Criminal Justice 1995 
Institute 
Review of Developments of the Law of HI Prosecuting Attorneys Annual 1988 
Ethics in Hawaii Training 
Review of Recent Changes in the In-House CLE for Stanislaw- 2007 
Washington Ethics Rules Ashbaugh, LLP Lawyers -
Counselors - Advisors 
Revisiting the Basics WA State Bar Association 2002 
Role of the Attorney as Moral Seattle University School of Law ABA 2003 
Counselor: Right, Wrong. Legal and Law Student Division 
Illegal. Where's the line, what 
should you advise, and what's the 
difference? 
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TITLE 
Role of Expert Witnesses in Psychology 
and Psychiatry In Civil and Criminal 
Litigation in Washington 
Role of Forensic Evidence in Criminal 
Law 
SPONSORING ORGANIZATION 
University of WashingtonlWestern 
State Hospital Institute for 
Psychology and Psychiatry 
WSBA 
DATE 
1999 
2001 
Rule Changes and the work of The RPC University Of Washington Annual 1999 
Committee Ethics Continuing Legal Education 
Program Year-End Review 
Rules of Professional Conduct 
Committee 
Self Defense For Lawyers 
Selected Ethics and Professionalism 
Issues for Criminal Law 
Practitioners 
Selected Ethical Problems in Business 
Selected Ethic Problems For Civil 
Defense Lawyers 
Selected Washington/Oregon Ethics 
Issues 
Seventh Annual Ethical Dilemmas for 
Washington Practitioner; Co Chair 
and Presenter 
Seventh Annual Tort Law Update 
Seventh Annual Washington Criminal 
Justice Institute 
Sixth Annual Litigation 
Special District Counsel Investigation of 
Disciplinary Cases Training Session 
for Attorneys Desiring to be SDC 
Taking Equity Interest in Your Cfienfs 
Business 
University of Washington Annual 
Ethics Review Program 
Irwin H. Schwartz 
WSBA Criminal Justice Institute 14th 
Annual CLE 
Washington State Bar Association 
1999 Purchase And Sale Of A 
Smaller Business From Asset 
Valuation To Zero Hour Closing 
Washington Defense Lawyers Annual 
Eastside Convention 
Oregon Reciprocity Seminar 
WSBA 
W A State Trial Lawyers Associations 
WSBA 
In-House Ethics Program For 
Halverson Applegate. P.S. 
W A State Supreme Court and W A 
State Bar Association Joint 
project on Discipflnary Training 
Seattle King County Bar Association 
2000 
2001 
2007 
1999 
2000 
2002 
2000 
2000 
2000 
2000 
1999 
2000 
The Straight and Narrow: Ethical Issues Law Seminars International: Real 2004 
in Purchases and Sales Estate Purchases & Sales 
The Trial of Clarence Darrow: Ethics 
Then and Now 
WA State Bar Association and W A 
Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers 
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TITLE SPONSORING ORGANIZATION DATE 
Three ethics presentations in various Washington State Bar Association's 1999 
forms with materials Annual Convention 
Thirteenth Annual Insurance Law Washington Defense Trial Lawyers 2000 
Seminar Defense Lawyers Fighting For Justice Ir 
Courts 
T rial Advocacy and Ethics AK District Attorneys Association 
Understanding the Residential Landlord- Housing Justice Project Free CLE 
Tenant Act and the Unlawful 
Detainer Process 
Use of Judicial Evaluation Programs The Access to Justice Subcommittees 
and On Access to Justice for Education and Jurisprudence 
Indigents 
Voire Dire in Washington W A State Bar Association 
Washington Criminal Justice System University of WashingtonlWestern 
and the Role of Psychiatrist and State Institute for Forensic 
Psychologist Psychology and Psychiatry 
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DEPOSITION & TRIAL TESTIMONY 
Exhibit C 
CASE NAME JURISDICTION CAUSE NO. 
Andreas Meyn v. Superior Court 002-00820-8 
Christopher Fletcher Whatcom County 
Bernard v. Hernandez Judicial Arbitration and 
Mediation Services, 
Seattle 
Boyd H. Graves, et a/. v. Superior Court, King 94-2-26227 -1 
John A. McGary, et County, WA 
al. 
Chenega Corp., et al. V. AK Superior Court 3rd 3AN985599 
Fortier and Mikko Judicial District 
DeLiew, et al. v. Dodge AK Superior Court 3rd 3AN-96-8492 CiVIL 
etal. Judicial District 
Del! D. Jackson v. Superior Court, Third 3-AN-90-6535 CiV 
Cynthia Coulter, et JUd. District, AK 
al. 
Diane Rommel v. King County Superior 98-2-19908-3SEA 
Walthew Warner, Court 
Dicran Kassouni v. Superior Court, 3AN-02-8638 CIV 
Cathleen Anchorage AK 
McLaughlin, et a!. 
Douglas A. Young v. U.S. District Court, C 91-1-1267R 
Chase Riveland, et Western Dist., WA 
al. 
Frank Shiers, et a/. v. Superior Court, King 92-2-29576-6 
W. Ronald County, WA 
Groshong, et al. 
Hansen v. Bart Arbitrator's Division Testimony 
Anderson Superior Court, King 
County 
Harry Schafer, et al. v. 94-2-11435-2 
David Utevsky, et al. 
Hensey v. Farmer's Superior Court of King 97-2-28353-1 SEA 
Insurance Co. County, WA 
In re Brett Clark County Superior 98-1-01038-3 
Court 
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Deposition 
Testimony 
Trial testimony 
Deposition 
Deposition 
Deposition 
Deposition 
Deposition 
T estirnony & deposition 
Deposition 
Deposition & Trial 
testimony 
Deposition 
Deposition and 
Testimony 
Page 1 of 4 
EXHIBIT "e" 
CASE NAME 
In Re Burlington 
Northern & Santa 
Fe Railway Co. 
Employee 
Settlement 
Agreements 
Utigation 
In Re Colby 
In re Consolidated 
Seattle Slew 
litigation cases 
In re Corporate 
Dissolution of 
Ocean Shores Park 
inc .• et al. v. Gloria 
Rawson-Sweet 
In re Douglas Schafer 
In re Hammermaster 
In Re Hammermaster 
JURISDICTION CAUSE NO. 
Federal District Court MOL #1418 
Western District of WA 
Supreme Court of 
Washington Judicial 
Conduct Proceeding 
Superior Court, Yakima 92-2-01880-1 
County, WA 
Superior Court, Grays 
Harbor Co. WA 
Bar Disciplinary Hearing 
WA Judicial Conduct 
Commission 
Supreme Court of 
Washington Judicial 
Conduct Proceeding 
02-201024·1 
139WA2d211 
In re Smith 
Furnishings 
Home U.S. Bankruptcy Court 
District-Oregon 
Inslee Best. et al. v. 
Dennis Kenneley, et 
al. 
Interactive Financial 
Services Group Inc., 
et al. v. Perkins Coie, 
LLP, et at 
Ito Int'l Corp., et al. v. 
Prescott, Inc., et al. 
Superior Court, 
County, WA 
Superior Court 
County. WA 
Superior Court, 
County, WA 
King 94·2·29357-5 
King 02-2-15004-7SEA 
King 94-206070-8 
Jack Stein v. Tana 
Wood 
U.S. District Court, CR 91-5523B 
Western Dist.. WA 
Jerry Omer v. City of U.S. District Court 
Bellevue Western Division 
JIJ Inc. V. Oles, 
Morrison, Rinker. & 
Baker 
Superior 
County 
Court 
C-98-0529L 
King 99-2-o807-USEA 
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Deposition 
Deposition 
DepOSition 
Testimony 
Testimony 
Testimony 
Testimony 
Deposition 
Deposition 
Deposition 
Deposition & Trial 
testimony 
DepOSition 
Deposition 
Page 2 of 4 
4/f)$ 
CASE NAME JURISDICTION CAUSE NO. 
John Hayden, et al v. Superior Court Thurston 99-2-02065-8 Deposition 
Kirk Veis, et al. County 
John Wilfiam Taylor, et Superior Court, King 93-2-04997-9 Trial Testimony 
al. v. Pauline Yuri County. WA 
Shigaki, et aJ. 
Joseph Clerget, et al. v. Superior Court, Pierce 90-2-07035-8 Deposition 
Donald Lyderson, et County. WA 
al. 
Kake Tribal Corp. v. Superior Court, First 1-JU-91-1026 CIV Deposition 
Selaska Corp., et al. Jud. District. AK 
Levernier Construction Superior Court. 02-2-06716-1 Deposition 
Co. v. St. Paul Life Spokane County WA 
Insurance Co. 
Leonard Kerr, et al. v. Superior Court, King 89-2-08553-4 Deposition 
Michael Caryl. et al. County. WA 
Uisa Wickersham v. Superior Court, King 94-2-07362-1 Deposition 
Lowell K. Halverson County, WA 
Lowell Halvorson v. Superior Court King 98-2-05130-2SEA Testimony 
Romelle Lowry County 
Meyn vs. Fletcher;; Whatcom County 00-2-00820-8 
Michael O'Rourke v. Superior Court, King 91-2-20581-7 DepOSition 
Robert Sennett, et County. WA 
at 
Moev. Wise Superior Court, Grays 91-2-00056-1 Deposition 
Harbor County, W A 
Ok Sik U v. Kenneth Superior Court, King 88-2-05509-2 Deposition & Trial 
Burrows County, WA testimony 
Omer v. City of Deposition 
Bellevue, et al 
Paradise Orchards v. 01-2-01030-9 Deposition 
Fearing, et at. 
Patricia Absher v. Alaska Fee Arbitration 1993 F 062 Testimony 
Ronald A. Offret, et 
al. 
Paul Hayes, et aL v. Superior Court, Lewis 91-2-00776-2 Deposition 
Laurel Tiller, et al. County, WA 
Sandra Johnson v. Superior Court King OO·213786-9SEA Deposition 
Timothy McGarry County 
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CASE NAME JURISDICTION CAUSE NO. 
Sansome v. Garvey Multnomah Circuit Court 981007633 
Shubert 
Schumacher v. Douglas Superior Court, King 93-2-02049-6 
Wilson, etal. County, WA 
Sea lion Corp. v. Superior Court, Third 3-AN-90-8961 
Ronald E. Judicial District, Ak 
Cummings, et al. 
William Dussault v. Mid- Superior Court, King 91-2-00847-7 
Century Inc., et al. County, WA 
Willis v. Holm King County Superior 
Court 
Workland and Superior Court, 02206348-3 
Witherspoon, PLLC, Spokane Co. WA 
et al. v. Marcus A. 
DeWood, M.D. 
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Gary D. Babbitt, ISB No. 1486 
D. John Ashby, ISB No. 7228 
HA WLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, ID 83701-1617 
Telephone: (208) 344-6000 
Facsimile: (208) 342-3829 
Email: gdb@hteh.com 
jash@hteh.com 
Attorneys for AlA Services Corporation, 
AlA Insurance, Inc., and CropUSA 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho ) 
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an ) 
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and ) 
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the ) 
community property comprised thereof; ) 
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; JOLEE ) 
DUCLOS, a single person; CROP USA ) 
INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., an Idaho ) 
Corporation; and JAMES BECK and ) 
CORRINE BECK, individually and the ) 
community property comprised thereof, ) 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho ) 
corporation; and AlA INSURANCE, INC., an ) 
) 
AFFIDAVIT OF GARY D. BABBITT - 1 
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Idaho corporation, 
Counterclaimants, 
vs. 
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person, 
Counterdefendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
GARY D. BABBITT, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am over the age of eighteen years and competent to attest to the 
following matters of my own personal knowledge. I am the lead litigation attorney for the law 
firm of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP ("Hawley Troxell") in this litigation. 
2. Attached hereto as Exhibit lA is a true and correct copy of the Idaho 
Secretary of State's Certificate of Amendment dated May 8, 1996, to which is attached the 
Amended and Restated Articles of Incorporation of AlA Services Corporation. Attached hereto 
as Exhibit IB is a true and correct copy of the Articles ofIncorporation of ALA, Inc. filed with 
the Idaho Secretary of State on January 31, 1977, as amended by Articles of Amendment filed 
January 6, 1985, July 16, 1990, November 1, 1994 and June 5, 1995. 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit 2 is a true and correct copy of a letter from 
Plaintiffs counsel dated July 11, 2008. 
4. Attached hereto as Exhibits 3 through 10, respectively, are true and correct 
copies of emails from Plaintiff s counsel, Roderick C. Bond, dated July 17, July 21, July 27 
August 3, August 4, August 5, August 6 and October 7, 2008. 
5. Attached hereto as Exhibit 11 is a true and correct copy of an Assignment 
Agreement dated as of August 11, 2008, pursuant to which the lenders assigned to Hudson 
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Insurance Company ("Hudson") all of the lenders' interest in a loan (the "Surge Note") made to 
Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. ("CropUSA") 
6. Attached hereto as Exhibit 12 is a true and correct copy of excerpts from 
an Asset Purchase Agreement between CropUSA and Hudson dated as of August 29,2008, 
pursuant to which Hudson assumed the Assumed Liabilities, including (as indicated on 
Schedule 1.3) all of Crop USA's obligations under the Surge Note, without limitation. 
7. Attached hereto as Exhibit 13 is a true and correct copy of the 
Memorandum In Support ofLR.C.P. Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss filed and pending for 
hearing in Reed Taylor v. Hawley Troxell (Case No. CV08-01765). 
8. Before undertaking joint representation of AlA Services and AlA 
Insurance in May 2007, and before proposing that the co-Defendants enter into a Joint Defense 
Agreement, Hawley Troxell carefully considered whether such representation could be 
undertaken in accordance with the applicable Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct and 
concluded that, with carefully designed disclosures, informed consents to waive conflicts, and 
tolling agreements among the Defendants, such representation and joint defense arrangement are 
proper. Accordingly, in connection with Hawley Troxell's agreement to undertake the 
representation of AlA Services Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc., Hawley Troxell entered 
into a written engagement / conflict waiver agreement with AlA Services and AlA Insurance; 
obtained conflict waivers from all of the other Defendants (as well as CropUSA which, although 
not then named as a Defendant, was identified in Reed's complaint as a participant in 
transactions that Plaintiff contends were improper); and required that each Defendant execute a 
standstill and tolling agreement which tolled and preserved any possible claims that might be 
brought against that Defendant by any other Defendant. The boards of directors of AlA Services 
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and AlA Insurance reviewed and approved the engagement/conflict waiver letter agreement and 
the standstill and tolling agreements. 
9. In connection with Hawley Troxell's appearance in this case, Defendants' 
counsel proposed to their respective clients a Joint Defense Agreement among the Defendants, 
based on Defendants' common interest and common defenses in defending against Plaintiffs 
claims. Each of the Defendants did in fact sign the Joint Defense Agreement and a standstill and 
tolling agreement. 
10. Later in 2007, Reed filed an amended complaint naming CropUSA, 
Connie Taylor, and Jim and Corrine Beck as Defendants. As an accommodation to CropUSA 
and its counsel, Quarles & Brady, Hawley Troxell agreed to serve as CropUSA's local counsel 
and filed a motion for limited admission of Quarles & Brady pro hac vice. In connection with 
the addition of the newly named Defendants and Hawley Troxell's agreement to serve as local 
counsel for CropUSA, all of the Representation Agreements were revised to reflect the additional 
defendants - Connie Taylor and Jim Beck, in addition to CropUSA - named in Reed's amended 
complaint. Effective as of November 1,2007, Hawley Troxell entered into an engagement / 
conflict waiver letter agreement with CropUSA agreeing to serve as local counsel with Quarles 
& Brady as lead counsel; AlA Services and AlA Insurance signed an amended 
engagement/conflict waiver letter agreement; and all ofthe Defendants entered into an Amended 
and Restated Standstill and Tolling Agreement and an Amended Joint Defense Agreement. 
11. Hawley Troxell has not ever undertaken the representation of any of the 
individual Defendants in this litigation. Each of the individual Defendants has at all times been 
represented by his/her own independent counsel in this litigation. 
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12. Based on the limited engagement agreements with AlA Services 
Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc. and later Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., and the conflict 
waivers by and standstill and tolling agreements among the Defendants included in the 
Representation Agreements, Hawley Troxell reasonably believed that the firm would be able, 
and continues to believe that it is able, to provide competent and diligent representation to each 
of the corporate Defendants in the defense of Reed Taylor's claims in this litigation. In addition, 
Hawley Troxell reasonably believed, and continues to reasonably believe, that valid defenses 
exist to Plaintiffs claims. 
13. Hawley Troxell was not asked to advise, and did not advise, AlA Services 
in connection with its solicitation of the vote of AlA Services Corporation shareholders in March 
2007 to approve the advance of litigation expenses to the individual Defendants, or the 
disclosure made to the shareholders by the corporation. 
14. I never, and to my knowledge no other attorney at Hawley Troxell ever, 
advised the board of directors, any officer or employee of AlA Services or AlA Insurance in any 
matter relating to: 
a. Pacific Empire Radio Corporation; 
b. Parking Lot; or 
c. Series C Preferred Stock transaction. 
15. I never, and to my knowledge no attorney in this office ever, advised the 
board of directors, officers or employees of AlA Services or AlA Insurance concerning the 
allocation of expenses or the propriety or timing of debits or credits allocated under the 2001 
Master Marketing Agreement, the 2001 Management Agreement or the 2003 Administrative 
Agreement between CropUSA and AlA Insurance, Inc. 
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Further your affiant sayeth naught 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 6r-day of October, 2008. 
ar 
Residing at _-'-----"-'-="""'-u=.-=...;.. ________ _ 
My commission expires ~9-'iI-'I~)'-"7-'+I-+,-"'o'-------
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this l b~day of October, 2008, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF GARY D. BABBITT by the method indicated below, 
and addressed to each of the following: 
Roderick C. Bond 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
[Attorneys for Plaintiff] 
Michael S. Bissell 
Campbell, Bissell & Kirby, PLLC 
416 Symons Building 
7 South Howard Street 
Spokane, VVA99201 
[Attorneys for Plaintiff] 
David A. Gittins 
Law Office of David A. Gittins 
P.O. Box 191 
Clarkston, W A 99403 
[Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman] 
Michael E. McNichols 
Clements Brown & McNichols 
321 13th Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
[Attorneys for Defendant R. John Taylor] 
David R. Risley 
Randall, Black & Cox, PLLC 
P.O. Box 446 
1106 Idaho Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
[Attorneys for Defendants Connie Taylor, James Beck 
and Corrine Beck] 
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Charles E. Harper 
QUARLES & BRADY LLP 
500 West Madison Street, Suite 3700 
Chicago, Illinois 60661-2511 
[Attorneys for Crop USA Insurance] 
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State of Idaho 
II I 
CERTIHCATEOFAMENDNrnNT 
OF 
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION 
File Number C 74568 
I, PETE T. CENARRUSA, Secretary of State of the State of Idaho, 
hereby certify that duplicate originals of Articles of Amendment to the 
Articles of Incorporation of AlA SERVICES CORPORA nON duly executed 
pursuant to the provisions of the Idaho Business Corporation Act, have been 
received in this office and are found to conform to law. 
ACCORDINGLY and by virtue of the auUlOrity vested in me by 
law, I issue tins Certificate of Amendment to the Articles of Incorporation 
and attach hereto a duplicate original of the Articles of Amendment. 
Dated: May 8, 1996 
~(}i'~ 
SECRETARY OF STATE 
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EXHIBIT 
'.' 
ORIGINAL 
Pursuant to the provisions of §30-1-58, §30-1-59 and §30-1-61 of the Idaho Business 
Corporation Act, the undersigned corporation adopts the following ArticJes of Amendment to its 
, ~ 
Articles of Incorporation, as filed on December 20, 1983 and previously amended on October 14, 
1986, December 29; 1987, April i 1, 1995 and August 3, 1995. 
FIRST: The name of the corporation is AlA SERVICES CORPORATION. 
SECOND: On December 14, ]995, the shareholders of the corporation adopted and 
approved the following Amended and Restated Articles of Incorporation of AIA Services 
Corporation, pursuant to which Section 4.3.3 of Article Fourth was amended by replacing it in its 
entirety. 
tfAMENDED AND RESTATED ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION 
OF 
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION 
Except for the amendment of Section 4.3.3 of Article Fourth by replacing it in its entirety, 
these Amended and Restated Articles ofIncorporation of AIA Services Corporation correctly set 
forth without change the corresponding provisions of the original Articles of Incorporation as 
hereinbefore filed on December 20, 1983 and amended on October 14, 1986, December 29, 1987, 
April 11, 1995 and August 3, 1995; and these Amended and Restated Articles of Incorporation, 
including the amended Article Fourth, supersede the original Articles of Amenclnient and all 
previous amendments thereto. 
FIRsT 
The name of the corporation is AlA SERVICES CORPORATION. 
SECOND 
The period ofit5 duration is perpetuaL 
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THIRD 
The purpose for which the corporation is organized is for the transaction of any or all lawful 
business for which the corporation may be incorporated under the Idaho Business Corporation Act. 
FQURTH 
4.1 Authorized Capital. The aggregate number of shares which this corporation shall 
have authority to issue is 11,700,000 shares, of which 700,000 shares shall be Preferred Stock and 
11,000,000 shares shall be Common Stock ($0.01 par value). The corporation is authorized to issue 
thePteferred Stock in two classes designated as "Series A", consisting of200,OOO shares of Stated 
Value Preferred Stock (without par value); and "Series C", consisting of 500,000 shares of 10% 
Preferred Stock ($1 par value). The respective preferences, limitations and relative rights of each 
of the two classes of Preferred Stock and the Common Stock of the corporation are set forth in the 
following provisions of Article Fourth: 
4.2 Series A Preferred Stock. 
4.2.1 General. Each share of Series A Preferred Stock shall have the rights and 
preferences conferred in this Section 4.2 of Article Fourth. Holders of Series A Preferred Stock 
shall have no rights to share in any distribution of the profits or assets of the corporation, whether 
in the form of cash or stock or dividends or otherwise, except to the extent specifically provided 
herein .. 
4.2.2 No Dividends. The Series A Preferred Stock shall not payor accrue any 
dividends. 
4.2.3 Demand for Redemption. (a) The holder of Series A Preferred Stock shall 
have the right to require the corporation to redeem such stock from any legally available funds upon 
breach of any covenant of the corporation set forth in this Article Fourth, but only to the extent such 
redemption shall not violate the Idaho Business Corporation Act restrictions on the corporation's 
redemption of its own shares. This right may be exercised by giving the corporation written notice 
of demand for redemption specifYing the default and a redemption date not less than ninety (90) days 
from the date such notice delivered to the corporation; provided however that, if the corporation 
cures such specified default within sixty (60) days after receipt of such notice by corporation, the 
right to redeem Series A Preferred Stock on account of such specified default shall be extinguished. 
(b) The holder of Series A Preferred Stock shall have the right to require the 
corporation to redeem such stock from any legally available funds at any time after September 14, 
1993, but only to the extent such redemption shall not violate the Idaho Business Corporation Act 
restrictions on the corporation's redemption of its own shares. This right may be exercised by giving 
the corporation written notice of demand for redemption specifYing a redemption date after 
September 14, 1993 and not less than ninety (90) days or more than one hundred eighty (180) days 
from the date such notice is delivered to the corporation. 
4.2.4 Call for Redemption. The Series A Preferred Stock may be called for 
redemption by the corporation, in whole or in part, upon payment of the redemption price from 
legally available funds at any time prior to the demand for redemption by the holder of Series A 
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Preferred Stock. Notice of such call for redemption, specifying the redemption date not less than 
thirty (30) days from the date such notice is mailed, shall be mailed to each record holder of Series 
A Preferred Stock. If fewer than all shares of Series A Preferred Stock are to be redeemed, the 
shares shall he redeemed prorata from the holders thereof 
4.2.5 Redemption Price If Series A Preferred Stock is redeemed on or before 
September 14, 1990, the redemption price is $&.00 per share if paid in a lump sum. If Series A 
Preferred Stock is redeemed any time during the three-year period beginning September 15, 1990 
and ending on September 14, 1993, the redemption price is $8.50 per share if paid in a lump sum. 
If not paid in a lump sum on or before September 14, 1993, the redemption price for Series A 
Preferred Stock is $10.00 per share, provided that the redemption price may be paid, at the 
corporation's sole option, in monthly installments on a fifteen (I5) year amortization schedule 
beginning on the day after the redemption date and accruing interest at a rate of one-and one-half 
(I Y2) points under the First Interstate Bank ofIdabo, N.A., prime lending rate, adjusted quarterly. 
4.2.6 Redemption Procedure and Effect. 
(a) Lump Sum Payment. If the redemption price is to be paid in a lump sum, the 
corporation shall deposit, or shall cause its nominee to deposit, on or before the redemption date 
specified in the notice of redemption, the aggregate redemption price of the shares of Series A 
Preferred Stock to be redeemed with a bank or trust company specified in the notice, payable on the 
redemption date in the amounts and to the respective orders of the holders of the shares of Series A 
Preferred Stock to be redeemed, on endorsement to the corporation or its nominee as may be 
required and upon surrender of the certificates for such shares. Unless the corporation or its 
nominee fails to pay the lump sum redemption price on or before the redemption date, the shares of 
Series A Preferred Stock subject to such redemption shall be deemed to have been redeemed, and 
shall be deemed no longer to be outstanding, from and after the redemption date set forth in the 
notice of redemption. On or after the redemption date, subject only to payment of the redemption 
price, Series A Preferred Stock so called for redemption shall cease to be entitled to any interest or 
right in the corporation; and holders of such Series A Preferred Stock shall thereafter cease to be 
shareholders and shall be entitled only to payment ofthe amount of the redemption price, without 
interest, upon surrender of the certificates evidencing such stock. If the lump sum redemption price 
shall be paid by a nominee of the corporation, such nominee shall upon such payment become the 
owner ofthe shares with respect to which such payment was made; and certificates of stock may be 
issued to such nominee in evidence of such ownership. 
(b) Installment Payment. If the corporation elects to pay the redemption price in 
instaIlments, the number of shares of Series A Preferred Stock equal to the principaJ portion of each 
installment divided by $10.00 per share shall be deemed to have been redeemed and to be no longer 
outstanding from and after the date of such instaIJment. On and after such payment date, such 
number of shares of Series A Preferred Stock shall cease to be entitled to any interest or right in the 
corporation; and holders of such shares shall thereafter cease to be shareholders of the corporation 
with respect to such shares, whether or not the certificates evidencing such shares have been 
surrendered. Upon request of the corporation from time to time, certificates evidencing shares of 
Series A Preferred Stock including redeemed shares shall be surrendered to and reissued by the 
corporation in reduced amount to reflect any and all installment redemptions of shares prior to such 
request. 
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4.2.7 Liquidation Preferenc~. In case of the voluntary liquidation or dissolution 
of the corporation, the holder of Series A Preferred Stock shall have the right to be paid in full, 
before any amount shall be paid to the owners of the Common Stock or to the owners of the Series 
C Preferred Stock, as follows: 
$8.00 per share if the liquidation price is paid on or before September 
14, 1990. 
$8.50 per share if the liquidation price is paid after September 14, 
1990 and on or before September 14, 1993. 
$10.00 per share if the liquidation price is paid after September 14, 
1993. 
In case of the involuntary liquidation or dissolution of the corporation, the holder of Series A 
Preferred Stock shall have the right to be paid $10.00 per ~hare, in full, before arty amount shall be 
paid to the owners of the Common Stock or to the owners of the Series C Preferred Stock. After 
payment to the holders ofthe Series A Preferred Stock of the full preferential amounts hereinabove 
provided, the holders of the Series A Preferred Stock as such shall have no right or claim to any of 
the remaining assets of the corporation either upon any distribution of such assets or upon 
dissolution, liquidation or winding up; and the remaining assets to be distributed, if any, upon a 
distribution of such assets or upon dissolution, liquidation or winding up, may be distributed among 
the holders of the Series C Preferred Stock and the Common Stock in accordance with the provisions 
of this Article Fourth. 
4.2.8 Limited Votinl;: Rights. The Series A Preferred Stock shall have no right 
(except as required bylaw or as provided by Section 4.2.12 of this Article Fourth) to receive notice 
of or to vote at any regular or special meeting of stockholders, except that the holders of a majority 
of the shares of Series A Preferred Stock shaH have the right, voting separately as a class, to elect 
one director to the board of directors of the corporation. 
4.2.9 Covenants. So long as any shares of Series A Preferred Stock are outstanding, 
and except with the consent of the holders of a majority of the outstanding shares of Series A 
Preferred Stock. 
(a) Common Stock. The corporation shall not issue any Common Stock for less than book value. 
(determined as of the end of the immediately preceding fiscal year), except for Common Stock 
issued to pay a dividend payable solely in shares of Common Stock or issued to employees or agents 
pursuant to incentive stock option or bonus plan. 
(b) Preferred Stock. The corporation shall issue no Preferred Stock or securities 
convertible into such stock, other than the Series A and Series C Preferred Stock. 
(c) I~debtedness. The corporation win not, and will not permit any of its 
Subsidiaries to, directly or indirectly, create, incur, assume, guaranty or otherwise become or remain 
directly or indirectly liable with respect to, any Indebtedness, except: 
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(1) The corporation may remain liable in respect of Indebtedness 
outstanding on the date of adoption ofthls Article Fourth by the corporation's shareholders. 
(2) The corporation and its Subsidiaries may become and remain liable 
with respect to Indebtedness that is not secured by a Lien on any of the assets of the 
corporation or its Subsidiaries, provided that the aggregate principal amouht of such 
unsecured Indebtedness shall not exceed Consolidated Net Worth less goodwill of the 
corporation at any time; and 
(3) The corporation and its Subsidiaries may become and remain liable 
in respect of Indebtedness secured by any of the following Liens: 
(i) Liens for taxes, assessments or governmental charges or 
claims the payment of which is not yet delinquent or is being contested in good faith, 
if such reserve or other provision, if any, as shall be required by generally accepted 
accounting principles, consistently applied, shall have been made therefor; 
(ii) Statutory Liens of landlords and lines of carriers, 
warehousemen, mechanics, materialmen and other liens imposed by law incurred in 
the ordinary courses of business for sums not yet delinquent or being contested in 
good faith, if such reserve or other appropriate provision, if any, as shall be required 
by generally accepted accounting principles, consistently applied shall have been 
made therefor; 
(iii) Liens incurred or deposits made in the ordinary course of 
business in connection with worker's compensation, unemployment insurance and 
other types of social security, or to secure the performance of tenders, statutory 
obligations, surety and appeal bonds, bids, leases, governmental contracts, 
performance and return-of-money bonds and other similar obligations (exclusive of 
obligations for the payment of borrowed money); 
(iv) Any attachment or judgment Lien; provided that if the 
judgment it secures exceeds $250,000 (alone or when aggregated with all other 
judgments secured by Liens permitted by this clause (vi», such judgment shall, 
within forty-five (45) days after the entry thereof, have been discharged or execution 
thereof stayed pending appeal, or shall have been discharged within forty-five (45) 
days after the expiration of any such stay; 
(v) Easements, rights-of-way, restrictions and other similar 
charges or encumbrances not interfering with the ordinary conduct of the business 
of the corporation or any of its Subsidiaries; 
(vi) Any interest or title of a lessor under any lease; 
(vii) Any Lien existing on any asset of any corporation at the time 
such corporation becomes a subsidiary if such Lien was not created in contemplation 
of such event; 
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(viii) Any Lien on any asset securing Indebtedness incurred or 
assume for the purpose of financing not more than Eighty-five percent (85%) of the 
cost of acquiring such assets; provid5<Q that such line attaches to such asset 
concurrently with or within ninety (90) days after the acquisition thereof; 
(ix) Any Lien on any asset of any corporation existing at the time 
such corporation is merged into or consolidated with the corporation or a subsidiary, 
if such Lien was not created in contemplation of such event; 
(x) Any Lien existing on any asset prior to the acquisition thereof 
by the corporation or a Subsidiary, if such Lien was not created in contemplation of 
such acquisition; 
(xi) Any Lien arising out of the refinancing, extension, renewal or 
refunding of any Indebtedness secured by any Lien permitted by any of the foregoing 
clauses of this Section 4.2.9(c); provided that the amount of such Indebtedness is not 
increased and that ·such Indebtedness is not secured by any additional assets; and 
(xii) Liens not otherwise permitted by the foregoing clauses of this 
Section 4.2.9(c) (including. without limitation, Liens on stock of Subsidiaries, 
whether consolidated or unconsolidated) securing Indebtedness in an aggregate 
principal amount of any time outstanding not to exceed ten percent (10%) of the 
difference between Consolidated Net Worth and the amount of the goodwill of the 
corporation. 
(d) Corporate Existence. The corporation will maintain its corporate existence 
and will not liquidate, wind up or dissolve itself (or suffer any liquidation or dissolution), or enter 
into any transaction of merger or consolidation with any Person (including any Subsidiary) unless 
(i) this corporation is the surviving corporation following any such merger or consolidation, and (ii) 
the Consolidated Net Worth of the surviving corporation immediately following such merger or 
consolidation equals or exceeds the Consolidated Net Worth of this corporation immediately prior 
to such merger or consolidation. 
(e) Sale of Assets. The corporation will not, and will not permit any of its 
Subsidiaries to, convey, sell, lease, transfer or otherwise dispose of all or any material part of its 
business, property or assets, whether now owned or hereafter acquired, except: 
(1) The corporation and its Subsidiaries may convey, sell, lease, transfer or otherwise dispose 
of investment assets in the ~rdinary course of business; 
(2) The corporation and its Subsidiaries may sell or otherwise dispose of 
Capital Assets or real property if the asset so disposed of is concurrently replaced by a 
substantiaUy equivalent asset having a value equal to or greater than the assets disposed o~ 
(3) The corporation and is Subsidiaries may sell or otherwise dispose of 
obsolete or worn out property in the ordinary course of business; 
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(4) The corporation and its Subsidiaries may sell and lease back any 
newIy acquired asset for the purpose of financing the acquisition of such asset and securing 
the repayment of Indebtedness, provided that such Indebtedness shall not exceed eighty-five 
percent (85%) of the cost of such asset and is otherwise permitted by the covenants 
contained in this Article Fourth; and 
(5) The corporation and its Subsidiaries may sell or otherwise dispose of 
any of their other assets; provided that any such sale or other disposition is made for the fair 
market value of such assets. 
(f) Acquisitions. The corporation will not, and will not permit any of its 
Subsidiaries to, acquire by purchase or otherwise all or substantially all the business, property or 
fixed assets, or the stock or other evidence of beneficial ownership, of any Person unless, 
immediately prior to and after giving effect to such transaction, no violation of any of the covenants 
or other provisions contained in this Article Fourth shall have occurred and be continuing or wouId 
be caused by such acquisition. 
(g) Transactions with SharehQlders and Affiliates. The corporation will not, and 
will not perhlit any of its Subsidiaries to, directly or indirectly, enter into or permit to exist any 
transaction (including, without limitation, the purchase, sale, lease, loan or exchange of any property 
Of the rendering of any service) with any director or officer or any holder of equity securities of the 
corporation, Of with any Affiliate of the corporation or of such director, officer or holder, on terms 
that are less favorable to the corporation Of that Subsidiary, as the case may be, than those which 
hlight be obtained at the time from Persons who are not such a director, officer, holder or Affiliate; 
provided that the foregoing restriction shall not apply to (i) any transaction in effect at the date of 
adoption of this Article Fourth by the corporation's shareholders; (ii) any transaction between the 
corporation and any of its wholly-owned Subsidiaries or between any of its wholly-owned 
Subsidiaries; (iii) compensation (net of amounts contributed or repaid to the corporation or any 
Subsidiary or to Lewiston Land Company and contributed or repaid to the corporation or any 
Subsidiary), by way of salary or bonus, paid to director or officers of the corporation in an amount, 
as to anyone individual, not greater than the greater of $400,000 or the total compensation paid in 
ca1endaryear 1986; (iv) compensation paid to any director or officer ofthe corporation in amounts 
equal to income tax liability of such director or officer attributable to transactions involving the 
corporation, AlA, Inc., AlA Travel Services, Inc., AlA Travel, Inc., Lewiston Land Company, 
AlA Bancard Services Corporation or Taylor Brothers Aircraft on or before January 1, 1988 or to 
other personal income tax liability of such director or officer for tax years ended before January 1, 
1988; or (v) any loan to Of account receivable from an officer, director or stockholder which is 
repaid in full at least annually on or before the last day of the fiscal year. 
(h) Consolidated Net Worth. The corporation will not permit Consolidated Net 
Worth at any date to be less than the number of shares of Series A Preferred Stock outstanding at 
such date multiplied by $10.00 per share. 
(i) Dividend Restriction. The corporation will not, directly or indirectly, declare, 
order, make or set apart any sum for payment of any dividend in respect of its Common Stock (other 
than a dividend payable solely in shares of Common Stock), except that the corporation may declare 
and pay Common Stock dividends in an aggregate amount not exceeding the Dividend Availability 
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Amount. 
(j) DebtlEquity Ratio. Neither the corporation nor any Subsidiary will incur any 
new Indebtedness (other than Indebtedness permitted by Section 4.2.9(c)(xi) of this Article Fourth) 
if, at the time of incurring such Indebtedness, the ratio of Consolidated Long Tenn Debt to 
Consolidated Net Worth exceeds, or such additional Indebtedness would cause such ratio to.exceed, 
3.6 to 1.0. 
(k) Debt Service CQverage. Neither the corporation nor any Subsidiary will incur 
any new Indebtedness (other than Indebtedness permitted by Section 4.2.9(c)(xi) of this Article 
Fourth) it: at the time .of incurring such Indebtedness, the ratio of (i) Consolidated Net Income plus 
depreciation and amortization expenses plus compensation contributed or repaid to the corporation, 
any Subsidiary, Lewiston Land Company or AlA Travel Services, Inc. during the immediately 
preceding fiscal year of the corporation, divided by (li) current maturities of Long Tenn Debt is, or 
such additional Indebtedness would cause such ratio to be, less than .8 to 1.0. 
4.2.10 Definitions. For the purpose of Section 4.2.9 of this Article Fourth, the 
following terms shall have the following meanings: 
"Affiliate", as applied to any Person, shall mean any other Person directly or 
indirectly controlling, controlled by, or under common control with, that Person. For the purposes 
of this definition, "control" (including, with correlative meanings, the terms "controlling", 
"controlled by" and "under common control with"), as applied to any Person, means the possession, 
directly or indirectly, of the power to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies 
of that Person, whether through the ownership of voting securities or by contract or otherwise. 
"Capital Asset" shall mean, as at any date of detennination, those assets of a Person 
that would, in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles, consistently applied, be 
classified as plant, property or equipment on the balance sheet of that Person. 
"Consolidated Long Term Debt" shall mean, as at any date of determination, the 
tOtal of all Long Term Debt of the corporation and its Subsidiaries on a consolidated basis 
determined in accordance with generally accepted (or, in the case of an insurance company for 
which GAAP financial statements are not prepared, statutory) accounting principles consistently 
applied. 
"Consolidated Net Worth" shall mean, as at any date of determination, the sum of 
(a) the capital stock and additional paid-in capital, (b) plus retained earnings (or minus accumulated 
deficit) of the corporation and its Subsidiaries on a consolidated basis, determined in conformity 
with generally accepted (or, in the case of an insurance company for which GAAP financial 
statements are not prepared, statutory) accounting principles consistently applied. 
"Consolidated Net Income" for any period, shall mean the net income (or loss) of 
the corporation and its Subsidiaries on a consolidated basis determined in conformity with generally 
accepted (or, in the case of an insurance company for which GAAP financial statements are not 
prepared, statutory) accounting principles consistently applied. 
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"Dividend Availability Amount" shall mean, as at any date of detennination, an 
amount equal to flfty percent (50%) of Consolidated Net Income for the period (taken as single 
accounting period) commencing January 31, 1987 and ending on the last day of the fiscal quarter 
immediately preceding such date of determination. 
"Indebtedness" as applied to any person, means (a) all indebtedness for borrowed 
money, (b) that portion of obligations with respect to finance leases which is capitalized on a 
balance sheet in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles, consistently applied, (c) 
notes payable and drafts accepted representing extensions of credit whether or not representing 
obligations for borrowed money, (d) any obligation owed for all or any part of the deferred purchase 
price of property or services which purchase price is (i) due more than six (6) months from the date 
of incurrence of the obligation in respect thereof, or (ii) evidenced by a note or similar written 
instrument, and (e) all indebtedness secured by any Lien or vendor's interest under any conditional 
sale Of other title retention agreement existing on any property or asset owned or held by that Person 
regardless of whether the indebtedness secured thereby shall have been assumed by that Person or 
is non-recourse to the credit of that Person; provided, however, that "Indebtedness" shall not include 
policy claims, potiey reserves or mandatory securities valuation reserves of a regulated insurance 
company; and further provided that "Indebtedness" shall not include indebtedness of the corporation 
to any Subsidiary. 
"Lien II shall me'an any lien, mortgage, pledge, security interest, charge or 
encumbrance of any kind (mcluding any conditional sale or other title retention agreement, any lease 
in the nature thereof, and any agreement to give a security interest). 
"Long Term Debt", as applied to any Person, shall mean all Indebtedness of that 
Person which by its terms or by the terms of any instrument or agreement relating thereto matures 
more than one year, or is directly renewable or extendable at the option of the debtor to a date more 
than one year (including an option of the debtor under a revolving credit or similar agreement 
obligating the lenders to extend credit over a period of one year or more), from the date of creation 
thereof, but excluding any payments due under the terms thereof within twelve (12) months of any 
date of determination. 
"Person" shall mean an individual, corporation, partnership, joint venture, trust, 
unincorporated organization or any other jurisdictional entity, or a foreign state or any agency or 
political subdivision thereof. 
"Subsidiary" shall mean any corporation of which at least a majority of the 
outstanding stock having by the terms thereof ordinary voting power to elect a majority of the board 
of directors of such corporation (irrespective of whether or not at the time stock of any other class 
or classes of such corporation shall have or might have voting power by reason ofthe happening of 
any contingency) is at the time directly or indirectly owned or controlled by the corporation or one 
or more of its Subsidiaries or by the corporation and one or more of its Subsidiaries. 
4.2.11 Conversion Right. The holders ofthe Series A Preferred Stock shall have 
the following conversion right ("Conversion Right"): 
(a) Right to Convert. Each share of Series A Preferred Stock shall be convertible, 
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at the option of the holder thereof, at any time prior to the date on which notice of redemption is 
given under Section 4.2.3 or Section 4.2.4, at the office of the corporation or any transfer agent for 
the Series A Preferred Stock or Common Stock, into one fully paid and nonassessable share of 
Common Stock. 
(b) Mechanics of Conversion. Before any holder of Series A Preferred Stock 
shall be entitled to convert such stock into shares of Common Stock, he shall surrender the 
certificate or certificates for such Preferred Stock, duly endorsed, at the office of the corporation or 
any transfer agent for the Common Stock, and shall give written notice to the corporation at such 
office that he elects to convert such Preferred Stock and shall state therein the number of shares of 
Series A Preferred Stock being converted. Thereupon the corporation shall promptly issue and 
deliver at such office to such holder of a certificate or certificates for the number of shares of 
Cornmon Stock to which he shall be entitled. 
Such conversion shall be deemed to have been made immediately prior to the close 
of business on the date of such surrender of the shares of Series A Stock to be converted (the 
"Conversion Date")~ and the person or persons entitled to receive the shares of Common Stock 
issuable upon such conversion shall be treated for all purposes as the record holder or holders of 
such shares of Common Stock on such date. 
(c) Fractional Shares. No fractional share of Common Stock shall be issued upon 
conversion of Series A Stock. In lieu of any fractional shares to which the holder would otherwise 
be entitled, the corporation shall pay cash equal to the product of such fraction multiplied by the fair 
market value of one share of the corporation's Common Stock on the Conversion Date, such value 
to be determined in good faith by the Board of Directors. 
(d) Reservation of Stock Issuable Upon Conversion. The corporation shall at all 
times reserve and keep available out of its authorized but unissued shares of Common Stock, solely 
for the purpose of effecting the conversion of the shares of the Series A Stock, such number of its 
shares of Common Stock as shall from time to time be sufficient to effect the conversion of all 
outstanding shares of the Series A Preferred Stock; and if at any time the number of authorized but 
unissued shares of Common Stock shall not be sufficient to effect the conversion of all then 
outstanding shares of the Series A Preferred Stock, the corporation will take such corporate action 
as may, in the opinion of its counsel, be necessary to increase its authorized but unissued shares of 
Common Stock to such number of shares as shall be sufficient for such purpose. 
(e) Termination of Redemption Right. Upon exercise of the Conversion Right 
under this Section 4.2.11, all rights of a holder of Series A Stock to require redemption of such 
stock under Section 4.2.3 shall automatically be terminated; and no holder of Common Stock 
acquired upon conversion of Series A Preferred Stock shaH have any right of redemption. 
4.2.12 Modification of Rights and Preferences. The rights and preferences hereby 
conferred on the Series A Preferred Stock shall not be changed, altered or revoked without the 
consent of the holders of the majority of the Series A Preferred Stock outstanding at the time. 
4.3 Series C Preferred Stock. 
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4.3.1 General. Each share of Series C Preferred Stock shall have the relative 
rights, preferences and limitations set forth in this Section 4.3 of Article Fourth. 
4.3.2 Restricted Voting Rights. The holders of the Series C Preferred Stock shall 
have no right (except as required by law) to receive notice of or to vote on any matter (including, 
without limitation, the election of directors of the corporation) at any regular or special meeting of 
stockholders of the corporation, except that the holders of a majority of the shares of Series C 
Preferred Stock shall have the right, voting separately as a class, to elect one director to the Board 
of Directors ofthe corporation. 
4.3.3 Cumulative Dividend Preference The Series C Preferred Stock shall be 
entitled to receive, when and as declared by the corporation's Board of Directors, cash dividends at 
the per annum rate of 10% of the Liquidation Rate (as defined in Section 4.3.4), cumulative, payable 
quarterly at March 31, June 30, September 30 and December 31 of each calendar year out of any 
funds legally available for the payment of dividends, and in preference to any dividends upon the 
Common Stock. The dividends on the Series C Preferred Stock shall be cumulative, whether or not 
declared, so that, if for any period such dividend shall not be paid, the right to such dividend shall 
accumulate as against the Common Stock; and all arrears so accumulated shall be paid before any 
dividends shall be declared or paid upon the Common Stock. No dividends shall be declared or paid 
on the Series C Preferred Stock if the redemption payments due to the holders of the Series A 
Preferred Stock under Section 4.2. of this Article Fourth are in arrears. No dividend shall be 
declared or paid upon the Common Stock nor shall any Common Stock be purchased or otherwise 
acquired by the corporation for value (other than payment of amounts due to Reed J. Taylor for 
redemption of his Common Stock), unless all dividends on the Series C Preferred Stock for aU past 
period shall have been paid or shall have been declared and a sum sufficient for the payment thereof 
set apart for payment. 
4.3.4 Liquidation Preference. In the event of any liquidation, dissolution or 
winding-up of the corporation, whether voluntary or involuntary, before any other distribution or 
payment is made to the holders of Common Stock or any other series of Preferred Stock (except the 
corporation's Series A Preferred Stock), the holders of the Series C Preferred Stock shall be entitled 
to receive, out of the assets of the corporation legally available therefor, a liquidation payment in 
the amount of$10.00 cash per share of Series C Preferred Stock ("Liquidation Rate"), plus a further 
amount equal to the dividends accumulated and unpaid thereon to the date of such liquidation 
payment. 1£ upon any liquidation, dissolution or winding up ofthe corporation, the assets available 
for distribution are insufficient to pay to the holders of all outstanding Series C Preferred Stock the 
full amount of the Liquidation Rate and all accumulated but unpaid dividends, the holders of the 
Series C Preferred Stock shall share pro rata in any such distribution of assets. Such rights of the 
holders of the Series C Preferred Stock shall be subordinate only to the right of the holder of the 
Series A Preferred Stock to be paid the redemption price of such stock in full, together with accrued 
interest, in accordance with Section 4.2 of this Article Fourth. After payment to the holders of the 
Series C Preferred Stock of the full preferential amounts hereinabove provided, the holders of the 
Series C Preferred Stock as such shall have no right or claim to any of the remaining assets of the 
corporation either upon any distribution of such assets or upon dissolution, liquidation or winding 
up; and the remaining assets to be distributed, if any, upon a distribution of such assets or upon 
dissolution, liquidation or winding up, may be distributed among the holders of the Common Stock. 
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4.3.~ Redemptiont 
(a) Mandatory R~emption by Corporation. Subject to the conversion rights 
provided in Section 4.3.6 of Article Fourth, the Series C Preferred Stock shall be called for 
redemption by the corporation upon payment of the aggregate Redemption Rate from legally 
available funds upon the dosing of the earliest of the following events ("Equity Offering"): 
(i) an offering of the corporation's securities conducted pursuant to the 
registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 (" 1933 Act") in which gross proceeds 
of at least $5,000,000 are raised; 
(ii) an offering of the corporation's securities pursuant to exemptions from 
registration under the 1933 Act in which gross proceeds of at least $5,000,000 are raised; or 
(iii) an offering of any securities convertible into corporation's Co'mmon Stock 
that are sold in an offering that conforms to the parameters of subparagraph (i) or (ii) above. 
The redemption price for each share of Series C Preferred Stock ("Redemption Price lt ) shall be the 
"Redemption Rate" equal to 100% of the Liquidation Rate if such redemption occurs within two (2) 
years from the issuance of the first shares of Series C Preferred Stock. After such two year period, 
an amount equal to 5% of the Liquidation Rate will be added to the Redemption Rate immediately 
and each 180 days thereafter until all outstanding shares of the Series C Preferred Stock are fully 
redeemed, viz: ' 
Time from Original Issuance Percentage of Liquidation Rate 
Within two years 100% 
After two years 
but 105% 
before two years plus 181 days 
After two years plus 180 days but 
before two years plus 361 days 110% 
After two years plus 360 days 
but 115% 
before two years plus 541 days 
... . .. 
Notice of such can for redemption, specifYing the anticipated date of closing of the Equity Offering, 
shall be mailed to each record holder of Series C Preferred Stock as soon as practicable before such 
closing date. The redemption date for mandatory redemption of the Series C Preferred Stock shall 
be the actual closing date ofthe Equity Offering. Mandatory redemption of the Series C Preferred 
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Stock under this Section 4.3.5 of Article Fourth shall automatically be cancelled upon determination 
by corporation's board of directors that the Equity Offering will not be consummated for any reason. 
(b) Voluntary Redemption byCQrporation. The Series C Preferred Stock may be 
called for redemption by the corporation, in whole or in part, upon payment of the Redemption Price 
from legally available funds at any time prior to the closing of an Equity Offering. Notice of such 
call for redemption, specifYing the redemption date not less than thirty days from the date such 
notice is mailed and the number or percentage of outstanding shares of Series C Preferred Stock to 
be redeemed, shall be mailed to each record holder of Series C Preferred Stock. If fewer than all 
shares of Series C Preferred Stock are to be redeemed, the shares shall be redeemed prorata from 
the holders thereof; and, upon request of the corporation, certificates evidencing shares of Series C 
Preferred Stock including redeemed shares shall be surrendered to and reissued by the corporation 
in reduced amount to reflect any and all partial redemptions of such shares prior to such request. 
(c) Redemption Procedwe and Effect. 
The corporation shall deposit, on or before the redemption date specified in the notice of 
redemption, the aggregate Redemption Price of the shares of Series C Preferred Stock to be 
redeemed with a bank or trust company specified in the notice, payable on the redemption date in 
the amounts and to the respective orders of the holders of the shares of Series C Preferred Stock to 
be redeemed, on endorsement to the corporation as may be required and upon surrender of the 
certificates for such shares. Unless the corporation fails to pay the Redemption Price on or before 
the redemption date, the shares of Series C Preferred Stock subject to such redemption shall be 
deemed to have been redeemed, and shall be deemed no longer to be outstanding, from and after the 
redemption date set forth in the notice of redemption. On or after the redemption date. subject only 
to payment of the redemption price, Series C Preferred Stock so called for redemption shall cease 
to be entitled to any interest or right in the corporation; and holders of such Series C Preferred Stock 
shall thereafter cease to be shareholders and shall be entitled only to payment ofthe amount of the 
redemption price, without interest, upon surrender of the certificates evidencing such stock. 
4.3.6 Conversion of Series C Preferred Stock. Subject to the provisions of Section 
4.3.7, each holder of Series C Preferred Stock shall have the right, exercisable beginning at the 
earlier of the date of receipt of notice of mandatory redemption of the Series C Preferred Stock 
pursuant to Section 4.3.5(a) or two years after the first issuance of Series C Preferred Stock and 
ending oil the closing date of an Equity Offering, to convert Series C Preferred Stock into Common 
Stock at the Conversion Rate determined as foHows: Each share of Series C Preferred Stock shall 
be convertible into that number of shares of Common Stock which equals .0000693% of the 
Common Stock on a fully diluted basis at the effective date of exercise, including by way of 
inclusion and without limiting the foregoing, any conversion or exercise rights contained in any 
Preferred Stock, options, warrants, or other rights to Common Stock, granted by the corporation in 
any form or manner, as if :fully exercised at the effective date of exercise. Any holder of Series C 
Preferred Stock who exercises this conversion right prior to the closing date of an Equity Offering 
sharI be protected against dilution in the event of any Common Stock issuance or other transaction 
which occurs prior to an Equity Offering and increases the number of outstanding shares of 
Common Stock on a fully diluted basis: For each share of Series C Preferred Stock converted prior 
to an Equity Offering, the Company shall issue to the holder thereof such number of additional 
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shares of Common Stock as necessary to maintain, at all times prior to an Equity Offering, such 
holder's 0.0000693% interest in Company's outstanding Common Stock on a fully diluted basis. 
Subject to the provisions of Section 4.3.7) this conversion right shall be exercisable 
by any holder of Series C Preferred Stock as to all or any number of the shares of Series C Preferred 
Stock owned of record by such holder and shall be exercised by giving the corporation written notice 
of the exercise of such right) specifying the number of shares of Series C Preferred Stock to be 
converted and the effective date of such conversion, provided that the effective date of the 
conversion shall not be later than the closing date of an Equity Offering. 
4.3.7 Re~ulatory Limitation on Conversion Ri~ht. Notwithstanding any other 
provision of Section 4.3.6, the right to convert the Series C Preferred Stock into Common Stock of 
the Company shaH be subject to receipt of prior approval by all regulatory authorities with 
jurisdiction over the acquisition of such Common Stock. Without limiting the generality of the 
foregoing limitation, the Holder shall not be permitted to convert Series C Preferred Stock into 
Common Stock if and to the extent that, after such exercise, the Holder would, directly or indirectly 
(or by exercise of any unrestricted right to convert into or to acquire Company's voting securities 
or otherwise) be in "control" of an insurer within the meaning of any applicable state insurance 
holding company act, unless and until such change of "control" has been approved by all applicable 
state insurance regulators under their respective insurance holding company acts. If the time for 
exercise of any conversion rights shall expire or be scheduled to expire within two weeks of any 
fmal regulatory approval, then the applicable time periods to exercise any such conversion rights 
shall be extended for such a period of time equal to the period oftime from delivery of notice of 
exercise of any rights until the corporation notifies such rights holders of all applicable regulatory 
approvals. 
4.4 Common Stock. Holders of the Common Stock are entitled to one vote per share 
on all matters to be voted on by stockholders, including the election of directors. Common 
. Stockholders are not entitled to vote their shares cumulatively in the election of directors. Holders 
of Common Stock of the corporation shall be entitled to elect all of the directors of the corporation 
other than the director appointed by the holders of the Series A Preferred Stock and the director 
elected by the holders of Series C Preferred Stock. The holders of any series of Preferred Stock of 
the corporation have a preference over the holders of Common Stock of the corporation on the assets 
of the corporation legally available for distribution to stockholders in the event of any liquidation, 
dissolution, or winding up of the affairs of the corporation. In the· event of any liquidation, 
dissolution or winding up of the affairs of the corporation, holders of the Common Stock will share 
ratably iIi any assets of the corporation legally available for distribution to holders of Common Stock 
after satisfYing the liquidation preferences of the Series A and Series C Preferred Stock. Holders 
of Series C Preferred Stock have a preference over the holders of Common Stock as to the payment 
of dividends. Holders of Common Stock have rights) share for share, to receive dividends if and 
when declared by the Board of Directors out of funds legally available therefor, after paying 
preferred dividends to the holders of Series C Preferred Stock. 
FIFTH 
Holders of any class or series of corporation's stock shall not have a preemptive right to 
acquire unissued or treasury shares of any class or series or securities convertible into such shares 
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or carrying a right to subscribe to or acquire such shares, except as provided in the Idaho Business 
Corporation Act. 
SIXTH 
The location of the initial registered office of the corporation is One Lewis Clark Plaza, 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501; and the name of its initial registered agent at such address is R. Jolm Taylor. 
SEVENm 
The number of directors constituting the initial Board of Directors is fouf, and the names and 
addresses of the persons who are to serve until the first annual meeting of the shareholders and until 
their successors are elected and qualified are: 
Reed 1. Taylor 
R. John Taylor 
Raymond R. Heilman 
Mary K. Frost 
EIGHTH 
Address 
P.O. Box 538 
Lewiston ID 83501 
P.O. Box 538 
Lewiston ID 83501 
P.O. Box 538 
Lewiston ID 83501 
P.O. Box 538 
Lewiston ID 83501 
The name and address of the incorporator is as follows: 
Reed J. Taylor 
P.O. Box 538 
Lewiston ID 83501 
NINTH 
The Board of Directors is expressly authorized to alter, amend or repeal the Bylaws of the 
corporation and to adopt new Bylaws, subject to repeal or change by a majority vote of the 
shareholders. 
TENTH 
Shareholders entitled under Article Fourth to vote in the election of directors of the 
corporation shall not be entitled to vote their shares cumulatively in the election of directors of the 
corporation. 
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ELEVENm 
A director of this corporation shall not be personally liable to this corporation or its 
shareholders for monetary damages for breach offiduciary duty as a director, except for liability (a) 
for any breach of the director's duty ofloyalty to this corporation or its shareholders, (b) for acts or 
omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law, 
( c) under Idaho Code §30-1-48, or (d) for any transaction from which the director derived an 
improper personal benefit. If the Idaho Business Corporation Act is amended to authorize corporate 
action further eliminating or limiting the personal liability of directors, then the liability of a director 
of this corporation shall be eliminated or limited to the fullest extent permitted by the Idaho Business 
Corporation Act, as so amended. Any repeal or modification of this Article Eleventh by the 
shareholders ofthe corporation shall not adversely affect any right or protection of a director of the 
corporation existing at the time of such repeal or modification. II 
THIRD: The number of shares of the corporation outstanding at the time of such adoption 
was 1,079,520 shares of Common Stock, 170,562 shares of Series A Stated Value Preferred Stock, 
and 185,000 shares of Series C Preferred Stock; and the number of shares entitled to vote thereon 
was 1,079,520 shares of Common Stock and 185,000 shares of Series C Preferred Stock. 
FOURTH: The designation and number of outstanding shares of each class entitled to vote 
thereon as a class were as foHows: 
Class 
Common 
Series C Preferred 
Number of Shares 
1,079,520 
185,000 
FIFTH: The following table sets forth the number of shares of Common Stock and the 
number of shares of Series C Preferred Stock voted for and against such amendment: 
Class 
Common 
Series C Preferred 
-f 
DATED this r day of May, 1996. 
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AlAS 
Number of Shares 
865,093.5 
165,000 
Against 
48.153.5 
-0-
By~~~~~~~~~~ __ 
Daniel L. Spickler, 
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and unimproved. ~dom1nlUInQ. dWtlUfng- hQUllca, ~('lrt"",nt 1I0uII0$. ratb:'o-
m",nt hOlllca. hotaltl, l'lIotc~. bueinQlIs block.a, oU:loo buUding-II, I!Itorea f 1It10P12. 
oncl MY athOl' build!rtgs or sm,y ldnd. nnd tho pl'Odur;1!l ilfId .tI.voil.$ thoroot. ond 
in lillY and all othQl' p:ro~rty of cmy Idnd, Ilt'Id every ldnd or dasorlptfon. l'linl 
peraonlll and mixed t whorelJoovor fI'ltulltod ,.and to Ilulxlivido. plllt Md sell the 
sama. 
(6) To buill!. I'llbuild. !,nl4.r{fo. alter Or f.mprove any buUdinQ'9 ot' 
other Iltruaturoa now OJ' llero/11'tQr ol'oQtcd (In !mY lands flO owned. hold Oi.' 
oociupiod, or li'!nds to bQ owned. hnlll Ot' ooQupfed. 
I 
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(7) To oocupy and manage buiI(!iniB or livery kind and 'ahlll'llOtQr 
whlltQoavar i to ilnlllla/) tho PUrChlWQ, impraveml).f).ts. dQ'll'GLopmont and oon* 
strt,lctinn of land Illld building-s holQneml$ to or to be IIcquirO'd by thiG compMY, 
or ~y oth(ll' .[IOrBan. firm or corporation. • 
(8) To npply tor. PUI'ChlHlll. or Ilcq,uirtl by Bt!sifP"lment. trlUlfl£Cl1, Or 
Qthorwilill. IUld to eX8rai.ee. carry outmct I)I1}oy Illly liCOllnilG • power. (iutllodty. 
!rl.l.nohisl'l. QOIlCQ8I1ion, right or pr1vilege that any govornment Or a.uthority. 
Federlll • State or- loce!, or any oo~oro.tiO(l or other leg'al entity may bl) em-
powered to on&ot. tnLIke. 01:' gl"llIlt and to pay !l)r r Ilid. lind oontribute' towllrd 
oarry.i.ng it into I).tiect and to Ilpproprlll.to any (It tha oompany's atoci<. bonds , 
and EUIBets to defl"ay ttl" lloc04$MrY COBtll. ohul.!'cli and CXp/lnBCII tharcot. 
(9) To 1).D.B'llgo In tho bU5inesIl of tile nocumulntton and lending' O( 
rooDfly'. by llmdlni; tho enpitnI of the compnny lind etlch othor funda u it may 
trQIn time 10 timo lllwl'ully Ilcqui't'e trolll varioua borrowors upon such pct'Sonnl 
SQ<Mity or a~cur1ty ot pl:ll'&OI'llll Pl'OPQrty as mllY be ll8'l'eod upon between the' 
corpo:ratioll and bQl.'rowel.'I.I, {ltld by re-lendine- in 11k", 'mnnnor tha t'unda Itriillnir 
trQm QUQ/lloanll ,whnn paid. 
(10) To aat IVl t+uetoQ in tlV0l'Y ktI'ld of fi!1uoilU'Y qlll.lMity, and 
gcme:rally to do IlU thinS'S RClOQIlIUlI'Y' or oonVI)I1{l3nt which II.rQ incidemtul to Or 
coMeC~I;jd. wt'(h tho If8Rcl'nl bU5illflBII Ilbovo mantiOl'lod. wbic.h '" natural pcrcon 
miij'h,t or could do. 
(11) To transact tho buoft'lO(I.(I 01 to.VOBting- On bobalf ot itDell or 
othor". (Q't(\ pa:rlB at Itt1 oll.pitll.l and such addiUonnl fimd5 Wi it mllY ()bU;rln. or 
nny intanlt tlUI\'eb'i t (it' SGUiftS' Qr othorwino d11lpoainer ot tho Sllm". Qr any part 
thOI."OOC. 01' 1nwl"cst thcrein. 
(l:e) t'o Oc:mtrllot md hire lallor neaaBllnn or convenient to the OOn-
ducting; and opcration ot sllid bunino/'lo. 
(13) To UBe IIlld apply Gurplull olll'nin,,~ Ol"OI)\ll\1lativc profits to tho 
purc!lll!$j) or acquisition or Ita own onpitnlntocl< from t~l1la to timll, IllId to such 
extent and in such mnnnor, and upon $Uch tlll.'lIW. os its board of directors 
shull detel.'mtne; to'lllvQut l.!ul"pluB funds from til'110 to tirn~ Ilt the d:ll:laretion (If 
the boerd (If dil'/lctQro. 
(14) To appof.nt IIII,tOh officera r ompl<lyoQI!I nnd II.~Clnts os tho bUSUlO\l\l 
or tho IXIt'POt'Otion!\lOY requiro. m(\ to) I\UCM thom oompqnsl).tiQn. 
(Ui) '1'0 mll\{c by-laws not tnllonlJi~ent wi1h ILny olOating lllw tor the 
ma:.nagCimcnt of ita bumnoss Illld proPtlrty r nnd the rog'Ulati(;m nnd conduct or ita 
Iltt'afrli. 8.I'Id the IlQrt;111ontion md transfer of itl!! lI,It,ock. 
I 
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(HI) To antsr into contrw;tl!! 01' obllr;itltiono of My type or' ldnd aBSen-
tlal. necQl:!l!U'y' 01:' prOpel' tl) tM trMDllction or i~ (It"<:1innl'y I.'lifciTcr lor the PUi>"OQtI 
ot the CQrpol.'(ltion. 
(I~) To have ana o~ more oft'{QCIl and plUl;!IlS of1:mainCllo in and out or 
tha: State or ldllho t md to D.Oq'ldre. t'eCQlvCl, hold. put'chllsa. lollSe t mortgll.g'CI. 
dispose of. and/or /UJnvey ro~ and per8onol. Proloiorty altuoto in ot'" oute:ido (It 
thll Stat!) of IdAho. 
(18) Genal'ally to do 1111 thtn\rli nelltlElsory 01' oonvonicmt whioh are 
ineldrmtel to or con~aoted wtth !ho S'ot'laril} "bua!nolul abOVIl tMntlonad I which 
11 nllturl\-l pt)t"91)n rni~ht Or COUld ,do. 
(1Q) Additfdnol to tho toroaoing t . to hAVO all or tho pOwor.1l or co~orat1on 
ti%'ovided by the .w.WD of t.h.(I StlltQ of ldilho I and l?lll."tiauio.rly 1\11~! tho r1a'ht.il 
and pow()ra $<!t torth in Idaho Code :10-114, and aU laws Ilmandtltory CU'ld BUP1I1o-
.mentnI thOl."Qto. 
B:dfltor'lt;IE 
The oorporudon I!Iha..l1 hl1'v6 a perpetual oxwtanco. 
LOQQtlon 
be at 418 WeisS"':rbor Building. Lllwtl>tDn. lde.ho 33501. i~ the County' of Nu PCrc~, 
Sti\.til of Idaho. Brllnah Qfttcos Or plQOelil of bllsim:uu, may be IQ(mtod Or (nrt.o.bliahCld 
by tho cOl:pOrntlon lIt such OtiH,Il' l?la()ol'S within Or without the Stall!! ot Idaho as 
A.RTtcL8 F1'VB 
Ttla' capitd stock ot thio corporation IIh~ aOflllillt o! 100 .000 f.lhl\t"li~ 
of clipitru stock I eamtt beiQIiI' common wring &'took. at f1.00. par ShllrQ pAr vo..lUIl. 
I 
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tor II. totnl oapiWiUlt1on of $100 .000 .00. ~4Ch ;nllrc of COM(non stOck chnll hnva 
, 
one: full vote lIt thO' stO()l<I'I0Idol's' me(ltinl,ru of tho ool'porll.tiQIl. 
Such shtl.l,"es oC stQQk al\1I11 have the (oIIowing rOlltrio.tiom'l and'll,lo1i('iOIl" 
(a) Tho ahaM'lfl OCthCl corpQ~aUon llhllIl not bo lIold 01' tr!l.n1lCol'l'od by 
my holder "thoI:'¢01 without tho w:z.oittoll conscnt of nil common atookholdClrll. unlOSIi 
the lIamo shall hav!) l1l"'st boon oft'ored (or 1!.1I1Cl in wrltinll to the oor-poratlon llnd 
I:ICll;lond. to each or thD other 69mmon lOlto$:holdoa.l!ll of tho corporation lit jI..prloe 
that olln ba bonn tidQ obtained from nnothor. rt tha corpOration hila rotused. in 
writing'. to purCMOQ Ilmd stock within 30 MYS nttor- the rC$!eipt of Buch watton 
0([&1' of /I ale , Or I:llrld period of :SO dllYB hIlS pfUlllod wHnout l100cptllnQQ or suoh 
aftor by tho OOl.'pOl'Rtion. then auch Wf'tttcn offet' to SeU chnU bo made) to elloh 
C:>lMlon Gtockhaldal' tor II. Uko por1oCl of 30 dara. and, it, tho (ivtJnt such otter hila 
not bean ncoep~od. by oither the COrpOl'lltton 01' the other COmmon frtoakholdOl'1l tn 
th~ timo QPIJoif'iad, then such ehllroo mAy ba $01d 0)." ttiln!lt'ared by tho holder thQt'aol 
to l!tJy person or oorpol'll.t.fon. 
(b) !n tho Qase ot'tllo death ot MY t!tot;:lI;holdllt' th a cc.!l.·pOl'lltion nhll.H 
hllvQ th., f.lr.,t Imd prior f'ight tol' II I?ol"locl ot un dllYs from tho dabt of donth of 
stdd utOckholdol' in whiQh t¢ I:lurohal:lc aaid srock !It thb book vA1UO ot'tlio corpot'ation 
as ,,:hcllll'tl by the tl.mmciol IIt11tomont or the QOrpor!l.tion prcplU'od by th.Q l'oft't111l.J:' 
ACCOtlntMt of th.; cOrpo:r-ation I'\S ot tho dllta or dOll1:h or ilia atoo\d1(1lder Or tho 
priCe tl:\at Ute admfuistrator or o:xocuto:r ¢f th" dacceed /ltoakholdol" qu.n bOfill 
I' tide oot:run from lU'lotl'\4t". whichovo.l.' mothod or val.nAtiQn tho dOQocaed hnim mny 
olltct. 
11'1 till:! event llIo.l!I corpol"ution r~ll.l ot' l'at\lslIs to purah.lu7o aaid atoQk 
",{thin said UO days the'n ellch. COlnlllOll. /rtl.:lr;:kl'101der BIlI.llI have 60 dllya, tQ pl.iI."OI'1(1SQ 
$otd (;f.(Ie:lC. In the event /JuQh stook h.1US (j¢t \)Cen Plu'chllllCd by c:dtho,'!:o tho aot;poru.~ 
tiOtl or nnv othQl' oommOn li,toOkllOldel' in tho timo £lpl)¢Ulod, tl"tan the adminiatrlltol" 
or 4~QutQr oJ thQ ~tll.te o! the doocill,'led ~tOI)\t:Mld(lrt! 1(IilY' flel! (It" t'r'unstilt' !laid 
Ii hnl'ca to IlIl'Y poraon Or Q(t~Ol"l1t1cm. 
MTrCLE SIX 
Ilnd tho numb or or .. haroR of atock or tho oorpo1'lltlon (or whi(:Ch oach hlltl (!tub· 
I 
.iI: ___ _ 
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SCl:!l;)tl:d IU'O OS foLlows: 
Nitrile an'l Address: 
Riled J. Tllylor, 1034 R.ipon. towillton. [dillie 835111 
H. ,John 'fuylQI', o(j9 Iill~ aa Avenue. I..~wit;ton. laa.lw 8:!!'IO !. 
lArry ii. Profitt. P, 0, 5538, . .B<;i:!e, Idnho 63705 
'rho numb«n' 0( dtractol"l1 ¢( thi6 oOL'porntion ShilU 00 110t 10il& th(m 
throe Q);"1l1oi'e than seven, ~xoept that in the qy"nt liB or tile ·Q:hIl.I'CG or tho 
corporlltlon Bl:'O ownQd bcnel'l.duUy liod of recOl'(l by althor onc (l) or two GO 
s~ckhQldQ~'S, tho number uf 4lrllctoP& mil}' 1:>4 lou thl\.l'l fh!.'ec (5). 1;1I.1t nOllaRs 
thlll'! (,IO nunlber o( II tookho/dot'S . The qIJIiH.I'iCn.tioos, LoIil'lIllS of amell., mallner 
of I!:l~(;thm, Wile: lind pUU)U or maotingll. Ilnd J:!OWQl'lI or directors und their duties, 
Th~ Soard ai' Uircctot'$ of thin ':)Ol'P01'll!:iOll ilhnU bo. tl.nd thl))r' ilL'!! 
ll.uUll)rl~ed to dotermine tho 1flllu!!) or my proj)Otty or CORsiclcrnUnll Other th(lfl 
1,rfI'ICLl':, SICiHT 
The Holtj"d or OlrQctOt'a ofU'l:ill COrpol'llt:!on fihnll "live tho powflt' ton(lopt by~ 
lilw!!. nl~d the ume muy ba rnOdit'lad a~" «melldad"l)y tnt) HaRt"a or I)!rQ~tol"tl. 
-6-
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All. TI OLE NINE 
}l'Q..!,REM!'TlV,E R10HTS 
Onle!UI otharw}so dotormln~l;! by th<'/ bolU'6 of dl.l'oo1oro. no holdQ1." of 
stocl{ oC the 1l0l:'pot'ation shllll bo ontitlod Il.a U matter of right. to lIUl'Challe 
oi' !'lubacriba for any !Jtoak ot ony clQ$o which tho c:orporntion may il!lsue 01." I$QU. 
whl!lthl!i: or not exchll.llgelible (or any stock or tba {Jo11l01'P-t1on or nny -tll.wls or 
clnlisilli f1nd 'whothor out ot unftHlUo!l .;;n(l.ralOl truthorb;ad by tho IlrticloQ ot inOO1"'p-
of Clhlll'M ot Qtock of the corporation floquit"¢d by it nftC)'t" UlQ i~tluo thoreof. Llnd 
whetnc:t' [BBued for cash. 1noo1' done. pSl,"sonlll proPQrty I oX' root Pt'OPqrty • (Ii" 
l.aanOI;! thel!'eot. NOt". unle.lllJ othorwiso dotorminl;ld by tho l)olll'd of dh:ooto,,"o. 
llhllli nny holdo1' of 1l..l'I1 ohp-r/J/l (If tho oup:\.tal I:Itack ot the C<>l'porn.tion ho qp,titlr:ld 
Oil 11 !'(Ul.ttC1," of l'!s'ht. to pU'rehnaQ or ~I\jbscribe {or nny obl1ll'litiOn wh1Cl1 
. 
thQ corporAtion may iSf\ue ot' sall tl18.t shall bo convo1'dblo into or O¥.onMr{enble 
fOr any snares ot tho IItock of tha (l't):rpo):"iltlon of My claeo 01' cltlflseB. or to whioh 
nnaH be llttnahod Qr ll-ppU.t'tc\1tLnt 1m,! worrn.nty 01' wll1'l'nnll! Qr nny Qt\11lt' imltrumc:mt 
or in:ltrumc.ntl! that sholl cantll:r upon tho holdct" 01:' hOiderli' ot such obUgl1tlon tho 
stoc.k Or uny OlallS Or clIlSSQII. 
Th!) fouow-!n", provisions are het'Qby QIP-'oad to for tho pUrpOIlQ or 
reltUtllting th", (!(Induot of tile llfi'iUt'D 0/1:1'10 corporll.t.!(:l!1: 
, 
-'/-
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(1) With thQ oonsent in writing'. or PUl'GIl!lnt to Q vOto ol tho 
h.old~a of a mlijority of tho Ol1pi.ttU stocK illlll.lUd Il1Id outatnndinB' 
and ontItl.Dd to VQt~, tho Dil'actors shall havo Quthority to a!G-
POIlQ I in any mltni1c:tt. of th" w holD pl"Oporty of thiD corporl1tion. 
(2) Tha 8toc!l:holdDrIl and DlroctotG ena.U hay!! l;hQ powe!:" to bOld 
th~.\' meutinll'r.! and keop the books t documonts E.lnd PQP~"o 0' the 
Co)."poration ouWdG or tho Stllte of Idll.)'IO. III auch plncos 11$ mtly 
be Cl'01l'l time to tlmt.! designated by tho By-lowe Ol" by l'osolution 
of the Stockholdl)).'S, or DireatoI'l'I. excopt ILl! otherwioe 1'QQ uu-e<:l 
by the laws ot ldnho. -
(3) /Uly ant:! aU ot the Dil'ccto).'G or the Corpol"P,tion ~ny bQ l.'lIrriovod 
at any timo. with ot' without allu8a. by 1:110 boldara at II maiQrity ot 
the lJisuld a.nd nutlltMdfl'le- vodnfl8tock 01 the col'pOl'atiC)'l. 
(0 1.'he aOlU"d 01 Dtl'oowX"s is e:r;praa~ly lluthoJ.'bad tQ removl,I Ilt 
any time. w1~ 0)' without c:aullO I MY atflc(Jl'lS ot tho corpol"o.tion • 
(5) '!'ha eorpol'lltion upon voto of tha pnrllons then holding n 
m~jo.r.lty 0/ the iGII\.l.od nnd outotandin&" voting (ftock or this carporlltion 
sholl ntl-Vtt the l'ig'ht at thalr aIOQtlOn to disllolvo tho ¢Otporli.uon and 
SlIllitll III1GOt:B, wlnd up fu buainel!ll'l diwrlil Wid distributo It II dQSota 
Ilnd the proceadlil thoroQl nmong ita E1tocl<holdOl'$ U$ they may oflvar-
ally b~ entitled to l'cCf.li vo 0)0 lIamo ll.O nfpJ."OIliUd. 
CO) Tho aotlrd of Otroctorlil IIhll1ll1tl'ViI the o.uthol"ity to C4utho.l."b'l:! 
the f.asuMao ot any prov.f.ol.JS},Y unls/tucd stoak llutho~!1ied by thooo 
a.rtll:lea without thQ OOWIont of oro¢kholders . 
IN WLtNESS WHSREOF. tho (JlIid incorporlltot'li hnv~ hQl'ounto ilot 
their hllnd; and I!IQll.lB Md t:lxecuted tho lorogoini At'tiCJlolI Qr [ncorpol."llt!on in 
f:rfpliclito thi!l ;? 'b*- day ot dA N«MY... 11)71. 
'J -/ 
.A. Q ... :ffWL; 
7 
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ST.A.1'.S Of' :a;f=.!. .. ~ ~·m) 
• till 
COUIit'y Qf. a . ..e.-., .. ) 
I)n this .. ;redBy or J.?,,"r.,;. .~( ....... ' lll77. beforo mo, the und~r~ 
,- --,' 
ulgooo(1, a Nota:ry f'ulHlc l/'l o.nd for tho Sto.tQ oC IdahO pOr$onlllly npDQllrod 
LARRY S. PROPITT known to rill) to bo thc pcrtlon whose nl1rn~ ill GUbsorlbod 
to tJl4 wi.thin alia foregoina- inlltrum(tnt lind lleknowlOd[fod to mil that he lIxeculod 
. 
the Ume. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF. 1 ,,00VI) I:!cl'eunto aot my hn.~d and ll1t'bccd my 
STAtE OF LD/l,l-{O 
: Il.G 
C01.l-nt;r of N'r,z P41'ClQ ) 
On this £ dllY or ..JA tJIJ.l\:i';l._ .. __ 11'177. b~orQ rna f th" 
linOl)rsl{!rtQi;l, a Notlll'}l' PubUa In Ilm') for thQ Stllto of Idaho, pCr:lonally nppcU"od 
REf:D J. TAYLOR ttn(l·R. JOHN.TAYLOR, known 10 rTiQ to l)~ the pal'l!ioml whoso 
nlll1lt)~ IU'I) ,pblJOlc'fbed to the within and CoraQ'oing 'nlil~I"l4mt lind ftcknowlndS't)(i 
to me thllt they Qxec.:utod tho &'nml'j. 
IN WrTNESS WHEREOF, I hav/) hOl"ot.lnto set my hand and rUl'ixod my 
oftjcif1l seal tho day md yea~ htllt'einllbOV'!, a 
-9-
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CERTIFICAT.E OF JNCORPORA'l'ION 
T, !'JI7."Z T. ClJNA'RRUSA., 6.aeW'Y of Btata 01 the StAU at Idaho, IUId Ie,raI ou.to-
dJmI of tho DDI'DOnUon mlotda at tho Btat. of Iuho, do hareb7 oert1f1 that tho DrlJlnaJ of 
til. utfc.la of IIIco1JHll1ltJon at 
A • .r • .\. ,rw. 
cia, 
ot .7A1:1UUV A..D .. 0111 TboUM1III Nint! BIlndn4 -9'OIttU-.cwmJ md 
;rJ;~.d 011 ~t'.1..Z.IIIot RMOI'd at Do.DIutla Col'JlOntJDn., Qf the StAte 01 . 
Ma.bD, and tlI .. tho ~ ariida ecmtaJn til •• tatemont at facti roqulTOd 117 8oct1011 a0-10l, 
I rultT8ER ClCaTlB'Y, nat UI. panCll\l lIlI.cuttDr th. artIaI.. ~d ~ .. _lat.. 
aDd .~ an hlm1 CIIUtlliltAld • CIOJ:POr&t!OJl, b¥ tha nama h~onll at.tH, tor 
. 
H~tuAl Itd~~m tho date hereof. wIth Ita nailtlHd offIc. In till. Bta'- locate4 at 
r.-Jrton,.rdah:t in till Coanl;y ot 60, ~ 
IN '.I'Ji.lS'l'DrlONY WlmRlCOr, 1 ban h~J;o 
Nt JIU' iw\d and IIftIzad the Great Seal. ~ dIG 
stat.. . .000. at &IIa OI~, tll. CepftaJ af Idaho, 
th'I. JJ.rt 
LD .. I.a 77 • 
Pete T. CenattUsa 
DgmcsUc 
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r ~ILMED AUG 14 1981 ROLL 4 8 7' 
"',~ ~. .. 
~".. (. 
'80 /" ," I \(;~R1JFJCA TE OF APl'OINTM!NT 
rlo , t!lliiRJi:GISTEREO AGENT 
t..S " 
":' 4ft/ /t) 
KNOW ALi::4V1Jf}j~~ .. tHESE PRESil.'lTS: 
Tliat &-=- 41 t,f9,C.· dJT."" . l:!: 1,1 ,.' " 
an Idaho corporation, pursUAnt to IklctiOI1 30.]·12, Id .... o Code, and by authority of its Boord of Directors, docs 
R. John Taylor 
hC::i'Clbynppoml -, -----.....:;;..::..-----::-:~_.__._..o:_-_:_'"_._-........ -.,--------.--
(HAIIUI 0( RaalJ\lIrn<I AIOIlt) 
of 301 0 ~treet, P.O. Box 1444 __ L_e_w_is_t_o_n ... ,___ 6~3~5_0_1 ___ • Idnho Q:J its 
("RIC' Idd_.) (tic,) 
Rogistered Agent in the Stat/:! of IdahO, up(m whom proces!! issued by authority of or under nny In w cfthc Stato of 
Idaho mAY be served. " 
IN WITNESS WflER£OF the corporntion bllS caul/od thil:! certificate to be o~outed rmd vcrifllXi by its 
PI'l::3idcnt (or Vice-President) on thi!l_. ____ 2.;..2 ___ ~ __ dny of ' Fepruary ,J9.!L... 
A.I.A." Inc. 
SLATE OF _-=I;.;;:;Q~lt.-h(l;::.., ~----l 
P ••• County of ..... , _N_e_z_'_e_r_ce ____ _ 
Su"","b<d DOd 'worn 10 bd'"", me ,hI. <Ziffd--..t- , dayof ~ 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, J have hl:tcunto /let my hand Ilnd 
) ,1 Il~~ my ~ar. ~ , . 
:: ,~ttzf, =:: 
(Tille) . 
ARA 4-'11'1 
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AIflch. of h'corp1llnlflon. 
of 
.. . Zii(lilt6li is' 
Piau of b."h'.,."... 
Exl.o."... '1~ .. (J{) 
CapJtal Stock . . ••• 
STATE of .PAHO 
Depprfr.nent of Stet. 
BoIM. 'cksho 
Appr'ovad, fff.,d Qftd admlHed 10 the 
rDGon:b of articles of Iru:or'Paroatlcm 
of iho 'State oflMf+o and certfR«J" 
1.lued IftI, it.Im.UU1I' " 
day t)i~4-. 1':; 19_ 
at o'clock M. 
1 Ie 
R;Q5 PAID 
filling 
·Recordlng 
CArt. Copy 
C$rtlncal9 
Licon" TQl( 
s: : = 
71.00 
$ .1.40 
-:' ~~:~ :)--
~QlJ.-•• 
J1.~ 
J,Z:I.J.() 
TOTAL $ __ _ 
Peto T. Cenarru.sa 
Tn' wleB Troxell 
,. 
f , 
.. ..J3o..Jro.,..Q" . r 4OY1 C(1~RAi'IQ t:iifli( 
,..tJ~ '1>11 a.uv ~ 
... 0. ~ 114 
.r:..rj~ ... r~ 
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•... , 
Pursuant to the provisiogs of Sections 30.1-59 and 30-1 ~6 ( of the Idaho 
B~slness Corpo!ation Act, the undersigned corporation adopts the following 
Articles of Amendment to its Articles of Incorporation. , 
FIRST: The name of the corporation is A.loA., INC. 
SECOND: Effective on January ..£, 1988, the sole shareholder of the 
, ' 
corporlltion adopted and approved the following am.endments, to the Articles of 
Incorp,oration of A.I.A., Inc., pursuant· to which new Articles Eleventh and 
Twelfth were added to tho original Articles of Incorporation of A.LA., Inc. as 
rued on January 31, 1977: 
"'ELBYEWH 
• At. ea.ch meeting of shareholders, every sharebolder of record of tbe 
corporation sh.lin be entitled . to One vote for each share of common stock 
registered In his name on the books of the corporation. Sharebolders shall not 
be entitled to vote their shares cumulativelY in the election of directors of the 
oorporation. 
TWELFI'H 
A director of this corporation shaH not be petsonaHy lia.ble: to this 
corporation or its shareholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary 
duty as a dIrector, except for lIability (a) for any breach of the director's duty 
of loyalty to thls corporation or its shareholders. (b) for acts or omissions not 
in good faith o.r which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of 
law, (c) under Section 30.l-48J Idaho Code,- or (d) for any transactIon from 
which the director derived an Improper personal beneflL If the, Idaho BusIness 
Corporation Act Is amended to authorize corporllte action further eUminating or 
IirnJting the personal Uability of directors, then the Ha.b1llty of a dIrector of this 
corporation shaU be eliminated or nmited to the fullest extent permitted by the 
Idaho Business Corporation Act, as so amended. Any repeal or mo~iificatlon of 
thJs Article Twelfth by tQe shatehoIder$ of the cot:poratton shall not adversely 
~ffect any right or protection of a director of the corporation existing at the 
tIme of such repeal or modification.'" , 
ARTICLES OF AMENDMENT/A.I.A, INC. - P. 1 
, 
.~. 
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THIRD: The number of shares of the corporation outstanding· at the time 
of such adoption wa.s 3500; and the number of shares entitled to vote thereon 
was 3500. 
. FOURTH: The designation and number of outstanding shares of ~ach class 
entitled to vote thereon a:s a class were as follows: 
~lass: 
Common 3500 
FIFTH: The number of shares voted for such amendment w~s 3500; and the 
:Qumber of shares voted against such amendment was O. 
DATED thls4?-~ay of January, 1988~ 
A.I.A., Inc. 
ATTEST: 
BY~~ ee. Ta;¥iOr, en 
VERlEI~[ON 
STATE OF IDAHO) 
:S5. 
County of Nez Perce ) 
~IJ ~1tili,*dJ,. U • a Notary Public t do hereby ce(tif'y that on this day 0 anuary, 1988, personally appeared before mc REED Jy TAYLOR, w Ot· emg by me first duly sworn, decJared that he is the Presidcrlt of A.l.A. t 
Inc. that he signed the foregoing document as President of tho corpor:ati~nt; and 
that the statemqnts contained therein are tru _ : \ .' , 
ARTICLES OF AM EN DMENT/A.LA, INC. w P.2 
',tw • 
. " 
414(' 
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Idaho Business COLpo~~tion Act. the!! undersigned corpo-rat..ion adopt.s tha 
following A-rticlea o~ Amondment to its A~ticles of Incorpo'ration. 
FIRST: 1'ho n~ of the corporation ;la A4'I.A., mc. 
S}ItONlh E£fao:tiva on May S. 1990, thIS sale shareholder of tha 
corporation adopted and approvod the £o~lowin8 amendment to the ~ticles 
o£ l:ncorporat:Lon of A.I.A., Inc., ,p'U~s'Uant to which Article One of the 
originnl Articles of Incorpol;'ation of A. LA." Inc. as rilad on January 31, 
1977. shall read B$ follows: 
The nama of the co~potation.shall hP AIA INSunANCE, INC. 
~: The numbe-r of shares of the co~oration out~tQnding at the 
t"imo of such adoption was J t 500; and tho numbe't' of shares entitled to voto 
thereon was 3.500. 
:roUR'lH: 'l'he dc.siglUltion and nWl)ber of outstanding shares. of each 
class entitled to vote theroon as a class were ~s follows: 
Number of Sb~~~3 
3.500 
. 
FD'l{(: Tha number I)f sruu;es voted for such runondment was 3 .. 500; and 
the nlJlIlbe.r of shares \Toted against such amendment 'WEllS Ea:J:!). 
DA'l,'EI) this :l!:f( "",y of ~ • 1990. 
A.:t .. A. ~ 
R. J nt 
• - '1"- --. -7- ... --..,":' • 
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STA'I'E OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Ne"l!l ~e't'cQ ) 
9. r II x. BOB~U?DELL; a Notary Public, do haraby certify that on this 
~dQy of --=4 $ 1990, parsonally Appaa.'t'ed befora me R. JaIIN 
rAlLOlt. who, ng y IIlQ first duly 5IWQr1lt daclaro(i thn:!; he is the 
PT:es::f.dant of A. I. A. J Xnc., that ho signed the forGgo:!.ng documatl't as 
Prasidant of the. cot:pol;'s:tion.t and t.hat: t statOJil(lnts ontained theroin 
aro tru«;\. 
to ____ • _______ , 
! 
r 
t, , 
t' l' 
• ...
( 
,. 
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Pu~atiant to the ptovimio~~ of SQotiona 30-1-59 ~nd 30-1-61 of the 
Idaho Bl,1l:1inQ~1:f Co:s:po:S:4tion Aot, tne under!IJ.gnf;id oo.t'poratiort.. ,~ptG the 
following Articles of Amendment to ita Articles of Ino¢~p6~ati~n. 
FIJW!1!. The name of tho QOI:'Po:t'at::ion is AlA IN8tmANCB, mc. 
SBCONnt gffective on Beptembo~ 23, 1994, tho ool~ ah~oh6ld~ o~ 
thtt aorpora:t:.i.on adopted and approved tho fQllowing amendment to tho 
Arti(llea of !rnooz:porat.i.on of AlA Insuranoe; Ina" pursuAnt:: to ...,1\lch 
Artiole Ona of thQ ¢riq1n~1 Artioles of Xncorpo~ation of AlA Inaurano$, 
1:no. (La f.i.lf,ld on J$nUiu;y 31, 1977 I tu'l.d as amendod Jul.y 16 t 1990, aha.ll.' 
;("ead as .follow1u 
Tho nrune of tha oOq?Qratiol'l ahall b.e FARHERS FIE1ILTll MLJ:.f\NOm 
.!\DHlmS~lU\TORS I INO. 
!!!KIRD. The number of ohares of the oor,pora.tion outotanQ:ing Q.t tha 
time 91: .su(:n adopti.on was 6,279 an4 tn.", num:b(l~ (;It oharas an-cit:.led to vote 
thereon, was 6,219. 
FO~t The dao.i.gnation and numbe~ of outstanding OhargD (;If Q~cn 
olass entitled to votq tnQ~oon as a class were AB followsr 
cla!!!P t, NlJrnba:r of $baraa 
FInal The numbttr of shares voted for suoh amendment: WAS 6,2791 and 
the number of shares ~ed AqALnat euch ame~dmant was %oro. 
. "1Plf. D~ED this ~ day of Ootober, 1994. 
AIA 
IMlO SEcRETARY OF stAle 
J9!*uol 0900 m3 B 
CK h U9700 cusr. 137t8 
CORP 
1 Iii 30.00- 30 .. 00 
c 
'p ~ 
4/44 
.. (' . :-- --;_ .......... -
AFFIDAVIT OF GARY D. BABBITT AlA001096 
I 
" 
~ 
~i 
1-
f 
-. 
J 
~ { 
" 
SEP-2J-2007 11:21 From:CLEMENT~ & MCN 208 746 9295 Tn:~awle~ Troxell 
.. 
B'L'A'.t'll: 011' IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
county ot Nez Perce l 
~ Ii SHERR! ROBERTS, a Notarf ~ublLa, do he~eby ce~tify thAt: on this ,Jf'~ day ot OQtober, 1994, pe~sonall:y ~peared bafore me 'Paul. 1)." .•• ~~-1if1nt:1 ~ b~ing by me fi~st dl,lly awo.ro, d.e¢lared·'that he ia t!.he Vi~.~~etl~tll:1t:i~·* 
ot A:tA !nsuranae, 1%'IQ., tha.t!. he lJ1.gned t:hc!s fc;1ret;1oing docwnau,t:.- A¥ Vioill·. 
President of the corpoJ;'",tion, and that th Q tdlmQ!:1t9 00 to-in - '-t.h$~o.tn '~ 
are true;.. -' . 
• + 
", ... 
• ~#, • 
~ .. 
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crll(itNAL o~ a 
-,"\0 ~ 
.--11. ~ 
o(./l ~ ~~ ~ C)~ ~ 
t'" 
pursuan~ to the provisions of sections 30-1-59 and 30-1-
61 of ths Idaho Business Co:t'poration Act'l the.: wiaersigned 
o'orporation adopts the toll.owing Articles of Amenc:'bnent to ita 
Articles o~,Ineo~oration • 
. J'IRSi'1 The name of the oQrporation is ]i'AlU(~S HEAL'rlt 
lUaLULHCE ADHl:JiJ:B~!fOllS, INC. 
SECOND: Effsotiv~ May 15 1 1995 I the sola shareholder ot 
the oorporation adopt~d and approvad the following aman4men~ 
to the Art~cle~ pi Inoorpo~ation or Farmers Health Alliance 
Administrators t Inc. I pursuant 'to whieh Article One of the 
original Articles of Incorporation of Farmers Health Alliance 
M:m.1nistr-ators t Inq. as filed on J.anuary :J 1 t 197'7, and as 
amended ~uly 16; 1990 t and »ovember I, 1994, shall read as 
, 
fo~lows: 
ARTICLE PNE 
IDUn.@ 
The nalne of the oorporation s1:).all, be .~~ '.~d!!" ~,fa~~ f 
The number of shares ot the corporation 
outstanding at tha time of such adoption was 6,279 and the 
number of shares entitled to vote ~h~eon was 6,279. 
, , 
FOURTH' Th~ ds.siqnation and pUlllber of outsta.nding shares 
of eacb olass entit.led to vote theJ:'6on as a class war'a as 
follows: 
Class: 
Common 
'" ir. 
IDlll'llle:r: of Shams 
6,279 
IIlIHl SEC!l£TARY IF SlATE 
19!i5060S 09:XJ 94877 e 
GK tl S!22. IlJSTI 00168 
CORP 
1@ 30.00g 30.00 
c 
, .. 
L/lr; ( 
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J?i:J''mil The nU~Qr of shares voted for such amendment was 
6/~i9; and the number of shares voted against such ~anament 
was ZerQ. 
DATED this ~d.ay ot May, 1995. 
By: 
STATE Ci~ I01UlO ) 
. 
w 
County of Ne3 Perce ) 
sC!!ereta:ey 
ss • 
'.Fha und~r .... "¢d, i:t Notary PublicI does hereby certify 
that on this day of May I 1995, personally appeared ~efore 
:me R. John 'ray or, wlio, ceing .by lIIe tirfil.t duly sworn, deolared 
th~t he is' the 1?residant of FARM:ItllS HEALnI ALLIANCE 
APMINISTRATORS, INC .. I. that he si91l~d the foregoing document as 
Pr4aident of ·the corporation, and that the statements 
,e~ntaln!ilc.'l. tharein are true. . k 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
' ..... -
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LAW OFFICES OF 
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC 
JERRY V. SMITH t 
NED A. CANNON 
RODERICK C. BOND" 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
SOB EiGHTH STREET 
LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501 
Telephone 
(208) 743-9428 
, ',', 
~ 
t Retired (72-31-05) 
* Adinitted in Wcishington.orily 
F;;csimi/e 
(208) 746-8421 
July 11,2008 
Michael McNichols 
tnmcnichols@clbrmc.coITl' 
Jon Hally 
jhally@clarka.ndfeerrey.com . 
Gary BabBitt 
gdg@liteh.cofu 
James Gatziolis 
ij g@qu'arles.com 
Re: Reed Taylor v. AIA SerVices Corporation, et at. 
Case No. CV 07-00208 
SC&B File No. 1048-004 
Dear Counsel: 
I regret fbrthe dehq in responding to the global settlement proposed by James Gaiziolis, but we 
have been awaiting information, some of which has been provided (which I appreciate) ahd the 
significant portion of wliicli has not been provided (financial information relative to Jolin 
Taylor). SpecificaI1y~ ai:J.d in particular, Reed Taylor requires the financial statements and tax 
returns, which have not been provided. 
We appreciate tlieiliost recent settlement offer made by you. However, Reed Taylor rejects your 
settlement offer. In addition, Reed Taylor is not willing to make a counter offer at this time 
without tecei'vmg full disclos-iIfe. 
Everyone mvolved in this caseunqeJ;$t!lQ,ds, tl1llt AIl\. Servic~s' assyt§ (including AIA Insurqrtce) 
are insufficient to satisfy the $8,,5 Million owed to Reed Taylor, This fact makes Jolin Taylor's 
financlal informf1,tiqp particularly import1U1t for me to advise Re~d on resolvingtliis case. It is nO 
secret thaI Reed Taylor will be seekib:g the balance Mille funds owed and/or other damages 
against the individual defendants, wliich sucli damages are supported by the facts in this case. 
In recent days I have spoken witli several of you regarding the Defendants' settletnent offer, I 
have also discussed specific facts. I wanted to confirm some of the discussion areas in writing at 
this time. . 
4153 
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First, I have seen no evidence that John Taylor, Jim Beck or Mike Cashman have put any money 
into Crop USA, other than John's credits/debits to his salary accrual account at AIA to allegedly 
purchase his shares in Crop USA for a minimal amount. Jim Beck and Mike Cashman 
converted their worlhless Preferred C Shares in AIA Services into common shares oferop USA. 
They also received common shares in AIA Services when they were not entitled to such shares. 
Second, there is absolutely no evidence to indicate that Crop USA was formed, operated and 
funded as a truly separate and distinct corporation. In fact, the documents all demonstrate that 
ALA provided Crop USA with millions of dollars offunds, assets, labor, expenses and other costs 
for which ALA was never compensated. 
Third; probably the most dirty transaction in this case is the $15 Million transfer to Crop USA ill 
eX9hangefor the worthless: Preferred. 0 Shares. In addition, this transfer acted asa double fraud 
becatiseappr6xiIilafely $700,000 of the $1.5 Million was used to repay llioney Crop USA owed 
to' AlA Insurance. Thus, the total value of the inappropriate transaction was $2.2 Million. Under 
the fraudulent conveyance and related claims, the $1.5 Million would be returned to AlA 
Insurance and Crop USA would owe AIA Insurance over $700,000. 
Fourth, the evidence shows that many expenses were never allocated to Crop USA. Some 
allocated expenses were never paid, i.e., approximately $500,000, while other expenses were 
under..:allocated in a yet to be estimated amount. 
Fifth, I will gratuitously say that if I was representing the individual defendants, I would be 
advising them that there was a high probability that they will be tagged with a judgment of a 
significant amount (millions of dollars). I hope that you all are advising your clients of the risks 
of this litigation as I believe that such a fact is essential for resolving this case. 
Sixth, had Reed Taylor put AIA Services in default in 2001, he would have oWiled Crop USA, 
the $1.5 Million would not have been transferred; John would own no shares in AIA or Crop 
USA, arid Jim Beck and Mike Cashman would own no shares in Crop USA or AIA Services. 
This is important to think about from the perspective of the defendants. 
Seventh, and most significant, I invite anyone of you to provide me with credible documentary 
or other evidence to challenge the above assertioIls. That being said, I do not believe that you 
will be able provide any evidence, because no such evidence exists. 
Finally, as I have advised you, if this case is not resolved in a timely manner (days not weeks), 
then other lawsuits will be filed agairist numerOus other defendants. I do not believe that this 
will be productive for any future resolution, but Reed Taylor makes the decisions. Reed Taylor 
fully understands the risks to continue litigating and is fully committed to see this case and the 
others to conclusion regardless of the number of years of tiine required to do so. I hope that all 
of your clients have been advised of the risks and are also willing to accept them. 
AFFIDAVIT OF GARY D. BABBITT 
Defense Counsel 
July 11, 2008 
Page 3 
The above being said, I believe-that this case could be resolved under the following general 
parameters (most of which I have discussed with you all); 
1. Full disclosure by John Taylor of his. fmancial statements and tax returns (including all 
information provided to Lancelot or other lenders). 
2. Jobi1 Taylor and Connie Taylor transfer at least one-half of their shares in Crop USA to 
Reed Taylor (including all option shares). 
3. Jim Beck and Mike Cashman (and the other fanner Preferred C shareholders) transfer 
an amount of their shares to Reed Tayloi' (but less than one-half). This could be in the 
form of new shares issued to Reed Taylor orfriore of John Taylor and Connie Taylor's 
shares transferred to Reed Taylor. 
4, Full disclosure is made on Crop USA and AlA Ser"vices (and AlA Insurance) in terms 
of their assets, debts, borrowing ability, and businesses. 
5. The Lewis/Clark Plaza Mortgage is transferred to Reed Taylor free of all 
encumbrances . 
. 6. John Taylor arid Connie Taylor'S parking lot that was purchased with AIA funds is 
transferred to Reed Taylor. 
7. The Dahman Hoilse Condo is transferred to Reed Taylor. 
8,. Reed Taylor is provided with either a lUIllp sum payment, or if such funds are not 
available or cannot be reasonably borrowed, then periodic payments of some sort 
(maybe a combination of monthly and/or upon reaching certain targets). The amoUnt 
and when such payments would be made would be predicated on the fmancial 
condition of the individuals and companies as fully disclosed (one more reason for full 
disclOsure). These payments would all be settlement payments only and not linked to 
any consultation services; etc. The payments could be based upon percentages of 
cottiniissions and/or back-end profits from underwriting. 
9;.; Donna Taylor is paid in full. Donna Taylor is also paid an additional sum or issued a 
limited number of'shares in Crop USA to fully and fairly compensate her for the delay 
in payment and related hardship. Finally, her her attorneys' fees are paid in full. 
Donna Taylor could be paid with John Taylor and Connie Taylor's Avista shares if 
limited funds are available. Of course, Donna Taylor's approval would be required. 
10. Reed's attorneys' fees and costs are paid in full. 
11. The settlement funds expected to be receive,d will go towards the payments to Reed 
Taylor or Donna Taylor, depending how the other terms are structured. 
AFFIDAVIT OF GARY D. BABBITT 
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12. AIA Insurance would remain a subsidiary of AlA Services and would be merged with 
Crop USA as described below. R~ed Taylor's $8.5 Million debt would be 
extingUished. 
13. AIA ServiCes and Crop USA merge. In the merger, Reed Taylor wants the innocent 
shareholders of AIA Services to also haYe an ownership interest. Thus, the 
dismtetested nlinority shareholders (the innocent shareholders) of AIA Services would 
convert each comh1on share into 1 0 (or so) common shares of the merged company. 
John Taylor, Jim Beck, Mike Cashman and the other old Preferred C Shareholders 
holding Crop USA stock would get no new shares in the merger and their common 
shares in AlA Services would be canceled. 
14, Protections are put into place to ensure the corporation is operated properly (whether 
agreements, amended articles of incorporation or other mechanism). This would be the 
best for eYeryone involved and woUld include required approvals for employee salaries, 
compensation, stock options, etc. There would be no more salary accrual accounts, no 
more IQaning money to related parties, and no mote inappropriate transactions without 
shareholder approval. 
15. Appropriate creditor and disinterested shareholder approval must be obtained. With 
the limited dilution from the above terms, I would suspect that the newer shareholders 
of Crop USA would gladly approve the deal, particularly since AlA Insurance would 
be part of the merger. Since they would also be treated fairly, I suspect that the 
innocent shareholders of AIA Services would also be obtained. 
16. AIA Services' 401(k) Plan must resolved in fulL We could discuss possible options 
here (such as converting to common stock and/or cash, etc.), subject to any necessary 
approvals or opt outs. 
17. I believe that Reed may be even receptive to agreeing to vote his shares in favor of 
certain designated people to be elected ari?Jor maintained on the board. 
18. Finally, I understand that many of the individual defendants may fear being sued by . 
Reed Taylor in the future. Reed Taylor'S claims involve fraudulent transactions, not 
business judgment rule transactions. If the company is operated properly, Reed Taylor 
wouldtiot have the significant claims as he does today. 
In closing, the Defendants' present offer would be a fair offer if there had been no corporate 
m.alfeasance and the significant events described above (and others) had not occurred. However, 
that is not the case as Reed Taylor has significant c1ainlS against named individual defendants 
and others. If Crop USA is truly in as dire financial condition as it appears to me and you 
represent, then transferring all of the shares in Crop USA owned by John Taylor, Mike Cashman 
and James Beck should be no problem and I believe Reed Taylor would accept the other terms of 
your settlement offer. 
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Oil the other hand, the failure to disclose the fmances' of John Taylor and the refusal to transfer 
significant shares in Crop USA to Reed Taylor for settlement can only be viewed as another 
attempt for; the individual defendants to unfairly profit from this litigation and avoid fairly 
compe:b.Sating Reed Taylor for his significant claims. 
In sum, the time is right for all counsel to advise their respective clients of the risks of this 
litigatioI,l. I can say that if I was representing the defendants in this action, I would believe that 
settlement makes sense, particularly when the individual defendants should truly not own any 
shares in either corporation and in light of the, significant claims against them. I believe the 
above items provide legitimate and fair settlement parameters for all parties involved and permit 
the individual defendants to retain significant ownership interest for which they are not entitled. 
I tnISt that each of you will forward a copy of this letter to your respective clients. In addition, I 
ttu~t that corporate counsel will provide copies of this letter to all of the shareholders of Crop 
USA and AlA Services, as the parties presently directing this litigation on behalf of both 
corporatlGns are interested directors and parties. Pertinent legal authority indicates that 
disinterested drrectors shoUld be directing the litigation. 
I am open to any ideas or suggestions that could be conveyed to Reed Taylor as a proposal to 
fairly resolve this case to his satisfaction. r also look forward to a response from any of you 
regarding my challenge to" produce any credible evidenc.e to support your defenses, as such 
evidence (if it exists) would be useful to present to Reed Taylor to discuss settlement options. 
I truly hope that you are all able to step back and revaluate this case based upon its true merits, 
which pertains exclusively to the defrauding of a creditor owed over $8.5 Million. Thank you 
for your time. 
Sincerely, 
cc: Reed Taylor via email 
David A. Gittins via email 
ONDPLLC 
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Michelle Neufeld 
From: Roderick C. Bond [rod@scblegal.com] 
Sent: Thursday, July 17,20084:38 PM 
To: Gary Babbitt; mbissell@cbklawyers.com; charper@quarles.com; Jack R. Little 
Cc: Michael McNichols; Jon; DavidA. Gittins; Gatziolis, James J.; John Ashby; rjt@lewistondsl.com 
Subject: RE: Deposition Availability Dates for Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor 
Hi Gary: 
I appreciate your desire to depose Reed and Donna. I too have depositions to schedule that have been delayed 
because of the tragedy at the Taylor family and in hopes that the parties will settle. However, it appears that this 
case will not be resolved. 
Mike Bissell's firm will be filing suit against you, John Ashby, Dick Riley and Hawley Troxell in the coming days for 
aiding and abetting and violations of various rules of professional conduct, among other claims. Reed intends to 
also forward copies of the Complaint to the bar association. In light of these pending events, please advise me if 
your firm intends to remain as counsel on this case. Sorry to be so direct, but it does not make sense for me to 
set up depositions when you will probably not be involved much longer. 
The above being said, we will oppose any continuance as I have repeatedly advised all of the attorneys in this 
case of the aiding and abetting and ongoing violations of rules of ethics. The problems have been recently further 
compounded by your actions in directing Jon Hally to file a motion that has no merit, inappropriately pledging 
assets to Crop USA, and refusal to peacefully hand over AlA Insurance to Reed, among the various other acts. I 
recall sending you a clear and concise letter when you first appeared in this case, which you ignored. I can't 
recall the number of phone calls and emails, but they are countless. That being said, I really don't savor the idea 
of being one of the star witnesses against your firm, but you can't say that I didn't warn you. 
Thanks. 
Rod 
From: Gary Babbitt [mailto:GDB@hteh.com] 
Sent: Thursday, July 17, 2008 2:43 PM 
To: Roderick C. Bond; mbisseIJ@cbklawyers.com 
Cc: Michael McNichols; Jon; David A. Gittins; Gatziolis, James J.; John Ashby; John Taylor 
Subject: Deposition Availability Dates for Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor 
Dear Rod, 
I would appreciate a list of available dates for Reed Taylor's deposition. I would need three (3) days initially to 
cover preliminary material. Also, I would like to notice up Donna's Deposition for July 31 at the same time that 
Mike has scheduled her deposition, as I have some questions. 
Thankyou, gary 
41$1 
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Michelle Neufeld 
From: Roderick C. Bond [rod@scblegal.com] 
Sent: Monday, July 21,20086:18 PM 
To: Gary Babbitt; John Ashby; charper@quarles.com; Gatziolis, James J.; rjt@lewistondsl.com 
Cc: David A. Gittins; Jon; Michael McNichols; mbissell@cbklawyers.com; Jack R. Little 
Subject: Taylor v. AlA Services, et al. 
Hi Gary: 
Thank you for your letter today. I presume that Mr. Bissell's letter today provides ample evidence and specificity as 
requested in your letter today. I also presume that your letter was drafted and sent without knowledge of Mr. 
Bissell's letter dated today's date. If you still need additional information, you will be able to obtain it through 
discovery, however, that would be handled through Mr. Bissell's office. 
Earlier on in this lawsuit, we moved to disqualify attorneys because of conflicts. Mike McNichols recognized this 
conflict and withdrew, although at the previous hearing Judge Brudie indicated that a Motion was not appropriate 
and that the Bar Association was the proper forum. I previously contacted the bar association providing a fact 
pattern only without names. I was advised the conflicts were real and deputy bar counsel advised me that the 
matter was subject to the Court for determination of disqualification. Thus, the Bar Association stated that it would 
handle any complaints and would leave the issue of disqualification in the hands of the Court. 
Based upon the above, your firm can either withdraw or Reed will file a new motion to disqualify. In the motion, I will 
advise Judge Brudie of my conversation with deputy bar counsel and that the Bar Association's position is that the 
Judge is the proper party to take action. I will also advise Judge Brudie of your lack of candor to the court. In 
addition, Reed will also be submitting a detailed complaint to the Bar Association on all of the conflicts and RPC 
violations of this case and others will be filed when Reed takes control of AlA Insurance. The defense (including 
you) has constantly accused me of making threats. Alii have ever done is advised everyone of aI/ applicable 
conflicts, try to resolve this case and try to prevent what is now transpiring. I know good and well that if the roles 
were reversed in this case, you all would have turned me into the Bar Association yourself. I warned you and 
warned you, and all you did was ignore me. Your firm has also continued aiding and abetting the defendants and 
taking and/or failing to take appropriate action. Mike Bissell's letter today clearly tells the story. This is all a shame 
and you should be ashamed of yourself. I reiterate again what I stated before, maybe it is time for you to speak with 
Merlyn Clark and get his opinion? Just a thought. 
If you are still adamant about deposing Reed and staying on the case in light of the pending legal action against you 
and your firm and the clear detailed facts provided by Mr. Bissell today, I will make Reed available for his deposition 
only by court order after we have made a new motion to disqualify. In the interim, I will block out my calendar for the 
requested days to depose Reed and Donna pending instructions from the Court. 
I am happy to bring the motion to disqualify, however, I presumed that such motion would only make something very 
embarrassing for your and your firm even more embarrassing for you and your firm. Please advise me how you 
would like me to proceed. If I do not hear from you, I will file a motion to disqualify. Thank you. 
Rod 
By: Roderick C. Bond 
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC 
508 Eighth St. 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Tel: (208) 743-9428 
Fax: (208) 746-8421 
rod@scblegal.com 
This email and any attachments may contain confidential and/or legally privileged information, which only the 
authorized recipient may receive and/or view. If you are not an intended recipient, please promptly dele_tile.tiihiiiiS __ IIII!iII~m!~~ 
message and contact the sender at the above address. Thank you. .. 
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John Ashby 
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From: 
Sent: 
To: 
Cc: 
Subject: 
Roderick C. Bond [rod@scblegal.com] 
Sunday, July 27, 2008 5:52 PM 
Gary Babbitt; John Ashby; Gatziolis, James J.; charper@quarles.com; rjt@lewistondsl.com 
jhally@clarkandfeeney.com; david@gittinslaw.com; mmcnichols@c/brmc.com; Jack R. Little; 
Mike Bissell 
FW: Taylor v. AlA, et al. 
Attachments: 5-11-07 Letter to Gary Babbitt.pdf 
Hi Gary: 
I really don't appreciate you and Ashby arguing to the Court that the conflicts are litigation tactics by Reed. You of 
all people should know how often I complained about your ethical violations over and over again. I am forwarding 
you my email and attached letter of May 11,2007, yes, over 1 year and 2 months ago. You might want to review 
this letter again. And this was before you started representing Crop USA-the company you should be suing. 
You don't represent John Taylor, James Beck or Michael Cashman, you represent the corporations, assuming 
that Crop USA shouldn't be getting sued by AlA. I am also reminded of the tolling agreement referenced in the 
board minutes, which simply confirms that you were aware of the ethical violations. I am really kind of getting 
tired of your lack of candor to the Court. Your oral argument last week and your firms' newest brief are yet 
additional examples. Even assuming all of your worthless arguments actually had merit, you owe your duties to 
Donna and Reed long before John Taylor. Does greed blind you that much? 
Rod 
From: Roderick C. Bond 
Sent: Friday, May 11, 2007 2:29 PM 
To: 'gdb@hteh.com' 
Cc: 'Paul Cressman Jr: 
Subject: Taylor v. AIA, et al. 
Gary: 
Attached is my letter dated today, which was also faxed to you today. 
Rod 
By: Roderick C. Bond 
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC 
508 Eighth St. 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Tel: (208) 743-9428 
Fax: (208) 746-8421 
rod@scblegal.com 
This email and any attachments may contain confidential and/or legally privileged information, which only the 
authorized recipient may receive and/or view. If you are not an intended recipient, please promptly delete this 
message and contact the sender at the above address. Thank you. 
Lflf«) 
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JERRY V. SMITH t 
NED A. CANNON 
RODERICK C. BOND * 
T Retired n2·3T-OS} 
'* Admitted in Washington only 
May 1 1,2007 
LAW OFFICES OF 
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC 
ATTOHNEYS AT LAW 
SOB EIGHTH STREET 
LEWISTON, IDAHO B3501 
Telephone 
(208) 743-9428 
Facsimile 
(208) 746-8421 
VIA FACSIMILE (208) 342-3829 
Gary D. Babbitt 
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, ID 83701-1617 
Re: Reed Taylor v. AlA Services Corporation, et al. 
Case No. CV 07-00208 
SC&B File No. 1048-004 
Dear Gary: 
This letter is in response to your letter dated May 3, 2007, our recent telephone conversations, 
and your email dated May 11, 2007. 
Reed Taylor will not agree to extend any additional time to your clients as requested in your 
letter dated May 3, 2007. While I am unaware of the date that your fIrm was retained as counsel 
for AIA Services and AlA Insurance, there has been ample time for your clients to respond to the 
Motion to Compel Audit and produce the requested documents. Reed Taylor's First Requests 
for Production of Documents was served on your clients on March 23, 2007. Clements, Brown 
& McNichols withdrew on April 13, 2007. Thus, your clients had 21 days to prepare responses 
with prior counsel, an additional 8 days to prepare responses since the date of your Notice of 
Appearance, and over 20 days without counsel. The requested documents could be easily 
assembled by AlA personnel, including John Taylor, who is an active member of the Idaho Bar. 
r note that you did not respond to my email request regarding the date your firm was retained as 
counsel. In any event, your clients have had more than sufficient time to respond. 
Pursuant to Rule 37, this letter serves as our last effort to have you comply with Reed Taylor's 
Requests for Production. As noted above, AlA Services and AlA Insurance have already 
received substantial additional time to respond and an additional 8 days since the date of your 
letter. There is absolutely no reason why the corporations could not have already provided the 
requested documents and further delay can only be viewed as an delay tactic. If the requested 
documents are not made available to us for inspection by 5 p.m. on May 16,2007, Reed Taylor 
will fIle a motion to compel and seek sanctions. 
With respect to additional time for fIling an Amended Answer, please note that Reed Taylor will 
be fIling a Motion to Amend the Complaint within the next week. Thus, your clients will receive 
additional time to answer by way of a Third Amended Complaint. 
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With respect to Reed Taylor's Motion for Reconsideration, Motion for Preliminary Injunction, 
and Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, AlA Insurance and AlA Services were vigorously 
represented by Mr. McNichols and your clients are not entitled to respond further. Reed Taylor 
would vehemently object to any further responses on these motions and we would move to strike 
all such responses. 
The Court indicated that new counsel for AlA Services and AlA Insurance would be permitted to 
file a response to Reed Taylor's Motion to Compel Audit. We believe that you have had 
sufficient time to respond to the Motion to Compel Audit. All parties are also fully aware that 
Reed Taylor requires pertinent documents and information prior to any mediation. Thus, your 
clients' further efforts to delay or prevent an audit can only be viewed as inappropriate litigation 
tactics. 
This letter also confirms that you advised me that AIA Insurance and AlA Services do not have 
claims against John Taylor. I am surprised at your position in this regard as you are exposing 
your firm to claims from shareholders and other parties, including Reed Taylor. As the counsel 
for the corporations, you have a duty to bring claims for the benefit of the corporations, their 
shareholders and their creditors in light of insolvency. Furthermore, it is inappropriate for John 
Taylor to direct litigation on behalf of the corporation in light of the substantial claims already 
alleged against him. I am further surprised that you would not require direction and consent 
from a disinterested board of directors prior to your representation of both corporations because 
of the substantial claims alleged against John Taylor. A careful review of the pleadings, briefs, 
oral testimony and hearing exhibits clearly demonstrates that the corporations have been 
operated for years for the benefit of John Taylor and others to the detriment of Reed Taylor and 
other creditors. 
In addition, all of the outstanding shares of AlA Insurance are pledged to Reed Taylor. If and 
when Reed Taylor is permitted to exercise his rights under the various agreements and/or Idaho 
law, AlA Insurance will be bringing claims against John Taylor, Bryan Freeman, and JoLee 
Duclos. Your firm will also be exposed to possible claims from Reed Taylor at that time. We 
will not permit this issue to go unaddressed. 
You previously advised me that the annual shareholder meeting of AlA Insurance would not take 
place. Reed Taylor demands that you advise him of timely prior written notice of the time and 
place of any shareholder meeting of AlA Insurance with sufficient time to seek emergency relief 
from the Court for approval to vote the shares pledged to him. 
You also indicated that your clients would seek to prevent Reed Taylor from obtaining the 
documents requested in his subpoenas to your clients' auditors based upon accountant/client 
privilege. As I advised you, such privilege is only applicable in situations involving the IRS. 
Your clients' position in this regard leads to but one conclusion: What are your clients hiding? 
In addition, Reed Taylor views such a position as further inappropriate delay tactics. I also 
advised you that the time has expired for any objections to the subpoenas and both auditors failed 
to timely object as required by the Court Ru1es. If necessary, Reed Taylor will move to compel 
the production of all documents from the auditors for inspection and will seek sanctions. 
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Finally, attached is a list of documents provided to me by AlA. The documents were provided to 
me in hard copy and not on a disk. The disk that you referenced is my work product, so a copy 
will not be provided to you or any other party .. 
I look forward to your clients' response to the issues raised in this letter. 
Sincerely, 
S1'VfITH, CANNON BONDPLLC 
12 
By: Roderick 
RC));ar , 
. (~d 
cc: Reed Taylor wi enclos res via email 
David A. Gittins w/enc SUTes 
Jonathan D. Hally w/en~osures 
Michael E. McNichols wfencIosures 
Paul Cressman, Jf. w/enclosures via email 
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AlA Consolidated Financial Statements, September 30, 2006 
AIA Consolidated Financial Statements, December 31, 2005 
AlA Consolidated Financial Statements, December 31, 2004 
AIA Consolidated Financial Statements, December 31, 2003 
AIA Consolidated Financial Statements, Years Ended December 31, 2002 and 2001 
AlA Consolidated Financial Statements, Years Ended December 31, 2001 and 2000 
AIA Consolidated Financial Statements, December 31, 2000 and December 31, 1999 
AlA Consolidated Financial Statements, Years Ended December 31, 1999 and 1998 
AlA Consolidated Financial Statements, Years Ended December 31, 1997 and 1996 
AlA Insurance, Inc. - Financial Statements, November 30,2006 
AlA Financial Statements & Auditor's Report, December 31,2005 and 2004 
AIA Financial Statements, Years Ended December 31; 2004 and 2005 
AlA Financial Statements, Years Ended December 31,2003 and 2002 
AlA Financial Statements, Years Ended December 31, 2002 and 2001 
AlA Financial Statements, Years Ended D.ecember 31, 2001 and 2000 
AIA Financial Statements, Years Ended December 31, 2000 and 1999 
AlA Financial Statements, Years Ended December 31, 1999 and 1998 
AIA Financial Statements, Years Ended December 31, 1998 and 1997 
AlA Financial Statements, Years Ended December 31, 1997 and 1996 
AlA Financial Statements, Years Ended December 31,1996 and 1995 
AIA Financial Statements, Years Ended December 31, 1995 and1994 
Crop USA Insurance Agency, 1ncome Statement Pro Forma, December 31, 2006 
CropUSA Insurance Agency, Financial Statements, November 30, 2006 
CropUSA Insurance Agency, Financial Statements & Auditor's Report, December 31, 2005 
and 2004 
CropUSA Insurance Agency, Financial Statements., Years Ended December 31,2004 and 2003 
CropUSA Insurance Agency, Financial Statements, Years Ended December 31,2003 and 2002 
CropUSA Insurance Agency, Financial Statements, Year Ended December 31,2002 
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AIA Confidential Limited Valuation Report of Series C Preferred Shares, December 31, 2005 
VaIuation RationlInvestment V alue/W ACC 
Grain Growers Membership and Insurance Trust, as of January 1998 
American Soybean Association Membership and Insurance Trust, Current Trust Declaration, as 
of February 1998 
American Independent Associations Participating Trust Agreement and Declaration of Trust, 
Related as amended through November 5, 1998 
National Contract Poultry Growers Association Membership & Insurance Trust, Restated as 
Amended January 17, 1997 
National Growers and Stockmen Group Trust Agreement, dated March 1, 1980 
Administrative Services Agreement Between Trustmark Insurance Company and AIA 
Insurance, Inc., dated December 1, 1997 
Marketing Agreement between Trustmark Insurance Company and AIA Insurance, Inc., dated 
December 1,1997 
AlA - 2005 U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return, Form 1120 & other docs. 
AlA - 2004 AmendedU.S. Corporation Income Tax Return, Form 1120X 
AlA - 2003 U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return for AlA, Form 1120 & other docs. 
CropUSA - Principal Stockholders of Crop USA as of June 1,2004 
AlA - 2002 U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return, Form 1120 & other docs. 
AlA -.2001 U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return, Form 1120 & other docs. 
AlA - 2000 Amended U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return, Form 1120X 
CropUSA - 2005 Corporate Return 
CropUSA - 2004 Federal Tax Return 
CropUSA - 2003 U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return, Form 1120 & other docs. 
CropUSA - 2002 U.S. Corporation Income Tax Retum,Form 1120 & other docs. 
CropUSA - 2001 U.S. Corporation Income TaxRetum, Form 1120 & other docs. 
New Restated Bylaws of AlA Services Corporation, effective April 10, 1989 
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Articles of Amendment to the Articles of Incorporation of AlA Services Corporation, dated 
February 17,1989, & other docs. 
Bylaws of A.LA., Inc., dated January 5,1988 
Articles of Incorporation of ALA., Inc., dated January 28, 1977, & other docs. 
Bylaws of AIA Crop Insurance, Inc., dated January 11,2000 
Articles of Incorporation of AlA Crop Insurance, Inc., dated November 17, 1999 & other 
docs. 
CropUSA Subscription Agreement & other docs - Maplewood, MN 
Crop USA SUbscription Agreement & other docs - Houston, TX 
CropUSAJTaylor/AGM - Closing Documents 2006 
CropUSAlTaylor/AGM~· Loan and SecurityAgreement 
Schedule A to Loan and Security Agreement, dated October 27, 2006 
Exhibit A Request for Advance 
Exhibit B Availability Report 
Exhibit C Assignment and Acceptance Agreement 
Exhibit D Compliance Certificate 
Exhibit E Form of a Promissory Note 
Exhibit F Form of Monthly Policy Report 
Exhibit G Form of Retained or Excess Premium Report 
Exhibit H Form of A&O Subsidy Aging 
Exhibit I Form of Insured Premium Receivables Aging 
Exhibit J Form of FCIC Premium Submissions, Reiections and Resolutions 
Exhibit K Form of Insured Loss Claims 
Exhibit L Form of Non-Renewal Report 
Exhibit M Net Income Covenant 
Promissory Note 
Solvency Certificate, dated October 27, 2006 
Guaranty/John Taylor, effective as of October 27,2006 
Guarantyl AlA, effective as of October 27, 2006 
Consent and Agreement, dated October 27, 2006 
Control Agreement for Deposit Account at U.S. Bank National Association 
Blocked Account Control Agreement 
Certificate of Deposit Control Agreement TaylorlBecklCashrnan, dated October 27, 2006 
Certificate of Deposit Control Agreement TaylorlLamberjack, dated October 27,2006 
Pledge Agreement Taylor/AGM, dated October 27,2006 
Pledge Agreement TaylorlLamberjack, dated October 27, 2006 
Pledge Agreement TaylorlBecklCashman, dated October 27,2006 
UCC Information Request and Authorization Form 
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vec Financing Statement, dated October 31,2006 
vec Financing Statement Amendment, dated October 31,2006 
uec Financing Statement Amendment, dated October 31,2006 
Officer's Certificate Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., dated October 27,2006 
Exhibit A - Articles of Incorporation 
Exhibit B - Bylaws & other docs. 
Exhibit C - Resolutions of Corporation 
Exhibit D - Certificate of Existence and Good Standing of Corporation 
Exhibit E - Fictitious Name Certificates 
Officer's Certificate of AIA Insurance, Inc., dated October 27, 2006 
Exhibit A -Articles of Incorporation 
Exhibit B - Bylaws 
Exhibit C - Resolutions 
Exhibit D - Certificate of Existence and Good Standing 
Exhibit E - Fictitious Name Certificates 
Zions First National Bank, October 26, 2006 
Private Bank Minnesota, October 25, 2006 
Private Bank Minnesota, October 27, 2006 
Letter from Quarles & Brady LLP to LancelotiAGM, dated October 27, 2006 
Letter from Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley to LancelotiAGM, October 27,2006 
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